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REINTERPRETING STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
CARLOS E. GONZALEZ*

What principles should courts apply when they interpret
statutes? While this perennial question has continued to spark

debate, Carlos Gonzdlez argues that, at a fundamental level, the
debate has failed to comprehend the proper relationship between
the judiciaryand the legislature. Mr. Gonzdlez firstgroups several
current theories of interpretationinto textualist, intentionalist,and

dynamic categories, discussing each in turn. He contends that
most of these theories view the courts to some extent as

subordinateagents of the legislature. The authorthen explains that
this "honest agent" approach results from a mistaken historical

concept of the judiciallegislativerelationship. The approachrelies
too heavily upon the popularfaith in legislative supremacy that

was prevalent during and immediately after the American
Revolution. Mr. Gonzdlez demonstrates that by 1787 Americans
had modified their views considerably, coming to see the courts
more as direct agents of the people than as agents of the
legislature This background of the federal Constitution suggests
that scholars andjudges today should view the proper institutional
role of the courts as partners, and not merely agents, of the
legislature.
To do otherwise ignores both the important
transformations in American constitutional theory leading up to
the Founding,and the unique structure of government ratifiedinto
the Constitution. The author concludes by demonstrating the
incompatibility between existing interpretive approaches and the
institutional relationship between the first and third branches of
government embedded in the federal Constitution. In place of
current interpretive approaches, he offers a tentative interpretive
approach that is compatible with that institutionalrelationship.

* The author is an associate with the law firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe in
San Francisco, California. B.A. 1989, University of Michigan; J.D. 1993, Yale University;
M.A. 1994, Stanford University. The author would like to thank Mark Tunick for his
comments on early drafts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no
intelligible,generally accepted, and consistentlyappliedtheory
of statutory interpretation.
Twenty years ago, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's quotation from
the late 1950s served as an epigram for the most important work on
statutory interpretation of the 1970s. This latter work began as
follows: "It would be hard to think of a field of law that needs
clarifying more than that of 'statutory interpretation.' "' Twenty
years later, statutory interpretation remains in great need of
clarification.
For a long period, despite the state of confusion in the field,
judges and scholars considered statutory interpretation a poor relation
in the family of legal scholarship.' Beginning in the early eighties,

1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1201 (tentative
ed. 1958).
2. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 1

(1975).
3. The general contemporary American view of statutory interpretation is that there
is "not a great deal to say about the subject." Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicial
Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983); see also
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUcTION 88 (1991) ("[S]tatutory interpretation has never received scholarly ...
attention equal to its practical importance. Instead, legal scholars typically have focused
on constitutional law or nonstatutory areas like tort law."); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarshipand Pedagogy in the Post-LegalProcess Era,48
U. PrrT. L. REv. 691, 691 (1987) ("A growing body of opinion bemoans legislation's
");Richard A. Posner, Statutory
'second class' status as an academic discipline ....
Interpretation-inthe Classroomand in the Courtroom,50 U. CHI.L. REV. 800,800 (1983)
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however, an explosion of scholarly writings, and a handful of opinions
by Justice Antonin Scalia 4 and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook,5
transformed the once sleepy debate.6 For well over a decade now,
the legal community has busied itself arguing over statutory
interpretation theory, from its nitty-gritty doctrinal rules to its airy
meta-foundations. Yet despite the renewed debate (and perhaps
because of it), statutory interpretation remains as complex, convoluted, and in need of clarification today as when Professors Hart
and Sacks wrote in the fifties, if not more so. As the recent Supreme
Court case of Smith v. United States7 illustrates, American courts still
have no "generally accepted and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation." 8
In Smith, an unwitting subject of a police sting operation offered
to trade a gun for two ounces of cocaine.' Federal statutory law
requires a mandatory prison sentence enhancement of up to thirty
years for anyone who "uses" a firearm "during and in relation to...

("It has been almost fifty years since James Landis complained that academic lawyers did
not study legislation in a scientific... spirit, and the situation is unchanged."); Robert F.
Williams, Statutory Law in Legal Education: Still Second Class After All These Years, 35
MERCER L. REV. 803,804 (1984) (noting the "lag of legal education behind the dramatic
increase in the importance of statutes in the American legal system").
4. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
5. See, e.g., Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 814
F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987).
6. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 3, at 88-89 (stating that public choice theory has
"helped revitalize scholarship about statutory interpretation"); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281,281 (1989) (stating that "there
has been something of a renaissance of scholarship about statutory interpretation");
Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 244-45 (1992); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and
Technique, Not Canonsand Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction,
62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 4 (1993).
Professor Eskridge argues that the "traditional," or Hart and Sacks, legal process
approach "has been well received by judges," but that "[t]he traditional approach is in
trouble" due to challenges from a number of judges and scholars. William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640-41 (1990). Briefly, the federal
decisional law doctrine on statutory interpretation holds that the will of the legislature is
supreme, and the words are a very strong indicator of the enacting legislature's will, but
that courts nonetheless may abandon this standard in order to avoid extreme results that
could not have been the will of the enacting legislature. New conceptions of legislative
process are challenging the very core of this approach.
7. 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
8. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1201.
9. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 2052.
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[a] drug trafficking crime."'" The straightforward issue of statutory
interpretation before the Supreme Court was whether trading a gun
for narcotics constitutes a "use" of a firearm under the statute."
Applying a literalist brand of textualism, 2 Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, writing for the majority, interpreted the statute to
encompass cases in which the defendant uses a gun as an item of
barter, and thus upheld the mandatory prison sentence enhancement. 3 In dissent, Justice Scalia applied a conventionalist form of
textualism, 4 arguing that the word "use" in the statute encompasses
only those instances where a defendant puts a gun to its normal use
to threaten, harm, or kill another and not those cases in which a gun
is used as a medium of barter or exchange.' 5 Justice O'Connor
rejoined that if Congress intended such a meaning, it could have
included language qualifying the word "use" in the statutory text; the
Court's role, she stated, does not 6 include "introduc[ing] that additional requirement on [its] own.'
Smith is not a tricky case. The statute involved is not complex.
It contains no technical terminology. Its language does not require
elaboration by the administrative machinery's rule-making process.
Its subject matter-sentencing-could not be a more familiar one for

10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). The relevant statutory text reads:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime ...for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses
or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime
of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years,
and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or
semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm
is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer
or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years.
Id.
11. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 2054.
12. Indeed, Justice O'Connor put much weight on Webster's and Black's dictionary
definitions of the word "use." Id at 2054, 2055.
13. Id. at 2060.
14. Justice Scalia showed his conventionalist stripes when he scolded the majority by
stating "[tihe Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can be
dissenting). Justice Scalia has
used and how it ordinarilyis used." Id. at 2061 (Scalia, J.,
elsewhere derided literal textualism. In KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988),
a case involving a trade statute, Scalia offered the following illustration:
Words... acquire meaning not in isolation but with their context. While looking
up the separate word "foreign" in a dictionary might produce the reading the
majority suggests, that approach would also interpret the phrase "I have a foreign
object in my eye" as referring, perhaps, to something from Italy.
Id. at 319 (Scalia, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
dissenting).
15. Smith, 113 S.Ct. at 2060-63 (Scalia, J.,
16. Id. at 2054.
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the federal courts. Only one statutory word was in question. Still,
the Justices of the Supreme Court could not agree on the statute's
meaning. The troubling fact, however, is that the Supreme Court
could not agree on how to arrive at the statute's meaning, because the
justices were unable to reach consensus on the properinstitutionalrole
of the Court when interpreting statutes. Justice O'Connor's literalism
suggests that she believes the institutional role of the Court is simply
to apply in a mechanical fashion the verbatim command of Congress;
a literalist textualism is well suited to this task. Justice Scalia's
conventionalism implies that he thinks the institutional role of the
Court encompasses discovering the intent of the entire enacting
Congress; limiting statutory words to their conventional meanings at
the time of enactment is an effective means toward that end. Smith
should be a cause for concern, for it illustrates that disagreements
over how to interpret statutes (and therefore over the meanings of
statutes) are often rooted in intractable but often ignored differences
over the proper institutional role of the federal courts and their
structural relationship with the more overtly political branches of
government.
As with Smith, much of the scholarly debate over statutory
interpretation glosses over foundational issues centering on the proper
institutional role of the federal courts and the structural relationship
between the first and third branches. Scholarship and opinions
instead focus on the more practical issue of which rules of statutory
interpretation ought to govern the federal courts or the case at hand.
Rules of statutory interpretation, however, must be rooted in a solid
theoretical foundation. Before deciding how the federal courts ought
to interpret statutes, one must first discover the normatively proper
institutional role of the federal courts and how the relationship
between the federal courts and Congress ought to be structured. This
Article, therefore, takes a "bottom up" approach by critically
examining and evaluating both the institutional premises underlying
different approaches to statutory interpretation and the institutional
role of the federal courts. The aim is to test the premises underlying
different approaches to statutory interpretation against the normatively proper institutional role of the federal courts. By the end of
the Article, a crucial institutional assumption that statutory
interpretation theorists have long taken as a given will be called into
serious question, as will the interpretive rules built upon that
assumption.
First, however, the Article provides a primer on statutory
interpretation theory. Part II surveys the statutory interpretation
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literature and organizes disparate interpretive approaches into three
main families-textual, intentional, and dynamic.17 The aim of the
section is not to provide encyclopedic coverage of theoretical writings
in the field, but rather to identify the main themes of the debate.
Imposing an organized structure onto the complex theoretical
conversation provides a framework for understanding the leading
positions and issues. Of particular importance, Part II highlights a
key distinction between textual and intentional interpretive approaches as compared with dynamic interpretive approaches. The
former theories presuppose the normative principle that the federal
courts ought to act as subordinate "honest agents" of Congress when
interpreting statutes." On this view, the institutional role of the
federal courts is simply to carry out Congress's command or will.
Disagreements between textualists and intentionalists, or even
disagreements among textualists and among intentionalists, are at
bottom technical disputes about which set of interpretive rules operate
to render the federal courts optimal honest agents of Congress. 9 In
contrast to both textualist and intentionalist theories, dynamic
interpretive theories are founded on the normative principle that the
first and third branches ought to act as collaborators in a dialogic
statutory law-creating process.' Under this view, the institutional
role of the federal courts is to shape and refine the statutory law
enacted by Congress, keeping in mind factors such as the intent of the
enacting Congress, the policy preferences of the current Congress, the
statutory interpretations agencies have adopted, the interpretations
the Chief Executive has adopted, past interpretations of courts,
evolving social values, current majoritarian sentiments, or the court's
notions of justice and equity. This crucial underlying distinction
between textual and intentional interpretation theories on the one
hand, and dynamic interpretation theories on the other, will be
revisited throughout the Article.
While Part II serves as a primer on the theory of statutory
interpretation, Part III analyzes the honest agent conception underlying textual and intentional statutory interpretation, and to a lesser
extent the dialogic model underlying dynamic statutory interpretation,
from the perspective of two foundational constitutional prin-

17. See infra parts II.A-C.
18. See infra part II.D.
19. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.

20. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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ciples-popular sovereignty and separation of powers.21 Popular
sovereignty involves a principal-agent relationship between a
sovereign people and their constituted government, under which an
agent/government's power and authority are derived from a
constitutive act of a principal/people.'
Part III argues that the
honest agent conception-the normative institutional assumption
underlying textual and intentional approaches to statutory
interpretation-is incompatible with the unique version of popular
sovereignty theory ratified into the federal Constitution of 1789.'
In 1776, at the height of the Revolution, Americans embraced a
radically democratic form of popular sovereignty theory. Under this
version of the theory, which Americans ratified into the early state
constitutions of 1776 and 1777, populist legislatures were considered
the sole legitimate agents of the people in government.24 By the
time of the Founding of the Constitution just eleven years later,
however, Americans rejected the Revolutionary-era version of
popular sovereignty, and instead embraced what can be called a
federalist version of popular sovereignty theory.
Rather than
viewing legislatures as the sole agents of the people, by 1787
Americans came to see all three branches of government as coequal
or peer agents of the principal/people.26 This transformed version
of popular sovereignty theory animates and was ratified into the
federal Constitution. 7 Part III explains the centrality of popular
sovereignty to American constitutionalism, the evolution in popular
sovereignty theory that occurred between 1776 and 1787, and, most
importantly, the fundamental inconsistency between the honest agent
conception underlying textual and intentional theories of statutory
interpretation and the federalist form of popular sovereignty theory
animating the Constitution of 1789. In short, rather than cohering
to
federalist popular sovereignty theory, the honest agent conception
coheres to the radically democratic Revolutionary-era popular
sovereignty theory, which had been rejected by the time of the
Founding.
The Article next considers separation of powers, a central
institutional device for effectuating the federal Constitution's version
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra part III.
See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
See infra part III.A.3.
See infra notes 235-37, 325-36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 239-54.

26. See infra notes 258-81 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 207-34 and accompanying text.
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of popular sovereignty.' s Though most commentators deploy
separation of powers as an argument in favor of textualist or
intentionalist interpretive theories, Part III demonstrates that the
version of separation of powers theory ratified into the federal
Constitution is inconsistent with the honest agent conception underlying those interpretive approaches.29 As with' popular sovereignty
theory, separation of powers theory underwent radical transformations
in the period between the Revolution and the Founding. 0 At the
time of the Revolution, Americans adopted a virtually "unalloyed"
separation of powers, which incorporated legislative supremacy and
a rejection of checks and balances.3
The Revolutionary-era
separation of powers theory, in other words, sought to divide
government powers, and to locate the bulk of those powers in
unchecked populist legislative bodies. By the late 1780s, however,
when state constituent assemblies gathered to ratify the federal
Constitution, the unalloyed separation of powers theory of the
Revolution had been discarded." In its place, Americans adopted
a separation of powers theory emphasizing overlapping powers, an
even distribution of powers between the three branches of
government, a rejection of legislative supremacy, and a strengthened
independent judiciary that could check legislative power at both
constitutional and statutory levels. 33 Part III demonstrates that the
honest agent conception underlying textual and intentional theories
of statutory interpretation is more consistent with the separation of
powers theory espoused at the time of the Revolution, than with the
altogether different separation of powers theory that emerged in the
1780s and was ratified into the federal Constitution.
The incompatibility between the foundational institutional
premise underlying both textual and intentional statutory
interpretation theories-the honest agent conception-and the
peculiar versions of popular sovereignty and separation of powers
theory ratified into the federal Constitution, calls into serious question
the rules of statutory interpretation most commonly employed in the
federal courts and suggests that a fundamental reconsideration of the
basic aims of those rules is in order. Consistency with the popular

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra part
See infra part
See infra part
See infra part
See infra part
See infra part

III.B.
III.B.4.
III.B.2.a-b.
III.B.2.a.
III.B.2.b.
HILB.3.
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sovereignty and separation of powers theories of the federal
Constitution demands that the federal courts act not as subordinate
honest agents of Congress, but rather as agents of We the People.
Thus, rather than simply seeking to reconstruct and then effectuate
the command or will of the enacting legislature, the institutional role
of the federal courts when interpreting statutes should center on the
shaping of statutes along public-regarding lines.
As is made clear in the first section of Part IV, since existing
approaches to statutory interpretation are aimed at either rendering
the federal courts honest agents of Congress, or affording the federal
courts an updating role in statute creation, they often work to
frustrate judicial shaping of statutes along public-regarding lines. A
new approach to statutory interpretation-one consistent with the
popular sovereignty and separation of powers theories of the federal
Constitution-is needed. The second section of Part IV proposes a
two-step interpretive approach, under which a federal court facing an
open-textured or ambiguous statute first employs traditional
interpretive tools to discover the range of plausible statutory
interpretations, and next exercises a channeled discretion to shape or
bend statutes along public-regarding lines. The statute-shaping
powers of federal courts under the two-step interpretive approach are
constrained in two ways. First, courts may shape statutory meaning
only within the limited range of plausible interpretations, the breadth
of which is under congressional control. Second, a set of generally
applicable interpretive rules, presumptions, and canons guide judicial
determinations of what does and does not constitute a publicregarding statutory scheme. The proposed two-step approach
represents only a first tentative step toward a normative theory to
statutory interpretation consistent with the institutional structure of
government embedded in the popular sovereignty and separation of
powers theories of the federal Constitution.
II. NORMATIVE THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Statutory interpretation theories are divisible into three main
families: textual, intentional, and dynamic. Pure textual theories hold
the words and only the words of statutes as legitimate guides to
discerning statutory meaning. Pure intentional theories attempt to
interpret legal texts in accord with the intentions or purposes of the
enacting Congress. Under pure dynamic theories, the meaning of
statutes can change over time and circumstance; statutes are
interpreted with an eye toward shaping statutory law in light of
changing social and contextual conditions. Of course, actual
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interpretive approaches, whether advanced as theories or practiced by
judges, are often hybrids of the three. For example, a hybrid
approach might follow the plain meaning of the text; if the text is
unclear, the purpose or intention of certain relevant actors may be
consulted; finally, if the first two steps yield a determinate
interpretation that would be unjust or anachronistic, the court may
develop
a novel interpretation aimed at doing justice or updating the
4
law.1
Each of the three theoretical families can be associated with
underlying conceptions of what statutes are, or of their role or
function, and also with normative accounts of the proper structural
relationship between courts and legislatures. Both descriptive theories
of statutes and normative ideas regarding the court-legislature
relationship serve as underlying yet often unstated premises in
arguments supporting different normative theories of statutory
interpretation. The pure textualist considers statutes to be commands
from the sole politically legitimate statutory law-creating body. The
role of the judge is simply to apply that command verbatim.
Interpretation that goes beyond statutory text operates in an extralegal domain. Thus, when applying the legislative command, judges
should rely only on a statute's text to determine the meaning of the
command.' The pure intentionalist views statutes only as evidence
of the true law, which is the intention of the enacting legislature, or
alternatively the personified purpose of the statute. The role of the
judge in interpreting statutes is simply to effectuate the legislative
intent or statutory purpose. The judge ought to use the inscribed
words of a statute as guide posts in the search for intent or purpose,
but should give statutory text no weight independent of legislative
intent or statutory purpose.36 The pure dynamicist thinks of statutes
as mere starting points in the politically legitimate statutory lawcreating process, which extends from the point of congressional
enactment, through the agency process, to litigation in courts, and
possibly back to the beginning with reconsideration by Congress. For
the pure dynamicist the normative role of courts is to update statutory
34. This sort of cybernetic approach is similar in form to Professor Eskridge's
normative theory of statutory interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483-84 (1987); see also Rudd v.
California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 948, 952 (1990) (applying a cybernetic
approach that looks first to the ordinary meaning of statutory text, then to the statute as
a whole, and finally to the policies and purposes of the statute).
35. See infra part II.A.
36. See infra part lI.B.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

law in light of the other actors in the process, a changed legal
landscape, shifting
majoritarian sentiments, or altered underlying
37
assumptions.
Note the following key distinction between the textual and
intentional approaches on the one hand, and the dynamic approaches
on the other hand: The former two view statutes as laws created in
the past, and somehow fixed or unchanging; the latter views statutes
as laws always changing, never solidified, or never at a state of rest or
completion. 8 Under both textual and intentional approaches to
statutory interpretation, the task is to discover what the law already
is, while under dynamic approaches the task is to shape law from the
mass of politically legitimate legal material available. We will return
to this fundamental distinction between textualist/intentionalist and
dynamic interpretive approaches in section D of this Part.
A. Textual Theories
The common thread linking the family of textual theories of
statutory interpretation is their uniform reliance on the words of
statutes as an interpretive guide. One may perceive, however, several
permutations of the textual approach. 9 Some textualists read the
words of statutory text according to their conventional meanings,
while others read textual words according to their literal dictionary
definitions. 4 Debates among textualists often concern how text
should be used when interpreting statutes, or in other words the
proper degree of reliance on text when interpreting statutes. Some

37. See infra part H.C.
38. This distinction is not entirely watertight, for even under pure textualist or
intentionalist interpretive methods the meaning of a given statute may change. Under a

pure textualist method, the conventional meaning of the words constituting a statute may
slowly change over time, as may grammatical forms. (This, however, is not true where the
conventional meaning sought is that of the meaning of the words of a statute at the time
of enactment). Under a pure intentionalist method, new evidence of the relevant actors'
intentions could come to light, thus leading to an enhanced and different interpretation of
legislative intent.
Still, a fundamental difference remains between dynamic interpretive theories on the
one hand and intentionalist and textualist theories on the other: In the former case,
change in the meaning of statutes is a conscious possibility, while change in the latter case
is unintended or accidental.
39. Farber and Frickey find distinctions between textualist theories similar to those
discussed here. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, LegislativeIntent and Public Choice,
74 VA. L. REv. 423, 452 (1988).

40. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993) (containing a majority
opinion reading statute in literalist terms and a dissent reading statute in conventionalist
terms).
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textualists urge a "four-comers rule," under which judges interpret
statutes with the sole guidance of text.4 ' Other textualists argue that
statutory text ought to be the primary interpretive guide, but that
judges may in a cybernetic fashion resort to secondary and tertiary
guides when the primary guide inevitably fails.42 Another cleavage
within the textualist camp concerns the reason to use text when
interpreting statutes. Some textualists believe that only the text of a
statute should be relied upon when interpreting statutes because only
the text is legitimate legal material.43 Unlike statutory text, they
argue, statements of legislative intent have not crossed the twin
Other
constitutional hurdles of bicameralism and presentment.'
textualists, however, accept legislative intent as legitimate, and argue
that text should be solely or primarily relied upon because it is by far
the best available heuristic device for discovering legislative intentions.4' Below, the textual family is divided into two main strains,
which are briefly outlined.
1. Four-Corners Textualism
This more purely textualist strain argues that the text and only
the text ought to be the guide to judicial discovery of statutory
meaning in any given case.4 A similar rule, known as the fourcorners rule, once operated in contract law.47 Rather than striving
to interpret statutes so as to be consistent with the intent of the

41. See, e.g., Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 2060-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Rudd v. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 948, 952
(1990).

43. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326,334-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part).

44. See, e.g., Continental Can v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.
1990); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring in judgment).

45. See, eg., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
46. Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook are often cited as proponents of what
Professor Eskridge has termed "the new textualism." See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra
note 3, at 89-95. Judge Easterbrook has written:
The text of the statute, and not the private intent of the legislators, is the law.
Only the text survived the complex process for proposing, amending, adopting,
and obtaining the President's signature (or two-thirds of each house). It is easy
to announce intents and hard to enact laws; the Constitution gives force only to
what is enacted. So the text is law and legislative intent a clue to the meaning
of the text, rather than the text being a clue to legislative intent.
ContinentalCan, 916 F.2d at 1157-58.
47. David W. Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
Interpretationunder the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 415 (1992).
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enacting Congress, four-corners textualists argue that statutes ought
48
to be interpreted with the sole aid of a statute's inscribed words.
The four-corners approach has been justified with a positive
claim, an epistemological claim, an analytical claim, and a formalist
claim. Four-corners proponents often argue that the intent of an
enacting legislature is undiscoverable, and therefore illegitimate as an
interpretive device. 49 Textualists may view congressional intent as
undiscoverable for two reasons, the first of which is a positive claim,
and the second of which is an epistemological claim.
First, four-corners proponents argue that congressional intent
cannot exist. While individuals can have intents, the argument goes,
collectives such as legislatures cannot.5" Thus, Judge Easterbrook
writes,
Because legislatures compromise many members, they do
not have "intents" or "designs," hidden yet discoverable.
Each member may or may not have a design. The body as
a whole, however, has only outcomes ....
This follows from the discoveries of public choice
literature. Although legislators have individual lists of
desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be
difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into
a coherent collective choice.... The existence of agenda
control [in legislatures] makes it impossible for a
court-even one that knows each legislator's complete table
of preferences-to say what the whole body would have
done with a proposal it did not consider in fact....

48. Or as Professors Farber and Frickey have put it, "Justice Scalia would replace the
current approach to statutory construction with a 'four comers' rule, under which the
meaning of a statute would be determined solely on the basis of statutory language."
Farber & Frickey, supra note 39, at 455.
49. Id. at 453.
50. The argument is based on the findings of public choice literature, and especially
upon Arrow's impossibility proof, which demonstrates that, given a set of intuitively
attractive limitations, no method can be said to combine individual values into a
meaningful social welfare function. Arrow's proof appears in KENNETH J. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES

(1963). Simpler treatments of Arrow's proof

and discussions of its meaning and implications can be found in FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 3, at 38-42, DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 384-407 (1989), and
WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 115-36 (1988). For a treatment of
the implications of Arrow's theorem and public choice scholarship in general with respect
to statutory interpretation, see Farber & Frickey, supra note 39, at 425-37. Note, however,
that public choice theorists are not the only ones to argue that congressional intent is
incoherent. Max Radin, a legal realist, made largely the same point more than sixty years
ago. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870 (1930).
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[A] court has no justification for deciding cases as it
thinks the legislature would in [its] absence.5'
From this perspective, reliance on evidence of legislative intent when
interpreting statutes results in ex post constructions of fictive
congressional intent.5 2 Given that congressional intent cannot exist,
statutory text becomes the sole interpretive guide by default.53
The claim that congressional intent does not and cannot exist is
a positive claim. The second argument advanced by four-corners
textualists for viewing congressional intent as undiscoverable is an
epistemological claim. Briefly, even if congressional intent does exist,
because the documentary record of legislative history is incomplete
and unreliable,5 4 and may be used as a way of "passing" unpassable
law,55 judges interpreting statutes can never really "get inside the

51. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 547-48 (1983).
52. In this vein, Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit has said that using legislative
history as an interpretive guide is like "looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends." Patricia Wald, Some Observationsof the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOwA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983).
53. One should recognize that even if legislative intent is an incoherent concept, and
therefore ought not be consulted when interpreting statutes, it by no means follows as a
matter of logical necessity that statutory text be the only interpretive guide available to
judges. The various canons of construction and interpretive presumptions could be
employed to resolve ambiguities in statutory text.
54. The opinion of Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski in Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d
1539 (9th Cir. 1986), contains an excellent example of this argument:
The fact of the matter is that legislative history can be cited to support almost
any proposition, and frequently is.... Reports are usually written by staff or
lobbyists, not legislators; few if any legislators read the reports; they are not
voted on by the committee whose views they supposedly represent, much less the
full Senate or House of Representatives; they cannot be amended or modified on
the floor by legislators who may disagree with the views expressed therein.
Committee reports that contradict statutory language or purport to explicate the
meaning or applicability of particular statutory provisions can short circuit the
legislative process, leading to results never approved by Congress or the
President.
Id.at 1559-60 (Kozinski, J., concurring in judgment).
Likewise, Justice Scalia has advocated the idea that "even if legislative intent is a
coherent concept, legislative history provides an exceedingly poor documentary record."
Farber & Frickey, supra note 39, at 437. Judge Easterbrook has stated that "[o]ften there
is so much legislative history that a court can manipulate the meaning of law by choosing
which snippets to emphasize." In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
55. Professor Slawson argues:
When courts and agencies use legislative history to find more specific intent
than the statute expresses, legislators have an incentive to "manufacture"
legislative history on points of interest to them ....
Manufacturing legislative history offers two advantages over amending.
First, it is quicker and easier than drafting, debating, and voting on an
amendment. Second, [it] increases the chances that the member's intentions will
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minds of legislators" and know what they were trying to say or do
when passing statutes.56 Stated another way, even if omniscient
agents could discern the true legislative intent, judges are not such
agents and therefore can rarely know what the enacting Congress
intended, if anything. Since only fragments of the legislative process
are preserved in documentary records, judges lack enough "data
points" to make accurate assessments of congressional intent. The
data points that are preserved will likely sketch a skewed portrait.
Documentary history of the legislative process preserves, for example,
committee reports, which are likely to represent different views from
those of the chamber as a whole. Further, members of Congress may
strategically create a misleading documentary record. Since statutory
text must cross the twin hurdles of bicameral passage and
presentment, while evidence of legislative intent need not, strategically minded legislators may implant "unpassable" clauses or
elaborations into the congressional record or into a committee
report.57 Textualists argue that statutory text is both legitimate law
and a knowable interpretive aid, while the fragmentary and skewed
record of congressional intent is neither. Even ifin theory a true
legislative intent exists, in practice judges can rarely reconstruct it.
Statutory text, in contrast, is eminently knowable and needs no
reconstruction. 8 Since an accurate picture of legislative intent is

become law if they are controversial.
Slawson, supra note 47, at 397.
Justice Scalia used a variation of this argument in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988), when he cited a colloquy between two House
members where one stated to the other, "I have an amendment [to the proposed bill] here
in my hand which could be offered, but if we can make up some legislative history which
would do the same thing, I am willing to do it." Id at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Finally, Judge Kozinski argued in Wallace that the use of legislative history creates
"strong incentives for manipulating legislative history to achieve through the courts results
not achievable during the enactment process." Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1559 (Kozinski, J.,
concurring in judgment).
56. Easterbrook, supranote 51, at 550-51. In a frontal attack on his colleague Richard
Posner's imaginative reconstruction theory, Judge Easterbrook quotes Posner and writes,
"The number of judges living at any time who can, with plausible claim to accuracy, 'think
[themselves] . . . into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would
have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar,' may be counted on one hand." Id.
Though Posner is cognizant of the public choice literature, he is more cautious than
Easterbrook in reading it to mean that the concept of congressional intent or purpose is
incoherent. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism,Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 195-96 (1986).
57. Judge Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (1985-86), discussed
in Farber & Frickey, supra note 39, at 442.
58. Of course, however, it needs construction.

1996]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

virtually impossible to capture, judges ought to rely solely on statutory
text when interpreting statutes.
A third argument four-corners proponents advance is a weaker
version of the idea that congressional intent (though not an incoherent concept) is unknowable. The claim is that plausible
contradictory legislative intents can be constructed from a statute's
legislative history.5 9 While legislative intent may exist, at least for
judges attempting ex post reconstruction, it is indeterminate and
therefore cannot be helpful in discerning the meaning of statutory
texts that are likewise indeterminate. This line of argument makes
the analytical point that indeterminacy (of legislative intent) is of little
utility in resolving indeterminacy (of a statute's meaning). It differs
from the argument in the previous paragraph in that it does not
necessarily view the legislature as a place where the historical record
of congressional intent is purposefully skewed, intent is manufactured,
and constitutional provisions circumvented. Rather, this line of
argument is sympathetic with the view that legislators are wellintentioned and refrain from strategic behavior. Still, this line of
59. Judge Mikva provides the following example of incoherent legislative history:
My favorite story along these lines involves Representative Morris Udall's
passage of [a] strip mining law .... Because strip mining is one of the more
confrontational issues that the nation faces, there were directly opposing views
to reconcile in fashioning a bill. The miners and mine owners, the "states'
righters," and environmentalists each have very strong views on what the stripmining laws should be.
Representative Udall fashioned a compromise and got it out of the
committee and onto the floor.... [During floor debate o]ne of the congressmen
from West Virginia, a strip mining state, arose and asked if the gentleman from
Arizona would assure him that this bill would carefully protect states' rights and
state sovereignty and that the states would continue to perform their role in
managing strip mining within their borders. Representative Udall solemnly
assured the gentleman that he was absolutely correct.., state sovereignty was
not impinged upon in any form. Twenty minutes later a pro-environmentalist
congressman arose and asked if the gentleman from Arizona would assure him
that the bill, once and for all, set single standards for strip mining and ensured
that one federal law would cover strip mining throughout the country.
Representative Udall assured the gentleman that he was absolutely correct, that
this bill ... set uniform federal standards. Some of us were sitting in the
cloakroom during this exchange; when Representative Udall came out for a drink
of water one of the congressmen who had been listening in told him that both
positions could not be right. Udall then assured that gentleman that he was
absolutely correct.
Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 380-81
(citations omitted). While Judge Mikva's tale illustrates how contradictory legislative
intents could be drawn from the documentary record of legislative history, it should be
noted that Judge Mikva nonetheless endorses the use of legislative history in interpreting
statutes. Id
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argument views the historical record of congressional intent as full of
even more contradictions, ambiguities, and plausible interpretations
than a related statutory text contains. As such, the historical record
of congressional intent is of little utility in resolving textual ambiguities.
Finally, four-corners proponents offer what has been termed a
"formalist" critique of congressional intent as a guide to interpreting
statutes. 60 The essential thrust of the critique is that the use of
congressional intent as an interpretive guide shifts law-creating power
from the first branch to the third branch, which is inconsistent with
representative democracy and the idea that law should be made by
those parts of government directly accountable to the people.61
Further, the use of congressional intent subverts the formal lawmaking process set up by the Constitution, that is, passage in both
houses and presentment to the executive. 62 The argument is that the
use of legislative history leads to the alteration or rewriting of statutes
by courts, for example, by emphasizing the views of committee
members in determining statutory meaning. Such a process bypasses63
the views of the Committee of the Whole, and the Chief Executive.
On this view only the inscribed words of statutory text may be
considered a legitimate part of a statute. While the statutory text
passes constitutionally-mandated hurdles,' 4 the intent of Congress,
or of specific members of Congress, does not. When legislators vote
"yea" or "nay," and when the President decides whether to sign a bill
60. Professor Eskridge has labeled this the formalist critique. Eskridge, supra note 6,
at 646-50.
61. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory

Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988) (arguing that while the original
meaning of a statute is a useful tool in statutory interpretation, the original intent of
Congress in enacting the statute is irrelevant).
62. Id. at 64-65.
63. See Kenneth Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 371, 375 (1987).
64. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
the House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at
large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.
ld.; see also Continental Can v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990)
(arguing that only the text of a statute has passed the complex process of creating
statutes).
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into law, the goals, aims, or purposes of the committee, or the sponsor
of a bill, or certain legislators who make statements during floor
debate, are not known and therefore are not ratified. Thus, judicial
elaborations upon statutory text based on supposed congressional
intent is in truth illegitimate lawmaking at odds with Constitutionally
mandated procedures.
In review, proponents of the four-corners approach make the
following arguments against the use of congressional intent as an
interpretive guide: First, they argue that congressional intent is
undiscoverable, since collective intent is an incoherent concept.
Second, even if the idea of congressional intent is accepted, judges
cannot hope to reconstruct it from a very likely skewed and possibly
manipulated historical record. Third, even an honest record of
congressional intent is fraught with greater uncertainty than statutory
text. Finally, the use of legislative history is at odds with the
lawmaking scheme set up by the Constitution. Thus, since the text of
a statute is knowable, cannot be covertly manipulated, is relatively
clear in its meaning, and can only be altered via constitutional
bicameral passage and presentment, it ought to operate as the sole
guide to statutory meaning and interpretation.
2. Textual Intentionalism
This second main strand of textualism is really an intentionalist
theory in disguise. Textual intentionalism argues that courts ought to
interpret statutes so as to effectuate the intentions of the enacting
legislature. The inscribed words of the statute, however, are viewed
as the most reliable predictor, and, by some, the only legitimate
indicia of an enacting legislature's intentions.65 Other "external
sources" such as legislative history are considered poor indicators for
divining legislative intent, and therefore ought to be either completely
eliminated or kept to a bare minimum in the interpretive process.
Justice Scalia has exhibited the textual-intentionalist line of thinking
in some of his written opinions. Concurring in the judgment in Green
v. Block Laundry Machine Co., for example, Justice Scalia wrote:
The meaning of terms on the statute-books ought to be
determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in

accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely
to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted
65. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)
("There is... no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by
which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.").
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on the words of the statute.... I would not permit any of the
historical and legislative material discussed by the Court, or
all of it combined to lead me to a result different from the
one that these factors suggest.66
Judges, in short, ought to effectuate the intent of the entire enacting
Congress, and statutory text is the surest device for correctly
estimating the whole legislature's intent. A focus on legislative
documentary history, in contrast, will shed light only on the intent of
members of a given committee, or worse yet, committee staffers who
write committee reports. Further, reliance on legislative history
creates incentives for manufactured legislative intent, which is easy to
include in a statute's legislative history, but not necessarily representative of the median policy position of the enacting Congress. The
conventional meaning of the words in a statute, in light of the legal
context, provides the best indication of the entire enacting Congress's
intent, for this is what the entire Congress deliberates upon. While
the text may not always operate as a reliable indicator of congressional intent, it is nonetheless a far better indicator of Congress's
intent than any "external" piece of evidence.67
Textual-intentionalist reasoning can be contrasted with the fourcorners textualist argument that legislative intent cannot be accurately
reconstructed by parsing the selective documentary record of a
statute's passage.6" The textual-intentionalist argument is subtly
different. While the textual-intentionalist believes that legislative
history is a poor guide to congressional intent, and that the text ought
to serve as the judge's interpretive guide, the textual-intentionalist
argues that the text ought to be viewed as a means for discerning

66. 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia in his academic
commentary has suggested that legislative history ought not be considered at all when
interpreting statutes. Scalia, supra note 57, discussed in Farber & Frickey, supra note 39,
at 442. In his opinions, however, Justice Scalia appears to be more mild mannered, and
has given the intent of Congress weight in statutory interpretations.
67. Note here the emphasis on the intent of the enacting body, as opposed to the
intents of enacting legislators. The former assumes some sort of collective intent, while
the latter envisions only the intents held by individual legislators. Do only the majority
intents of legislators constitute the legislature's collective intent? Or do the views of those
who voted against a statute play a role in the legislature's collective intent? Further, a
legislature may possibly pass a statute by a majority vote although no majority exists
regarding the intended effect of the statute. What then? Should the statute lack legal
force? Or should a judge consider the plurality intent, that is, the intent held by the
largest hon-majority coalition of legislators? Or should the judge try to combine the
largest coalitions of intents held by coalitions of legislators until a majority coalition is
formed? Clearly, taking intent seriously involves substantial dilemmas.
68. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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legislative intent. The textual-intentionalist, in other words, privileges
text as vital to interpreting statutes, but only because text is the best
guide to congressional intent. The four-corners proponent, in
contrast, privileges the text independently from any utility it might
have in discovering legislative intent. Stated another way, a crucial
difference between the textual-intentionalist approach and the fourcorners textual approach is that the former ultimately hopes to
effectuate the will of the enacting legislature as conveyed by statutory
text, while the latter hopes to effectuate the command of the enacting
Congress as expressed by statutory text.
B. Intentional Theories
Intentional theories attempt to interpret statutory law in accord
with the intentions of the enacting legislature.69 The words of a
statute are important only in that they are evidence of the enacting
Congress's intentions or purposes, or the personified purpose of a
given statute. The pure intentionalist, unlike the textual-intentionalist,
the statutory text weight in detergives external evidence beyond
mining legislative intent.7" Under some intentional interpretive
theories the words of the statute take on a life of their own, and are
said to exhibit personified purposes distinct from the specific
intentions of their legislative creators." More commonly, however,
the intent a court seeks to discover is that of the enacting Congress.
Even more so than textual approaches to statutory interpretation,
intentional interpretive methods are a diverse lot.
1. Law as Legislative Intent 72
Under the purest form of intentional statutory interpretation-the
theory of law as legislative intent-"[t]he law is legislative intent."'73
69. In the words of Learned Hand, "[l]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d
737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
70. The Supreme Court has implied that a statute is not necessarily the best evidence
of intent, and has trumped the intent that can be inferred from statutory text with intent
that can be gleaned from legislative history. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989).
71. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1157.
72. For a full discussion of law as legislative intent, see Slawson, supranote 47, at 349415. The label "laws as legislative intent" is Professor Slawson's. Id. Slawson identifies
law as legislative intent, but is not among its proponents. Id. at 383-84.
73. Id. at 396.
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The text of a statute is merely a conduit for communicating
Congress's intentions to relevant actors. While statutory text is often
an important indication of congressional intent, other factors, such as
committee reports, lack of repeal, or floor debate statements, are also
given substantial weight. Under law as legislative intent, where both
the text of a statute and the enacting Congress's intent are clear but
contradict one another, the clear intent of the enacting Congress
prevails. In short, intent trumps text, but text is evidence of intent. 4
Law as legislative intent is not too different from the textualintentionalist approach. The key distinction between the two is that
the former sanctions a broader set of evidentiary sources for
discerning congressional intent than does the latter. Where textualintentionalism views the words'of the statute as the primary, and in
the eyes of some, the only legitimate evidence of congressional intent,
law as legislative intent views statutory text as only one of many
admissible pieces of evidence regarding congressional intent. Other
pieces of information are just as probative-legislative history, the
congressional record, post-enactment words, presidential understanding, and even previous judicial determinations of legislative intent.
Indeed, depending upon the circumstances, under law as legislative
intent, statutory text may be given less weight than other evidence of
congressional intent.
Professor Slawson argues that the federal courts have never
adopted the "law as legislative intent" approach, but that it is
nevertheless implicit in the Supreme Court's recent statutory
construction opinions.75 The law as legislative intent approach is
captured in the following passage from Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.:
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.... The
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are
contrary to clear congressional intent.76

74. Of course, congressional intent standing alone, without enacted statutory text, has
no legal force. Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S.
495, 501-04 (1988).
75. Slawson, supra note 47, at 395-96.

76. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 & n.9 (1984). Notice that the Court in Chevron states that
the clear legislative intent of Congress, rather than the clear meaning of statutory text, is
controlling.
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For Professor Slawson, Chevron and other recent Supreme Court
decisions demonstrate that "the status of the statute as the best
evidence [of congressional intent] has become questionable. '77 In
Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, for example,
the Court adopted a statutory interpretation based on clear congressional intent over clear statutory language. 79 According to Professor
Slawson, Public Citizen marks the ultimate demise of the plain
meaning rule, under which legislative history is consulted only when
statutory text lacks a clear meaning." Justice Scalia has argued
against law as legislative intent, most notably in his concurrence in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,8' where he criticized the majority for
relying on legislative history to discern congressional intent and
statutory meaning even though the enacting Congress's intentions
could have been gleaned from statutory language. 2
In sum, the law as legislative intent approach views any given
statute as probative evidence of the intention of the enacting
legislature, which is the ultimate source of law.83 This stands in
contrast to what Professor Slawson believes are more traditional
approaches to statutes, where the object of interpretation is "the
meaning of the statutory language," rather than the intent of the
enacting Congress.'
2. Imaginative Reconstruction
Imaginative reconstruction is the form of intentional statutory
interpretation exhibited in the opinions of Judge Learned Hand and
currently advanced by Judge Richard Posner. 5 The theory contemplates a role for both the actual and imagined intents of enacting
77. Slawson, supra note 47, at 396.
78. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
79. See id. at 454.
80. Slawson, supra note 47, at 414.
81. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
82. Id at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Slawson, supra note 47, at 396.
84. Id.at 421. Professor Slawson proposes his "law as statute" theory as a substitute
for law as legislative intent. Id. at 415-24. For Professor Slawson, law as statute is both
descriptive of practices in the federal courts prior to the current heavy reliance on
legislative history, and a normative substitute for the law as legislative intent approach.
Id. at 419.
85. See, e.g., Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d. 785, 787-91 (2d
Cir.) (opinion of Judge Learned Hand), affd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946); Lehigh Valley Coal Co.
v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547,552-53 (2d Cir. 1914) (opinion of Judge Hand), cert. denied, 235
U.S. 705 (1915); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-

93 (1985). Posner himself cites Judge Hand in Posner, supra note 3, at 817.
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Congresses. Regarding imagined intents, in cases where no clear
congressional intent on the issue at hand can be discerned, according
to the theory, a judge ought to put himself in the shoes of the
enacting Congress and determine what it would have done had it
squarely faced the novel issue.8 6 Imaginative reconstruction thus
goes one step beyond law as legislative intent, in that the law is not
just actual congressional intent, but also imaginatively reconstructed
congressional intent. In cases where reconstructing congressional
intent fails to yield a unique interpretation, Judge Posner argues:
[T]he judge must decide what attribution of meaning to the
statute will yield the most reasonable result in the case at
hand-always bearing in mind that what seems reasonable
to the judge may not have seemed reasonable to the
[enacting] legislators, and that it is their conception of
reasonableness, to the extent known, rather than the judge's,
that should guide decision.'
According to Posner, "[t]he judge's job is not to keep a statute up to
date in the sense of making it reflect contemporary values, but to
imagine as best he can how the legislators who enacted the statute
would have wanted it applied to the situations they did not
foresee."88
Posner's imaginative reconstruction theory89 involves a threestep cybernetic process: First, the judge should make a "scrupulous
search for the legislative will."9 Second, if the search is fruitless, he
should imagine what the enacting legislators would have willed had
they specifically considered the issue at hand. Third, if this second

86. POSNER, supra note 85, at 287.
87. Id.
88. Id. Professor Eskridge has described this element of Posner's theory as an attempt
to "recreate the general assumptions, goals, and limitations of the enacting Congress."
Eskridge, supra note 6, at 630. Judge Posner has stated that the judge applying
imaginative reconstruction must "not only consider the language, structure, and history of
the statute, but also study the values and attitudes, as far as they can be known today, of
the period when the legislation was enacted." POSNER, supra note 85, at 287. Posner
has also written that judges should be sensitive to Congress's intent regarding the way
courts interpret a given statute. Posner, supra note 3, at 818. Some statutes explicitly set
out requirements on how courts should interpret them; others, such as the Sherman Act,
virtually cry out for a common law type approach by the courts. POSNER, supra note 85,
at 287-88.
89. Posner's theory is actually what Judge Easterbrook has termed "a neta-theory of
statutory construction." Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 539. Posner offers, in his own
words, "not a substitute algorithm but only an attitude, or maybe a slogan." Posner, supra
note 3, at 817.
90. POSNER, supra note 85, at 289.
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approach yields indeterminacy, the judge should attribute the most
reasonable meaning to the statute, bearing in mind the conception of
reasonableness held by the enacting legislature. 9' The general
enterprise of Posner's approach is to discern the most likely specific
and/or general intentions of the enacting Congress.92 Like the law
as legislative intent theory, Posner's theory privileges the enacting
Congress's intents over statutory text. For example, he advocates
giving effect to the legislative "deals" that resulted in a statute, over
the text of a statute.93 Unlike law as legislative intent, however,
Posner explicitly advocates that the judge creatively "fill the gaps" in
actual congressional intent with "imaginatively reconstructed" intent,
thus allowing courts the power to make interstitial law, not just in the
gaps of congressional text, but rather in the gaps of congressional
intent. Easterbrook's textualism, in contrast, affords the courts no
interstitial law-creating powers.94
Posner views the judicial enterprise not as mechanical
interpretation of statutes, but rather as communication between the
Congress, the superior, and courts, the subordinate.' Posner offers
his famous military analogy to convey the core intuition of his
interpretive approach:
Suppose the commander of the lead platoon in an attack
finds his way blocked by an unexpected enemy pillbox....
He radios the company commander for instructions. The
commander replies, "Go-"; but the rest of the message is
garbled.... If the platoon commander decides that, not
being able to receive an intelligible command, he should
wait and do nothing until communications can be restored,

91. On this last point Posner has written,
[W]hat if the Judge's scrupulous search for the legislative will turns up nothing?
... It is inevitable, and therefore legitimate, for the judge in such a case to be
moved by considerations that cannot be referred back to legislative purpose.
These might be considerations of judicial administrability ... or considerations
drawn from some broadly based conception of the public interest.
Posner, supra note 3, at 820. See, e.g., Standard Office Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 819
F.2d. 1371, 1379 (7th Cir. 1987) (opinion of Judge Posner).
92. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 3, at 102.
93. POSNER, supra note 85, at 269-70.
94. Thus, Posner contrasts his theory with Judge Easterbrook's textualism as follows:
"Being highly skeptical of the possibility of reconstructing legislative intent in other than
simple cases, Easterbrook proposes 'declaring legislation inapplicable unless it either
expressly addresses the matter or commits the matter to common law.' Gapfilling based
on references to legislators' presumed goals is ruled out." Id. at 292 (quoting Easterbrook,
supra note 51, at 552).
95. Posner, supra note 56, at 189.
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his decision will be wrong. For it is plain from the part of
the message that was received that the company commander
wanted him to get by the enemy pillbox, either by frontal
attack or by bypassing it. And surely the company commander would have preferred the platoon commander to
decide by himself which course to follow rather than to do
nothing and let the attack fail. For the platoon commander
to take the position that he may do nothing, just because the
communication was garbled, would be an irresponsible
"interpretation."
The situation with regard to legislative interpretation is
analogous. In our system of government the framers of
statutes and constitutions are the superiors of the judges.
The framers communicate orders to the judges through
legislative texts.... If the orders are clear, the judges must
obey them. Often, however, because of passage of time and
change of circumstance the orders are unclear ... The
judges are thus like the platoon commander in my example.
It is irresponsible for them to adopt the attitude that if the
order is unclear they will refuse to act. They are part of an
organization, an enterprise-the enterprise of governing the
United States-and when the orders of their superiors are
unclear, this does not absolve them from responsibility for
helping to make the enterprise succeed. The platoon
commander will ask himself, if he is a responsible officer:
what would the company commander have wanted me to do
if communications failed? Judges should ask themselves the
same type of question when the "orders" they receive from
the framers of statutes and constitutions are unclear: what
would the framers [of the statute] have wanted us to do in
this case of failed communication?96
Thus, the imaginative reconstruction theory views statutes as often
unclear or incomplete communications or commands from Congress,
the principal, to courts, the agents.97 The job of courts is to interpret
the communications in a way most consistent with the will of the
Congress. The claim is that by applying the imaginative reconstruction approach to statutory interpretation courts will most often and

96. Id at 189-90. Posner recognizes that the military analogy is imperfect and
addresses possible criticisms in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE

270-73 (1990).
97. Posner, supra note 56, at 190.
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most closely approximate the will of its superior, or in other words,
be most likely to act as honest agents of Congress."s
3. The Hart & Sacks Legal Process Approach99
Hart and Sacks's unpublished but influential work The Legal
Where law as
Process offers a third version of intentionalism.X1
legislative intent focuses on the intentions of actual legislators, and
Posner's imaginative reconstruction argues that judges ought to
interstitially fill gaps in actual legislative intents, Hart and Sacks argue
that judges ought to determine the purposes of statutes themselves.
Hart and Sacks summarize their prescriptive theory of statutory
interpretation as follows:
In interpreting a statute a court should: 1. Decide what
purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any
subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question

so as to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure,
however, that it does not give the words either (a) a
meaning they will not bear, or (b) a meaning that would
violate any established policy of clear statement.''

For Hart and Sacks, the "purpose" of a statute is not synonymous
with legislative intent."° As such, the judge should not reflectively
ask "how did the enacting legislature intend to resolve the dilemma,
98. Id. Professors Farber and Frickey offer a variation on Posner's imaginative
reconstruction theory. They accept Posner's underlying assumptions that judges are agents
of Congress, and that the job of judges, therefore, is to interpret statutes in accord with
the will of Congress. They believe, however, that they have a better method for decoding
unclear congressional statutes. In short, where Posner argues that judges should adopt the
interpretation that most probably reflects the will of the enacting Congress, Farber and
Frickey argue that judges ought to consider both the most probable intent of the enacting
Congress, and the consequences of various plausible interpretations. Thus, judges should
adopt the interpretation that maximizes the product of these two factors. See FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 3, at 102-06; Farber & Frickey, supra note 39, at 461-65.
99. One commentator has lumped Hart and Sacks's, Posner's, and Calabresi's
interpretive theories, under the rubric of the "legal process approach," since all three can
be seen as critiques of older methods of statutory interpretation. See William S. Blatt, The
History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV.
799, 835 (1985). Posner, however, has pointed out key differences between his theories
and those of Calabresi. See, eg., Posner, supra note 56, at 196-97.
100. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process,107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994) (tracing the
making and influence of Hart and Sacks's work).
101. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1411 (emphasis added).
102. Ild.
at 1410; Blatt, supra note 99, at 832; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF

PUBLIC POLICY 575 (1988); Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1546.
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or how would the enacting legislature have resolved it had it been
considered?" Instead, the judge should use the technique found in
Heydon's Case: 3 it should discern the purpose of the statute by
examining the "mischief" the statute is designed to remedy.t " Hart
and Sacks write:
The function of a court in interpreting a statute is to decide
what meaning ought to be given to the directions of the
statute in the respects relevant to the case before it....
[This statement] does not say that the court's function is to
ascertain the intention of the legislature with respect to the
matter in issue. 05
This represents a key difference between Posner's imaginative
reconstruction and Hart and Sacks's legal process approach. For Hart
and Sacks, judges ought to discern the rational purposes of statutes.
Posner, in contrast, urges judges to look to the intent of the enacting
Congress. JI. Case Co. v. Borak 6 exemplifies the Hart and Sacks
103. 76 Eng. Rep. 637,30 Co. Rep. 7a (Ex. 1548). The "mischief rule" from Heydon's
Case reads as follows:
[Flour things are to be discerned and considered -1st. What was the common law before the making of the act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide.
3d. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy ; and then the office of all the
Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life
to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act,
pro bono publico.
Id.at 638, 30 Co. Rep. at 7b.
104. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1415.
105. Il at 1410 (emphasis added); see also ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 102, at
575 ("Hart & Sacks stressed that this approach is different from a search for legislative
intent.").
106. 377 U.S. 426 (1963). One commentator cites the "troika" of Borak, Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), and Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969), as
examples of the once dominant Hart and Sacks approach. Note, Intent, ClearStatements,
and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.

892, 893 (1982).
In Moragne a longshoreman was killed while on an unseaworthy ship docked in a
Florida port. His survivors brought a suit for wrongful death against the owner of the
ship. Several statutes bore upon the case, but none explicitly afforded a wrongful death
cause of action in cases of the death of a longshoreman on an unseaworthy vessel in
coastal waters. Had the facts been only slightly different-had the deceased been at sea,
for instance, or had he been a seaman rather than a longshoreman-an existing statute
would have clearly afforded a wrongful death cause of action. The Supreme Court,
however, reasoned in classic Hart and Sacks fashion:
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approach. In Borak, the Supreme Court recognized an implied
private right of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Act of
1933. The Court reasoned that since the purpose of the statute is to
protect investors from "deceptive or inadequate disclosures in proxy
solicitation,"'" private investors must have a cause of action against
those who violate proxy solicitation rules even though the text of the
This line of argument is very
statute does not provide one."3
different from the argument that Congress intended investors to have
a private cause of action under section 14(a). It is but a short hop
from the notion that the statute's purposeis to protect investors to the
conclusion that the statute gives investors a private cause of action.
The argument that the enacting Congress intendedthat inventors have
a private cause of action, however, involves a far more difficult leap
of reasoning.
Hart and Sacks view law creation as an ongoing and purposeful
process of solving problems that society constantly poses.°9 Thus,
they argue that judges interpreting statutes should "assume... that
the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably,"" 0 and that "[e]very statute must
be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act. The idea of a statute
without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea of law.""'
Hart and Sacks' assumption that the legislature is a purposive body
of the then-dominant
probably stemmed from their acceptance
12
politics.
American
of
view
pluralist

In many cases the scope of a statute may reflect nothing more than the
dimensions of the particular problem that came to the attention of the legislature,
inviting the conclusion that the legislative policy is equally applicable to other
situations in which the mischief is identical. This conclusion is reinforced where
there exists not one enactment but a course of legislation dealing with a series of
situations ....

Moragne, 398 U.S. at 392. Thus, applying the "mischief rule" from Heydon's Case, the
Supreme Court held that the longshoreman's survivors could sue for wrongful death.
107. Borak, 426 U.S. at 431.
108. Moragne,398 U.S. at 433. While Borak has never been overruled, its interpretive
logic has. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court set out a four-part test
for determining whether a cause of action can be implied from a statutory prohibition.
The purpose of the statute is but one factor to consider. Ia at 78.
109. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3, at 695.
110. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1415.
111. L at 1156.

112. Professors Eskridge and Frickey argue that the Hart and Sacks legal process school
rested on three premises: statutes as purposive acts of Congress, the centrality of
procedure, and pluralism. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3, at 694-98.
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C. Dynamic Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Under dynamic theories of statutory interpretation, judges may
shape the meaning of statutes over time or when the circumstances
surrounding a statute change. Statutes are interpreted with an eye
toward making the law ideal in light of evolving social and contextual
conditions, keeping in mind the path of the statute and its treatment
by other relevant political actors. Though not gaining the legitimacy
that textual and intentional theories of interpretation enjoy, dynamic
interpretive approaches are on occasion employed in the federal
courts, either explicitly or implicitly.
1. Dworkin's Chain Novel Method
Ronald Dworkin's dynamic theory of statutory interpretation is
based upon his famous chain novel analogy." 3 Under this approach,
a legislatively enacted statute constitutes a first chapter in a chain
novel, and judges adjudicating statutory claims should treat the
interpretive endeavor as if they were writing subsequent chapters in
the chain novel. The task of judges is simply to make the chain novel
the best coherent story possible in light of previous chapters written
by the legislature and other judges.' Thus, the process of statutory
interpretation is, in Dworkin's words, "fundamentally the creative one
of a partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best
way, the statutory scheme Congress began. '' 5 Though a constructive process, statutory interpretation under the Dworkinian approach
is clearly constrained. A judge operating under the Dworkinian
approach is not free to do what his own judgment, all things considered, finds just or right. Instead, a judge must strive to give the
best interpretation of the statute, in light of prior interpretations of
the statute. In Dworkin's words,
113. Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 541-43 (1982).
114. Thus, according to Dworkin,
Hercules [Dworkin's fictional judge] will use much the same techniques of
interpretation to read statutes that he used to decide common-law cases.... He
will treat Congress as an author earlier than himself in the chain of law, though
an author with special powers and responsibilities different from his own, and he
will see his own role as fundamentally the creative one of a partner continuing
to develop, in what he believes is the best way, the statutory scheme Congress
began. He will ask himself which reading of the act ... shows the political
history including and surrounding that statute in the better light.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313 (1986).

115. Id at 313. The view that courts are a partner of the enacting Congress stands in
contrast to the views of those theorists who assume that the courts are agents of Congress.
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Each judge is ... like a novelist in the chain. He or she
must read through what other judges in the past have
written not simply to discover what these judges have said,
or their state of mind when they said it, but to reach an
opinion about what these judges have collectively done ....
Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case
before him, as a partner in a complex chain enterprise of
which these innumerable decisions, structures, conventions,
and practices are the history; it is his job to continue that
history into the future through what he does on the day. He
must interpret what has gone before because he has a
responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than
strike out in some new direction of his own. So he must
determine, according to his own judgment, what the earlier
decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice
so far, taken as a whole, really is.' 6
For Dworkin, the way judges ought to interpret statutes is truly
a function of his concept of what statutes are, or more generally his
concept of what law is. Dworkin argues for twin principles of
integrity: the legislative principle of integrity, which "asks lawmakers
to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent," and the
adjudicative principle, "which instructs that the law be seen as
coherent.""' 7
Further, he claims that "integrity is the key to the best construcThus, for
tive interpretation of our distinct legal practices.""'
Dworkin, law consists of a coherent fabric. In the terms of his own
analogy, law is not a book of disjointed short stories; rather, it is a
novel written over time by different authors striving for internal
coherence. The chain novel analogy thus operates not only as a
normative concept, but also as a description of our legal practice.
Law is a chain novel, and statutes are the first chapter. Since
Dworkin considers law to be a coherent scheme of principles,"9 it
116. Dworkin, supra note 113, at 542-43.
117. DwoRKIN, supra note 114, at 176.
118. hL at 216.
119. In Dworkin's own words:
We have two principles of political integrity: a legislative principle, which asks
lawmakers to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent, and an
adjudicative principle, which instructs that law be seen as coherent in that way,
so far as possible.... [T]he legislative principle is so much a part of our political
practice that no competent interpretation of that practice can ignore it.
Id at 176.

[I]ntegrity is the key to the best constructive interpretation of our distinct legal
practices and particularly of the way our judges decide hard cases at law.... I
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naturally follows that judges ought to interpret statutes according to
the chain novel method, or in other words to "treat our present
system of public standards as expressing and respecting a coherent set
of principles, and, to that end, to interpret these standards to find
implicit standards between and beneath the explicit ones." 12
Dworkin contrasts his "law as integrity" approach to what he
calls the "speaker's meaning" approach."' To Dworkin law never
has a meaning fixed in time; rather, law is the continual process of
interpretation. While this approach may seem uncontroversial for the
common law, prevailing doctrine rejects this notion in relation to
statutory law. Dworkin, however, holds his approach applicable to
both statutory law and common law."2 "The adjudicative principle
of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far
as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single
author-the community personified-expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness."'" Dworkin goes on to say, "According
to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or
follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due
process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the
community's legal practice." 24
2. Eskridge's Quasi-Dynamic Statutory Interpretation...
Professor Eskridge's prescriptive theory of statutory
interpretation is built around the "central proposition ... that
statutory interpretation [is] influenced by the ongoing, not just
original, history of the statute."' 26 His proposed method involves
the present-day interpreter's understanding of text, original legislative
expectations, and the evolution of the statute's social and legal
context-or what he calls the textual, historical, and evolutive

do not claim ... that our political practices enforce integrity perfectly. I
conceded that it would not be possible to bring all the discrete rules and other
standards enacted by our legislatures and still in force under any single, coherent
scheme of principle.
Id. at 216-17.
120. 1i at 217.
121. Id.at 315-37.
122. For another who argues that the judicial role ought not differ between common
and statutory law, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982).
123.
124.
125.
126.

DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 225.
Id.
Eskridge, supra note 34.
Id.at 1497.
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perspectives. In Eskridge's own words, the three perspectives are
applied as follows:
In many cases, the text of the statute will provide determinate answers, though we should trust our reading of the
text primarily when the statute is recent and the context of
enactment represents considered legislative deliberation and
decision on the interpretive issue. This is one end of the
continuum: the text controls. At the opposite end of the
continuum are those cases where neither the text nor the
historical context of the statute clearly resolves the
interpretive question, and the societal and legal context of
the statute has changed materially. In those cases, the
evolutive context controls. In general, the more detailed the
text is, the greater weight the interpreter will give to textual
considerations; the more recent the statute and the clearer
the legislative expectations, the greater weight the
interpreter will give to historical considerations; the more
striking the changes in circumstances (changes in public
values count more than factual changes in society), the
greater weight the interpreter will give to evolutive considerations.
Note, however, that Eskridge is not entirely clear in his prescriptive
theory. In the above quote, the implication is that the judge must
exercise judgment in deciding how to apply the three interpretive
perspectives-textual, historical, and evolutive-in a given case. At
other times, however, Eskridge seems to imply a more mechanistic,
or cybernetic, interpretive theory, as is exhibited in the following
quote:
[T]he textual perspective is critical in many cases.... When
the statutory text clearly answers the interpretive question
... it normally will be the most important consideration....
The historical perspective is the next most important
interpretive consideration; given the traditional assumptions
that the legislature is the supreme lawmaking body in a
democracy, the historical expectations of the enacting
legislature are entitled to deference. Hence, when a clear
text and supportive legislative history suggest the same
answer, they typically will control."'
Thus, the dynamic model views the evolutive perspective as most
important when the statutory text is not clear and the original

127. Id. at 1496.
128. Id at 1483-84.
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legislative expectations have been overtaken by subsequent changes
in society and law.
Like Dworkin, but unlike both textualists and intentionalists,
Eskridge does not conceive of statutes as static texts. Intentionalist
approaches assume that the legislative will is fixed at the time of
enactment. 9 Likewise, textual approaches argue that the meaning
of statutory text is frozen until superseded or modified by the
legislature. Eskridge and Dworkin, however, argue that statutory
texts have no fixed meanings at time of enactment, 130 and that
legislatures have no fixed wil. 131 Instead both text and intent are
fraught with gaps and ambiguities. Statutes are attempts to address
issues and problems, new variations of which develop over time. In
Eskridge's words, "[S]tatutes are dynamic things: they have different
meanings to different people, at different times, and in different legal
and societal contexts.... [Thus] courts should interpret statutes in
fight of their current as well as historical context."3
Though Eskridge labels his theory dynamic, in fact it is only a
quasi-dynamic interpretive approach. Where the text of a statute is
clear and original legislative expectations remain intact, Eskridge
counsels courts to adhere to traditional honest agent-style interpretive
methods. Only where text and legislative history leave an ambiguous
meaning, and original legislative expectations have changed, does a
dynamic element enter into Eskridge's approach to statutory
interpretation.
1 33
3. Calabresi's Common Law Courts
Judge Guido Calabresi offers his dynamic theory of statutory
interpretation as a response to the "orgy of statute making" that has
occurred over the last eighty years134 and the problem of "legal
obsolescence" it has spawned." 5 For much of the eighteenth
century, courts were the primary shapers of American law. Common
law tort, contract, and property, fabricated and applied by common

129. Eskridge points out that originalist approaches to statutory interpretation "assume
that the legislature fixes the meaning of a statute on the date the statute is enacted." Id.
at 1480.
130. Id at 1554.
131. Id at 1538-39 & n.241.
132. Id at 1554.
133. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 122 (describing the dynamic theory of
interpretation).
134. Id.at 1 (crediting Grant Gilmore for the phrase "orgy of statute making").
135. lIdat 2.
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law courts, ordered much of private and commercial life for the first
37
100 years of the nation's existence. 6 Statutory law was rare,'
and when Congress did create statutory regimes they were either
confined to areas not fit for judicial law creation, such as the granting
of licenses,1 38 or were codifications of common law principles
3
vaguely phrased and leaving much room for judicial elaboration. 1
Further, when a statute did intrude into areas traditionally regulated
by the common law, it underwent strict interpretation by common law
judges designed to give the statute its narrowest possible impact."4
As a result, much of American law in the nineteenth century was
shaped by the slow, accretional, decentralized common law method.
Today, of course, statutes are the primary source of American
law. The movement away from common law and toward statutory
law began with the Progressive era and accelerated during both the
New Deal' and the "rights revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s.42
Today we are, in Calabresi's words, "choking on statutes."' 43 The
fallout from this shift in the primary source of American law includes
an increasing use of the Constitution, especially the Equal Protection
Clause, to invalidate statutes,'4 the use of statutory interpretation
methods that stray far from attempts to discern legislative intent, 45
and the delegation of much authority to administrative agencies. 46
Most importantly, however, as a consequence of the
" 'statutorification' of American law,"" we face the problem of
"legal obsolescence."'" Due to "legislative inertia," statutes that
136. IL at 4; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 17-18 (1990).
137. CALABRESI, supra note 122, at 4.

138. Id at 184 n.1.
139. Id at 5, 83, 188 n.22; GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 71-72
(1977).
140. CALABRESI, supra note 122, at 4, 186 n.15. The phrase of the day was that
"statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly construed." 3 NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.01, at 171 (5th ed. 1992); Shaw
v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 560 (1879).
141. CALABRESI, supra note 122, at 5; SUNSTEIN, supra note 136, at 19-24.
142. SUNSTEIN, supra note 136, at 24-31.
143. CALABRESI, supra note 122, at 1.
144. Ia at 8-15.
145. Id at 31-43.
146. Id at 44-58.
147. Id at 1.
148. Id. at 2. In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987), is a prime example of legal
obsolescence. In Erickson, a 1935 statute made certain farm implements, including a
"mower," unavailable for satisfaction of civil judgments. The court had to decide whether

a modem "haybine" qualified as "mower" under the statute. Judge Easterbrook, the
author of the opinion, wrote, "The problem in this case comes from the fact that
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have been passed are very difficult to repeal.149 Once passed, a
statute is likely to remain on the books even if it no longer can claim
majoritarian support and no longer fits the legal landscape. 50
Judges, Calabresi argues, do not sit idly by while statutory law
becomes obsolete. Though "taught to honor legislative supremacy,"
judges have also been "trained to think of the law as functional, as
responsive to current needs and current majorities, and as abhorring
discriminations, special treatments, and inconsistencies not required
by current majorities.""' While unwilling to blatantly ignore clear
but anachronistic
statutes, judges have resorted to the use of various
"subterfuges"' 52 -striking down statutes as unconstitutional that
would otherwise be upheld," 3 employing questionable approaches
t relying upon "passive virtues" such as
to statutory interpretation,"
"void for vagueness" 5 - an attempt to keep statutory law current
and functional.
But the use of subterfuges to keep law consistent with the legal
landscape, Calabresi argues, is an inadequate remedy to the problem
of legal obsolescence. On the one hand, subterfuges are blunt
instruments for updating the law. For example, regarding the use of
questionable methods of statutory interpretation as a subterfuge,
Calabresi writes, "No matter how 'functionally' courts approach
[statutory interpretation], as long as it is tied to a search for original
legislative intent, interpretation is bound to give courts too much
scope in reworking some statutes and, at the same time, to leave
courts powerless before other statutory anachronisms."" 6 Rather
technology has done more to change farm implements than the Wisconsin legislature has
done to change § 815.18(6)." Id. at 1092. Judge Easterbrook, usually the narrow
textualist, relied on the purpose of the statute, and the evolution in farm equipment, to
hold that a modem haybine qualifies as a mower, thus updating the statute. Id. at 1092-95.
149. CALABRESI, supra note 122, at 188 n.23 (citing GILMORE, supra note 139, at 95).
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id.
152. Id.at 172-77.
153. Id. at 8-15.
154. Id. at 31-43.

155. Id. at 16-31.
156. Id. at 42. On the other hand, the use of subterfuges can distort the meaning and
function of legal principles. When, for example, a court stretches constitutional principles
in an effort to strike down an anachronistic law, the meaning of these constitutional
principles may change in ways that can have unforeseen and perhaps unwanted
consequences in later adjudications. For example, in order to do away with an
anachronistic Connecticut statute banning the sale of contraceptives (CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-32 (1960)), in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court had
to stretch constitutional law in ways that were at the time, and today remain, controversial.
See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1391
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than rely on subterfuge to deal with the problem of statutes that

"could not be repealed and yet ...would never be reenacted,"'57

Calabresi argues that courts should
have the power to treat statutes in precisely the same way
they treat common law... [to] alter the written law or
some part of it in the same way (and with the same reluctance) in which they can modify or abandon a common law
doctrine or even a whole complex set of interrelated
doctrines ...[and] use this power either to make changes

themselves or, by threatening to use the power, to induce
legislatures to act."'
Calabresi's common law approach is tempered by a handful of
guidelines. A court, for example, should exercise its common law
powers only where a statute is "out of phase" with the "legal
landscape,"' should maintain a conservative bias against the
exercise of revisionary power,"6 and should presume that newly
enacted statutes enjoy current majoritarian support even if they are
out of phase with the legal landscape.' 6' Once a court has decided
that a particular statute is obsolete, however, Calabresi advocates that
the court go as far as to "strike down the existing rule and substitute
a new one... [or] strike down a rule and leave no rule in effect."' 62
Like the other dynamic theories of statutory interpretation,
Calabresi's common law approach envisions a dialogic statutory law
creation process in which both the legislature and courts play a role.
Calabresi, however, allocates the powers and responsibilities in this
process differently than Dworkin and Eskridge. Under Dworkin's
chain novel approach, when shaping statutory law a court would be
constrained to working within the parameters set by the enacting
Congress. Stated in terms of the chain novel metaphor, a court must
write a chapter in the chain novel of law that cohere with the initial
chapter written by the legislature. Though Dworkin's theory of
statutory interpretation leaves courts plenty of leeway for shaping
statutory law, it nonetheless demands that a statutory interpretation
in any given case is minimally consistent with the initial action of the

(describing Griswold as the origin of the "most controversial, boldly-constitutional species

of privacy").
157. CALABRESI, supra note 122, at 8.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.at 82.
Id.at 121.
1d at 123-24.
Id.at 132.
Id. at 147-48.
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legislature. In Dworkin's words, a judge interpreting a statute "must
justify the story as a whole, not just its ending."1" Calabresi's
common law method, in contrast, demands no consistency between
the way a court shapes a statute and the initial actions of the
legislature. Instead, Calabresi suggests that a judge try to shape
statutes so that they are consistent with current majoritarian preferences and the current legal landscape. Where a statute has become an
anachronism a court should disregard it and reform the law to be
consistent not with the initial actions of the legislature, but with
current majoritarian preferences and law. Calabresi's common law
method also differs from Eskridge's approach. Under Eskridge's
dynamic theory of statutory interpretation the evolutive perspective
exclusively controls only where the statute is old and its language does
not directly address the issue at hand. 164 Where a statute is new and
specifically addresses the issue before a court, however, the textual
perspective controls. Under Calabresi's common law approach, in
contrast, only a rebuttable presumption that a recent statute enjoys
majoritarian support keeps the court from exercising revisionary
powers.
One is tempted to see Calabresi's approach as the most radical
of the dynamic theories or statutory interpretation. Actually,
however, Calabresi's common law method is no more radical than are
Eskridge's or Dworkin's dynamic theories. The difference between
the three lies in the constraints each places upon the law-shaping
function of courts. Dworkin cabins courts' law-shaping function by
insisting that any judicial gloss on a statute coheres with the initial
legislative enactment. Eskridge limits the law-shaping function of
courts to situations in which a statute does not specifically address the
question before the court and the statute is old. Calabresi argues that
courts may operate as common law-style courts only when a statute
is of the kind that, due to legislative inertia, cannot be repealed, but
nonetheless could not be enacted again today. In the end, however,
all three approaches place well-defined (albeit nontraditional)
constraints on judicial statute-revising powers.

163. DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 338.
164. Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1497.
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Aleinikoff's Synchronic Coherence' 15

Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff has put forth a final dynamic
theory of statutory interpretation. His theory is very simple. When
interpreting statutes, Aleinikoff argues, judges should "treat the
statute as if it had been enacted yesterday and try to make sense of
it in today's world."'" Aleinikoff explains his approach with the aid
of Boutilier v. INS, 67 which interpreted § 212(a) of the McCarranWalter Act,'" as an exemplar. The McCarran-Walter Act sets forth
grounds for excluding aliens from entering the United States, which
included "aliens ...afflicted with [a] psychopathic personality... or
mental defect.' 69 In Boutilier the Supreme Court read this language to include homosexuality, therefore excluding homosexual
aliens from entry into the United States. The Court employed an
intentional interpretive method, relying heavily upon extrinsic
evidence of congressional intent. Aleinikoff concedes that under the
intentionalist approach used by the Court, Boutilier was correctly
decided.'
Legislative history provides fairly clear evidence that
Congress intended to include homosexual aliens within the meaning
of the statutory words "psychopathic personality ... or a mental
defect." 71
Rather than the intentional approach the Court
employed, however, Aleinikoff argues for a "present-minded analysis"
which would ask the following questions:
Would a reader of the statute [the McCarran-Walter Act]
today be likely to think it requires the exclusion of
homosexuals? Why would a legislature [today] enact this
law? What could it have been trying to accomplish? If a
legislature today sought to exclude aliens based on their
sexual orientation, would it be likely to choose the words of
the statute to do so? If the statute is read to exclude
homosexuals, how would we [today] then be inclined to state

165. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REv. 20,
46-54 (1988).
166. ld. at 49 (emphasis in original omitted).
167. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
168. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 182

(1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1988)).
169. Id.§ 212(a)(4), quoted in Aleinikoff, supra note 165, at 48.
170. Aleinikoff, supra note 165, at 52.
171. A Senate report on the bill stated that "[t]he Public Health Service has advised
that the provision for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality or a
mental defect.., is sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex
perverts." S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952).
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the objective of the statute? Would this reformulated
purpose cover other cases that the words would lead us to
believe ought to be covered? Would this reformulated
purpose make us understand the words in a new way? If
read to cover homosexual aliens, how would the statute fit
with other laws on the books? Does such an interpretation
appear consistent with broader prevailing common law and
constitutional norms?'7
These are the familiar questions a judge asks when interpreting
statutes, but, Aleinikoff argues, they are concerned with "presentmindedness" rather than backward-looking original legislative
intent. By asking the typical questions of statutory interpretation,
but with a present-minded spin, an old statute is woven into today's
legal system and today's 74conditions, achieving what Aleinikoff calls
"synchronic coherence."'
Applied to the McCarran-Walter Act,
a present-minded approach to statutory interpretation would ask not
whether legislators in 1952 thought that homosexuality constituted a
psychopathic personality or a mental defect, but instead whether
homosexuality constitutes a psychopathic personality or a mental
defect by today's standards.
D. The HonestAgent Conception in Textual and IntentionalStatutory
Interpretation
The different permutations of textualism, intentionalism, and
dynamicism either directly employ or imply a variety of descriptive
conceptions of statutes. Under Hart and Sacks's legal process
approach, statutes are purposive problem-solving devices put forth by
rational, well-intentioned legislatures. 5 Under Posner's imaginative
reconstruction theory, statutes are commands issued by a superior to
a subordinate which must be carried out even if unclear. 76 Under
Easterbrook's new textualism, statutes are, unlike legislative intent, 77a
clear memorialization of compromises that ought not be upset.
Where Dworkin views statutes as the first chapter in a chain
novel, 78 and Eskridge views statutes as text created in the past but

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Aleinikoff, supra note 165, at 49.
Id.
I at 49-50.
See supra part II.B.3.
See supra part II.B.2.
See Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 540, 550-51.
See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.

1996]

STA TUTOR Y INTERPRETATION

applied to present problems, 7 9 Aleinikoff views statutes as vessels
embarked on a voyage into constantly changing conditions.,
Despite these differences, one can draw a fundamental line of
demarcation between two groups of interpretive theories and their
corresponding positive conceptions of statutes. Both intentionalist
and textualist interpretive theories view statutes as having fixed
meanings at the moment of enactment,'' while dynamic interpretive
theories view statutory meaning as a fluid thing that takes its first
form upon enactment, but can bend or change shape as it works its
way through time, varying contexts, and different parts of the legal
process. Even if a statute has a certain meaning when enacted, its
meaning can be adjusted in light of new information, unforeseen
situations, or a changed legal landscape. Other commentators have
noted this subsurface distinction between textual and intentionalist
approaches on the one hand, and dynamic approaches on the other.
Professor Aleinikoff's analysis, for example, divides statutory
interpretation theories into two main camps: archaeological and
nautical."8' Archaeological interpretive theories-textualism and
intentionalism-view the "meaning of a statute [as] set in stone on the
date of its enactment," while the nautical interpretive
model-exemplified by Dworkin's and Aleinikoff's approaches-"understands a statute as an on-going process (a voyage)"
in which both Congress and the courts play a role in navigating the
ship. Professor Eskridge also has pointed out that textualist and
intentionalist approaches to statutory interpretation "treat statutes as
static texts" that have a determinate meaning"m while dynamic
theories involve a process of "understanding a text created in the past
and applying it to a present problem."'"
The different descriptive accounts of statutes associated with
textual/intentional and dynamic theories of statutory interpretation fit
like puzzle pieces with their respective normative foundations.
179.

ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 102, at 616.
180. See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.

181. Thus, any disagreement over interpretive methodology between the two is really
a debate about which interpretive rules judges ought to employ in discerning those fixed
meanings. While textualists emphasize statutory texts and intentionalists stress the intents
of enacting Congresses, both approaches are at bottom methods for interpreting statutory
meanings fixed at the time of enactment. The idea that statutes have a fixed meaning at
the time of enactment stands in polar opposition to the dynamicists' fundamental positive
conception of statutes as fluid, mutable, evolving instruments.
182. Aleinikoff, supra note 165, at 21.
183. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 102, at 613; Eskridge, supranote 34, at 1479-80.
184. Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1482-83.
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Textual and intentional statutory interpretation theories are both
founded upon the normative idea that the third branch ought to act
as the "honest agent" of the first branch. As honest agents, judges
interpreting statutes ought to have as their goal the discovery and
application of statutory meanings fixed at the time of enactment.
Posner, and Farber and Frickey, who build upon Posner's intentionalist imaginative reconstruction theory, for example, speak
explicitly of courts as the "honest agent" of Congress. 5 Textualists
such as Scalia and Easterbrook also invoke the honest agent image in
their writings. When deploying textual-intentionalist rhetoric, Scalia
argues that courts should interpret statutes so as to vindicate the will
of the entire enacting Congress." 6 Likewise, Easterbrook supports
his "new textualism" by arguing that textualism is the approach that
the legislature would want courts to adopt, since it allows the
legislature maximal freedom of choice."s Further, Easterbrook goes
as far as to explicitly refer to courts as "honest agents of the political
branches," who ought to "faithfully execut[e] decisions made by
others." ' Professor Aleinikoff has noted the connection between
the textualist/intentionalist positive conception of statutes and their
normative vision of the relationship between the first and third
branches:
The archeological metaphor conceives of statutory meaning
as determined on the date of the statute's enactment. The
model is premised on legislative supremacy and separation
of powers. In our system of government, the legislature is
assigned the chief law-making responsibility; an interpreter's
job is to be faithful to the legislative will-as expressed in
authoritative utterances called statutes-lest the interpreter
become the lawmaker....
Two strategies of interpretation have dominated the
archeological perspective: textualism (or plain meaning) and
intentionalism (or purpose analysis)."

185. Posner speaks of courts' role vis-a-vis Congress as "a helping one," Posner, supra
note 56, at 198, and analogizes courts to military subordinates trying to interpret communications from superiors, id.at 189-90. Farber and Frickey present their elaboration
on Posner's theory in Farber & Frickey, supra note 39, at 461-65.
186. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment).
187. Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 546-47.
188. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984).
189. Aleinikoff, supra note 165, at 22.
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Professor Sunstein has also noted the "honest agent" conception
underlying textual and intentional statutory interpretation theories.
He frames the issue as follows:
The most prominent conception of the role of courts...
in statutory construction is that they are agents or servants
of the legislature. As agents, courts should say what the
statute means, and in that process language, history, and
structure are relevant; but background norms, policy
considerations, or general principles are immaterial. Above
all, those who accept the agency view would bar courts from
undertaking value-laden inquiries into (for example)
appropriate institutional arrangements, or statutory function
and failure, as part of the process of interpretation. The
judicial task is one of discerning and applying a judgment
made by others, most notably the legislature.'
The textual and intentional-or in Aleinikoff's terms, archaeological-theories, which view the federal courts as agents of
Congress, stand in sharp contrast to dynamic interpretive theories.
Aleinikoff summarizes the normative underpinnings of dynamic, or in
his terminology "nautical," interpretive theories as follows:
Nautical models are built on an understanding of the
nature of statutes and the role of interpreters that is fundamentally different from the view that underlies an
archeological approach. Archeologists see statutes as onceshouted commands that continue simply to echo through
time. Current readers of the statute are not interpreters;
they are receivers of messages, capturing and recording the
communication precisely as it was uttered long ago. This is
a singularly inapt description of statutes and interpreters.
Enactment of a statute represents the beginning of a
journey, not the end. The statute "means" nothing until it
takes its place in the legal system, until it begins to interact
with judges, lawyers, administrators, and lay people. Each
of these interactions changes, or fills out, the meaning of the
statute.... Interpreters are not reporters or historians,
searching out the facts of the past. They are creators of
meaning.'
In short, where textual and intentional interpretation theories are
built upon the normative assumption that the third branch ought to
act as the honest agent of the first, always striving to find the correct

190. SUNSTEIN, supra note 136, at 112.
191. Aleinikoff, supra note 165, at 57 (footnote omitted).
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or most accurate meaning of the legislative command or intention,
dynamic theories are built on the assumption that the first and third
branches ought to act as collaborators engaged in a dialogic statutory
law-creating enterprise.
Under the honest agent conception underlying textualism and
intentionalism, the aim of rules of statutory interpretation is to
minimize the "costs" inherent in the principal-agent relationship
between Congress and the federal courts. The costs of the agency
relationship are of two types. First, there are costs of discretion.
Here the fear is that the federal courts, when interpreting open
textured statutory language, will divine some interpretation not
intended or commanded by the enacting Congress. The interpretation
may be under-inclusive in that it fails to cover instances the enacting
Congress wished to include, or it may be over-inclusive in that it
covers certain instances that Congress intended to exclude. In Smith
v. United States,1" for example, if in fact Congress did not intend
federal sentencing statutes to require sentence enhancement in cases
where a gun is used merely as an item of barter, then the Supreme
Court's holding would be over-inclusive. One may read Justice
Scalia's dissent in Smith as arguing that the set of interpretive rules
the majority opinion applies-a literalist form of textualism-results
in an over-inclusive interpretation. Justice Scalia believes that a
conventionalist textualism works better for capturing no more and no
less than the intent of the entire enacting Congress than does Justice
O'Connor's literalism. 193
The second type of cost inherent in the agency relationship
between Congress and the federal courts is the cost of constraint.
Here the problem is that a set of statutory interpretation rules or
practices may tie a court's hands from probing information that would
illuminate the actual command or intent of the enacting Congress. As
with discretion, constraint can result in over-inclusive or underinclusive interpretations. Again, to take Smith as an example, one
could imagine a second dissent arguing that the textual interpretive
approaches of both Justice O'Connor's majority opinion and Justice
Scalia's dissent fail to look at relevant information that could shed
light on the interpretive issue. A committee report, floor debate
transcripts, or post-enactment comments by key legislators might give
a clear indication of whether the enacting Congress intended sentence

192. 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
193. See id at 2061 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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enhancement where a defendant trades a firearm for illicit narcotics.
Since textualist interpretive rules employed by both Justices O'Connor
and Scalia exclude potentially illuminating information from the
interpretive analysis, the Court's analysis may be needlessly over- or
under-inclusive.
The problem is that the costs of discretion and the costs of
constraint cannot be simultaneously minimized. If the set of statutory
interpretation rules gives courts enough discretion to avoid over- or
under-inclusive interpretations resulting from an overly constraining
interpretive regime, courts will unintentionally but inevitably go
beyond the legislative command. Worse, a court with too much
discretion may strategically use evidence of legislative intent to
interpret statutes willfully in ways the enacting Congress never
intended. Under Posner's imaginative reconstruction theory, for
example, nothing stops a court from exercising discretion in a way
that intentionally or unintentionally reads ambiguities into the
legislative "command" along the lines of judicial, rather than
legislative, policy preferences. In principal-agent terminology, if the
agent/courts are afforded too much interpretive discretion, they will
inevitably (and possibly intentionally) misconstrue the principal/legislature's command or will, engaging in self-dealing behavior.
The costs of agent discretion are inherent in any principal-agent
relationship. On the other hand, an attempt to limit the costs of
discretion with constraining interpretive rules will result in interpretive
errors due to the exclusion of relevant information from the
interpretive inquiry. By guarding against misuse and abuse of "too
much" court discretion, one blinds the court to information that
would tend to resolve statutory ambiguities in accord with the
enacting Congress's policy command or preference. Courts operating
under strict four-corners textualism, for example, will often follow the
words of the enacting Congress, but not its will. Smith v. United
States is a good example of this phenomenon. In principal-agent
terminology, if the agent/court's interpretive inquiry is too
constrained, then the agent will inevitably ignore information that
could make crystal clear an otherwise ambiguous statutory text. As
with the costs of discretion, the costs of constraint are inherent in any
principal-agent relationship.
Since minimizing the agency costs of discretion maximizes the
agency costs of constraint, and vice versa, the different textual and
intentional interpretive theories, which afford various levels of
discretion and constraint, can be seen as attempts to minimize the
sum total costs of the two types of agency costs. Thus, differences
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between the textual and intentional schools, and debates within each
school, center upon which set of interpretive rules or practices
minimizes the sum total costs of discretion and constraint. 9 4 The
debate operates on two levels. At the meta-level, statutory
interpretation theorists argue about the relative costs of discretion and
constraint. Textualists tend to emphasize the costs associated with
discretion. An underlying theme of textualist theory is the paramount
importance of limiting the ability of courts to infuse statutory law with
their own independent policy judgments. Thus, the textualist
Easterbrook stresses that any attempt by a court to discern statutory
meaning beyond that clearly expressed in the text "is a transfer of a
substantial measure of decision-making authority from the speaker
[Congress] to the interpreter."'9 5
Proponents of intentional
statutory interpretation, in contrast, emphasize the costs associated
with constraint. Posner's military analogy, for example, argues that
when faced with an ambiguous command a subordinate ought not
refrain from action, but should instead exercise discretion and ask
what the "commander" would want in the case of ambiguous communications.'9 6

194. The cases of West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) and Friedrich
v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 499
U.S. 933 (1991), illustrate this point. In Friedrich,Judge Posner applied his imaginative
reconstruction approach to the issue of whether, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the prevailing
party may recover fees paid for experts hired to prepare a case and testify. Posner wrote:
We are quite aware that appeals to literalism are common. The cases are
thick with references to "plain meaning" and with such tired saws as that
interpretation must begin with the words of the statute-and stop there if they
are clear. In fact, interpretation must begin with the linguistic and cultural
competence presupposed by the author of the statute.... [L]egislatures,
including the Congress of the United States, often legislate in haste, without
considering fully the potential application of their words to novel settings....
When a court can figure out what Congress probably was driving at and how
its goal can be achieved, it is not usurpation ... for the court to complete (not
enlarge) the statute by reading it to bring about the end that the legislators would
have specified had they thought about it more clearly ....
Friedrich,888 F.2d at 513-14.
On appeal from Freidrich,the Supreme Court in Casey dismissed Posner's interpretive
approach as "profoundly mistak[ing] our role." Casey, 499 U.S. at 100. Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia employed a textualist approach, arguing that anything but the strict
enforcement of unambiguous statutory language is a "usurpation" by the Court. See id.
at 100-01. Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens argued in favor of Posner's imaginative
reconstruction approach to statutory interpretation. See id. at 103-16 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Frickey, supra note 6, at 263-67 (analyzing Justice Stevens's opinion
in Casey).
195. Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 536.
196. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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Beyond the agency costs of discretion and constraint and their
relative importance, the statutory interpretation debate operates on
a technical level. On this level textual and intentional statutory
interpretation theorists concern themselves with empirical matters
related to the costs of discretion and constraint, including issues such
as whether legislative intent exists, whether historical evidence of
legislative intent is likely to be skewed, whether courts afforded
substantial interpretive discretion are likely to act as strategic policy
actors, the merits of various types of legislative history for discerning
intent, and whether non-repeal suggests tacit legislative approval of
a controversial statutory interpretation.
Where textual and intentional theories seek an optimal set of
interpretive rules or interpretive practices for minimizing the agency
costs of discretion and constraint, dynamic theorists aim for
interpretive rules and practices that divide up the statutory lawcreating task between
Congress and the federal courts in the most
"efficient" way."9 Put differently, dynamic theories are efforts to
allocate statutory law-creating authority between the first and third
branches in ways that maximize coherence of statutory law with the
legal landscape, consistency with current majoritarian sentiments, the
use of novel information, consideration of changing contextual
circumstances, and the continuing vitality of statutory law. Just as
business enterprises utilize specialization and division of labor to run
an efficient production process, so too does the government under
dynamic approaches to statutory interpretation divide labor between
Congress and the federal courts. Under Dworkin's chain novel
theory, for example, Congress "writes" the first chapter, and the
federal courts "write" subsequent chapters. In Aleinikoff's current
Congress approach, a past Congress passes a statute, and the federal
courts interpret it in accord with the most probable wishes of the
current Congress. Dynamic statutory interpretation theories focus
more upon the quality of the end product rather than upon which
branch of government plays the central role in creating that product,
and they are built upon the recognition that allowing courts arole in
shaping statutory law results in a more coherent, up-to-date, and
enlightened body of statutory law. Institutional roles follow statutory
function.
Proponents of textual and intentional statutory
interpretation, in contrast, are concerned primarily with who makes
197. Here I refer to "efficiency" as productive efficiency, rather than Pareto optimality.
On the various uses of the term efficiency, see JULEs L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS
AND THE LAW (1988).
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statutory law, and only secondarily with how well it is made, and with
the quality of statutes as end products. Under the honest agent
conception of textual and intentional interpretation, the institutional
role of the federal courts in interpreting statutes arises out of what
Congress lacks-time and adjudicative expertise. Indeed, it is a lack
of time and special expertise on the part of principals that gives rise
to most principal-agent relationships. Under dynamic theories,
however, the federal courts' role in statutory interpretation arises out
of unique virtues they can bring to the statutory law creation process.
Rather than viewing courts as agents doing the principals' bidding,
dynamic theories envision the third branch as a collaborator with the
first, bringing vital qualities to the law-creating enterprise.
Though dynamic statutory interpretation theorists reject the
honest agent conception underlying textual and intentional statutory
interpretation, they are nonetheless concerned with the costs of
discretion and constraint. Viewing the first and third branches as
collaborators implies that each is to play a distinct role in the
statutory law-creating process. Though dynamic theories offer courts
more discretion than textual or intentional theories, limiting court
discretion is clearly central to keeping courts within a distinct
institutional role. Thus the real difference between textual/intentional
theories and dynamic theories lies in why they are concerned with the
costs of discretion and constraint. Where the former seek to minimize
agency costs inherent in the principal-agent relationship between
Congress and the federal courts, the latter are aimed at an optimal
allocation of institutional functions between these two branches of
government.
As such, dynamic theories adjust the level of
interpretive discretion and constraint, not in an effort to render the
federal courts perfect agents of Congress, but rather in the hope of
making the federal courts' role most conducive to the maintenance of
a coherent, updated, or rational body of statutory law. In Calabresi's
common law method, for example, courts are afforded substantial
interpretive discretion in cases where the statute in question is
obsolete, and in Eskridge's dynamic theory the level of interpretive
discretion rises as textual and historical meanings become less
determinate. In both cases the level of discretion afforded courts is
sensitive to the courts' unique institutional role in updating statutory
law. Stated from the opposite perspective, the level of constraint
upon courts under both theories is sensitive to whether or not
statutory law is likely to need updating or evolution.
A surprising fact about the scholarly debate over statutory
interpretation during the last decade is that it has for the most part
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ignored the normative institutional visions underlying textual,
intentional, and dynamic interpretive approaches. Perhaps because
of the dominance of textual and intentional theories in legal practice,
commentators have given little explicit attention to whether the
federal courts ought to be considered the honest agents of Congress,
or instead considered coequal collaborators in the statutory lawcreating process. The following section takes this issue head on.
III. FOUNDATIONS: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND SEPARATION
OF POWERS THEORY IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Generally, rules may be analyzed in two ways. First, one can
examine whether a rule operates to effectuate its background
justification. This approach concerns the technical issue of whether
a rule is over- or under-inclusive with respect to results the rule is
designed to produce. 9 ' Does a rule capture all of the instances that
its background justification would? Does it capture instances that its
background justification would not? The second way to analyze rules
is to examine their background justifications themselves. Here the
question is whether the background justification is worthy of being
followed. Much of the debate over statutory interpretation has
centered on the first way of analyzing rules. This Part, however,
employs the second method. Rather than asking which approach to
statutory interpretation, or which set of statutory interpretation rules,
best effectuates its background justifications, we will ask which of the
background justifications are worthy and which are not.
Central to the analysis is an awareness of the role statutory
interpretation rules play in allocating law-creating authority.'99 Both

textual and intentional interpretive rules attempt to locate statutory
law-creating authority primarily within the first branch, viewing the
federal courts as honest agents of Congress, with the sole objective of
enforcing the congressional command or will. Congress, the principal,
creates law, while the federal courts, the agents, are limited to
applying it in specific cases. Under both textual and intentional rules
of statutory interpretation, any law-creating role for the federal courts
is a mere byproduct of the agency relationship between the first and
third branches, an unavoidable but minimizable cost of the agency
Differences between textual and intentional
relationship.

A PHILOSOPHICAL
198. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 31-34 (1991).
199. Id. at 158-62.
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interpretation are technical ones regarding which set of interpretive
rules operates to minimize the agency costs inherent in the agency
relationship. Textualists, for the most part, emphasize the agency
costs inherent in affording the federal courts free-ranging discretion
in discerning the legislative command. Thus, they offer a simple but
tightly-constraining approach-interpret with the aid of text and only
the text. Intentionalists, in contrast, focus more on the agency costs
inherent in constraining the federal courts with an overly limiting set
of interpretive rules. Judges who only look to text when interpreting
statutes will be little more than mechanical literalists, often failing to
discern the true legislative will. For this reason, intentionalists
emphasize the importance of a diverse array of interpretive tools,
which allow the judge enough breathing room to resolve statutory
ambiguities in accord with the most probable legislative intent.
The various permutations of dynamic interpretive rules are
rooted in a balanced allocation of law-creating authority between the
first and third branches. Rather than presuppose a principal-agent
relationship between Congress and the federal courts, dynamic
theories envision an ongoing dialogic law-creating process between the
first and third branches. Rather than aiming to minimize inevitable
costs of a principal-agent relationship, dynamic statutory
interpretation rules are designed to create a process through which
statutory law is continually purified, updated, perfected, and reshaped
to incorporate new information, unforeseen events, or changes in the
legal landscape. The danger, of course, is that judges will abuse the
broad discretion dynamic approaches offer.
Once it is understood that the rules of statutory interpretation at
bottom function to allocate statutory law-creating authority between
the first and third branches, the question shifts from the technical
issue of how courts ought to interpret statutes (are the rules over- or
under-inclusive regarding their background justifications?) to the more
fundamental normative issue of the proper relationship between the
first and third branches (which background justifications ought to be
followed?). An answer to the former must be derived from an answer
to the latter. At the abstract level, therefore, this Part is concerned
with the following questions: Should rules of statutory interpretation
be designed to effectuate a principal-agent relationship between
Congress and the federal courts? Or instead should the design of
statutory interpretation rules be based on the notion that the first and
third branches are collaborative players in a statutory law-creating
game? Are the federal courts to be commanded by Congress? Or
are the two to engage in a dialogue between peers? Ought legislative
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supremacy be the root of statutory interpretation doctrine? Or should
we seek its roots elsewhere?
We shall address these abstract issues by examining two
principles at the core of the federal Constitution-popular sovereignty
and separation of powers. Why are these two core constitutional
principles helpful in understanding either statutory interpretation or
the more fundameiltal issue of the proper relationship between
Congress and the federal courts?2" Briefly, the federal Constitution
embodies and reflects our axiomatic political principles, and current
government practices and institutional structure must at least be
consistent with these principles.
While proponents of both textual and intentional statutory
interpretation have pointed to separation of powers and democratic
legitimacy as constitutional principles supporting the honest agent
conception,'O their analyses have been cursory at best. Arguments
in support of textual and intentional statutory interpretation too often
assume simple models of separation of powers and democratic
legitimacy without examining whether they in fact are consistent with
the principles animating the federal Constitution. The largely
unexamined conventional wisdom among statutory interpretation
theorists is that both separation of powers and democratic legitimacy
provide strong support for the honest agent conception. Even those
theorists who espouse the use of dynamic statutory interpretation are
aware of the deeply rooted acceptance of the idea that the federal
courts ought to act as the subordinate agents of Congress.E To
caricature the academic debate on statutory interpretation, dynamic
theorists argue that honest agent-style statutory interpretation leads
to obsolete and incoherent statutory law, whereas an evolutive
perspective allows for a present-minded body of statutory law. In
retort, proponents of textual and intentional statutory interpretation
argue that separation of powers and democratic legitimacy require

200. The idea that popular sovereignty ought to inform legal practice has been invoked
by others. Professor Amar, for example, argues that the law of sovereign immunity is
"antithetical" to popular sovereignty, and therefore ought to be reformed. Akhil R.
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466 (1987).
201. For a description of these principles, see Aleinikoff, supra note 165, at 22.
202. Thus, Judge Calabresi devotes much of his book, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES, supra note 122, to arguing that his approach is really just an outgrowth of
widely accepted traditions, and to explaining the many limitations his approach carries.
Likewise, Professor Eskridge calls his dynamic theory a "cautious one" in which the
evolutive perspective is appropriate only when a statute is old, when it does not specifically
address the issue at hand, and when the policy context or public values have undergone
a decisive shift. Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1554-55.
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that the federal courts act as the honest agents of Congress. Even if
dynamic interpretation leads to updated and coherent statutory law,
claim textualists and intentionalists, the dynamic approaches are
inconsistent with constitutional principles, and are therefore impermissible.
A close look at the popular sovereignty and separation of powers
theories in the federal Constitution reveals strong reasons to doubt
the retort of honest agent proponents. Briefly, in 1776, at the height
of the Revolution, Americans embraced a radically populist form of
popular sovereignty and an "unalloyed" version of separation of
powers. The populist form of popular sovereignty was characterized
by the idea that legislatures were the sole legitimate agents of the
people in government, while the unalloyed version of separation of
powers was characterized by legislative supremacy and a lack of
overlapping powers between the three branches of government.
Eleven years later, however, at the time of the Founding, a federalist
form of popular sovereignty, and a balanced version of separation of
powers, emerged to supplant their Revolutionary-era predecessors.
The federalist form of popular sovereignty is characterized by the idea
that all three branches of government are coequal or peer agents of
the people, while the balanced version of separation of powers is
characterized by checks and balances, the rejection of legislative
supremacy, and an enhanced role for courts in the institutional
structure of government. The honest agent conception is consistent
with the popular sovereignty and separation of powers theories
favored at the time of the Revolution, but it is incompatible with the
Founding era popular sovereignty and separation of powers theories
that were ratified into the federal Constitution. Rather than supporting the use of statutory interpretation rules based upon the honest
agent conception, fundamental principles of the federal Constitution
argue for statutory interpretation rules designed to effectuate a
dialogic law-creating game in which both Congress and the federal
courts act as peer players.
A. Popular Sovereignty and Statutory Interpretation
The central idea of popular sovereignty is that the people are the
one and only sovereign in civil society; as sovereign the people may
cede governing authority to a constituted government, which is
charged with the duty to pursue public-regarding policies. To borrow
Professor Amar's words, under popular sovereignty "[t]rue
sovereignty reside[s] in the People themselves.... Government
officials [are] 'representatives,' 'agents,' 'delegates,' 'deputies,' and
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'servants' of the People.... As sovereign, the People need not wield
day-to-day power themselves, but could act through agents on whom
they conferred limited powers."'2
Thus, the essence of popular
sovereignty is a principal-agent relationship between a principal/people and their constituted agent/government, under which a
sovereign people grant governing power and authority to a
government that acts as a trustee over the people's sovereignty. 4
Under popular sovereignty theory a main purpose of constitutions
is the creation of an institutional scheme or structure that minimizes
the agency costs inherent in the principal-agent relationship between
a principal/people and their constituted agent/government. Much as
the law of agency or the law of trusts sets forth rules that guide and
constrain agents and trustees, under popular sovereignty theory
constitutions set forth rules guiding and constraining an
agent/government.
Ideally, a 'constitution affords the
agent/government enough power so that it may act for the good and
betterment of the principal/people, but at the same time constrains
the agent/government from engaging in self-dealing policies or policies
at odds with the public interest. James Madison's famous words from
FederalistNumber 51 point to the central dilemma of the principalagent relationships between a people and their constituted
government:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administeredby men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the

203. Amar, supra note 200, at 1435-36.
204. The word "agent" as used in connection with popular sovereignty refers to the sort
of agent evoked in the economic literature on agency theory. In this literature a principal
delegates authority to act on the principal's behalf to an agent. The agent's preferences,
however, differ from those of the principal, thus giving rise to actions by the agent which
diverge from the interests of the principal. The structures or incentive schemes designed
to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal constitute an agency contract.
The optimal agency contract minimizes the "costs" of the agency relationship to the
principal. Even under the optimal agency contract, however, the agent's actions will
diverge from those which are in the principal's best interests, since at the margin the costs
of monitoring the agent outweigh the costs of agent self-dealing. See, e.g., THRAINN
EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 40-45 (1990). Under popular
sovereignty theory the people are considered the principals and their constituted
government an agent. A constitution creates an institutional structure that organizes that
relationship between the principal/people and their agent/government and minimizes the
agency and monitoring costs entailed in the delegation of authority by a people to their
government.
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government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself. 5
Americans grappled with the "great difficulty" of framing
governments both at the time of the American Revolution in 1776,
In both the
and at the time of the Founding in 1787.206
Revolutionary and Founding periods, popular sovereignty theory
operated as the primary normative underpinning of constitutional
government, and carried with it definite notions of the proper
structural relationships between the people and their agent
government, and between the different components of government.
Yet the particular form that popular sovereignty theory took during
the two periods, or the peculiar structural relationships embedded in
the theory, were radically different. At the time of the Revolution,
Americans experimented with a radically populist form of popular
sovereignty. By the time of the Founding, however, most considered
the populist form of popular sovereignty to have been a failure, and
a new federalist version of popular sovereignty theory emerged to
supplant it. As we shall see, the normative underpinning of textual
and intentional statutory interpretation theory-the honest agent
conception-is much more consistent with the institutional structure
of government inherent in the populist form of popular sovereignty
theory ratified into the Revolutionary-era state constitutions, than
with the altogether different institutional structure of government
inherent in federalist popular sovereignty theory ratified into the
federal Constitution of 1789.

205. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
206. Make no mistake about the fact that Americans between 1776 and 1787 were selfconscious about the framing of governments. They realized the rare opportunity they had
to create totally new institutions and a totally new order in the period following independence from Great Britain. As Professor Shalhope writes,
[T]he Revolution... engender[ed] an intense excitement over the prospects for
new republican governments that would drastically reorder the world Americans
had known. Freedom from the corruption and restraints of Great Britain created
a chance for a new kind of politics, a new kind of government, that would change
the lives not only of Americans but of all people. Given such an opportunity,
Americans labored from 1776 to 1788 to perfect constitutions that would embody
the republican principles for which they fought the Revolution.
ROBERT E. SHALHOPE, THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY:

AMERICAN THOUGHT AND

CULTURE, 1760-1800, at 83 (1990). Shalhope calls this era "the most creative period of
constitutional development in their [Americans'] history." Id. at 84.
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The Cornerstone of American Constitutional Theory

Though legal scholars and practitioners have written less about
it than other important features of American constitutional theory,
popular sovereignty is the cornerstone of both American
constitutional theory and the federal Constitution.2" Upon its
foundation rest more familiar constitutional pillars including
federalism, electoral checks, separation of powers, the jury system, the
enumeration of powers, and bicameralism. Though its disaggregated
parts are fabricated from these familiar pillars, the federal
Constitution as a unified whole embodies the ultimate exercise of
popular sovereignty-the creation of an agent/government by a principal/people. The words "We the People... do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America" serve as bookends
to the Preamble."8 The Constitution's main body opens with the
Preamble's popular sovereignty theme, and ends with Article VII's
instructions on ratification by the people through specially assembled
conventions. The final two amendments in the Bill of Rights reserve
powers not delegated to the agent/government for the prin-

207. Thus, Professor Tribe's treatise on constitutional law states in its opening
paragraphs: "That all lawful power derives from the people and must be held in check to
preserve their freedom is the oldest and most central tenet of American constitutionalism."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-2, at 2 (2d ed. 1988). On
American popular sovereignty Tocqueville wrote, "Whenever the political laws of the
United States are to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people
that we must begin." 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 55 (Phillips
Bradley ed., 1945); see also A.J. BErIZINGER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 290 (1972) (discussing James Madison's belief that "all power is originally
vested in and consequently derived from, the people"); DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 247 (1988) (indicating that "the essence of the
American constitutional tradition [is]... that while all governments are derived from the
people, constitutional decisions shall never be made by transient majorities"); DAVID F.
EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 11-12,31-32 (1984) (analyzing the
role of the Declaration of Independence and The Federalistin shaping the idea of popular
sovereignty as it was understood in 1787); Additions Proposed By the Virginia Convention:
A Proposed Bill of Rights (June 27, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES

219 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) ("[A]I1 power

is naturally invested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates
therefore are their trustees and agents, at all times amenable to them."); Donald S. Lutz,
Popular Consent and Popular Control; 1776-1789, in FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 60, 64
(George J. Graham, Jr. & Scarlett G. Graham eds., 1977) (discussing Revolutionary and
Founding era notions of popular consent).
208. U.S. CONST. pmbl. Further, as Professor Amar points out, the Preamble and the
Tenth Amendment serve as bookends to the original Constitution. Akhil R. Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1199-1200 (1991).
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cipal/people. Beyond these explicit references, popular sovereignty
implicitly "informs every article of the Federalist Constitution. 2 9
Initially expounded by Locke and Montesquieu, popular
sovereignty found its first practical applications on American soil in
colonial compacts, 1 then later in the Declaration of Independence,2 ' the state constitutions of the Revolutionary period, and in
a final incarnation in the federal Constitution of 1789.212 Emerging
as a central idea of constitutional theory and practice at the time of
the American Revolution, popular sovereignty was transformed in the
eleven years between the Declaration of Independence and the
federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Though its shape
and meaning shifted dramatically between the beginning of the
Revolution and the Philadelphia convention, popular sovereignty
remained as important to constitution making in 1787 (if not more so)
as it had been in 1776.
Political thinkers and political actors during both the
Revolutionary and Founding eras stressed the centrality of popular
sovereignty to constitution-building. In a clear expression of
Revolutionary period popular sovereignty theory, the 1776 instructions for the delegates from Mecklenberg, North Carolina, to the
Provincial Congress at Halifax, North Carolina, read in part:
1st. Political power is of two kinds, one principal and
superior, the other derived and inferior.
2d. The principal supreme power is possessed by the people
at large, the derived and inferior power by the servants
which they employ.
3d. Whatever persons are delegated, chosen, employed and
intrusted by the people are their servants and can possess
only derived inferior power.1 3
209. Amar, supra note 200, at 1439.
210. Professor Amar suggests that colonial charters were the first "constitutions" to
employ popular sovereignty theory. Id.at 1432-33.
211. The Declaration of Independence reads in relevant part:
We hold these truths to be self-evident ....Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government,
laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form,
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

212. JULIE MOSTOV, POWER, PROCESS, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 52-60 (1992).
213. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DELEGATES FROM MECKLENBERG, NORTH CAROLINA,
TO THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS AT HALIFAX, 1 NOVEMBER 1776, reprinted in 1 THE

FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 56 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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The Declaration of Independence and the state constitutions written
in the Revolutionary period explicitly stated that the people are the
ultimate source of political power and authority. 14 On the issue of
sovereignty in the Revolutionary period, Professor Shalhope writes:
"After the Declaration of Independence dissolved the covenant
between king and people, it was a foregone conclusion that state
constitutions would exclude any mention of a king. Only one source
new state governments] drew
of power remained, the people.... [The
215
people.
the
from
all their authority
Eleven years later, during the Founding period, popular
sovereignty remained on the lips of American political thinkers and
actors. For example, James Wilson, one of the federal Constitution's
primary architects, said at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in
1787, "[T]he truth is, that the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable
authority, remains with the people .... [S]upreme power.., resides
in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government. ' 21 6 Wilson was not
alone. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay peppered
21 7
The Federalistwith approving references to popular sovereignty.
214. E.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776):
We hold these truths to be self-evident... Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government ....
See also MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights I & IV, in 1 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE

UNITED STATES 817, 817 (Ben Perley Poore ed., 1877-78) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS] ("All government of right originates from the people, is founded
in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole.... [P]ersons invested
with the legislative or executive powers of government are the trustees and servants of the
public, and, as such, accountable for their conduct."); VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776,
§ 2, in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1908, 1908 ("[A]II power is
vested in, and consequently derived from, the people ... magistrates are their trustees and
servants, and at all times amenable to them."). The early state constitutions may be found
in Poore's volumes. Other compilations of these constitutions and related sources include
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONS], and SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
(William F. Swindler ed., 1973-79) [hereinafter SOURCES].
215. SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 87.
216. JAMES WILSON, PENNSYLVANIA RATIFYING CONVENTION, 4 DECEMBER 1787,

reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 213, at 62; see also CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 213-14 (1986) (discussing James Wilson's views
on popular sovereignty).

217. But see CAESAR, NO. 2, 17 OCTOBER 1787, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 213, at 60. Caesar, an Anti-Federalist, argued that the
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In FederalistNumber 22, for example, Hamilton wrote "The Fabric of
American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT
OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow
immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate
authority. 2 18 And in Federalist Number 49 Madison wrote, "the
people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them
that the constitutional charter, under which THE several branches of
government hold their power, is derived ... .,,219 Likewise, Noah
Webster wrote in 1787 that "[t]he powers vested in Congress are little
more than nominal; nay real power cannot be vested in them, nor in
any body, but in the people. The source of power is in the people of
this country."" Anti-Federalists in the Founding period were also
enamored with popular sovereignty as the foundation of government
power and authority. Thus, Elbridge Gerry, who opposed the
Constitution, stated at the Massachusetts ratifying convention "witness
the truth of these political axioms... [t]hat the origin of all power is
in the people, and that they have221an incontestible right to check the
creatures of their own creation.,
Beyond stressing the centrality of popular sovereignty to
constitutional government, political thinkers of both the
Revolutionary and Founding eras were explicit in wedding popular
sovereignty to the idea that an agent/government is an institution

Federalists employed popular sovereignty as a rhetorical tool to persuade the common
man to accept the proposed federal Constitution.
218. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also Amar, supra note 208, at 1429-66 (discussing the role of sovereignty in
constitutional debates). Professor Amar "revives the Federalist ideas that the true
sovereignty in our system lies only in the People of the United States, and that all
governments are thus necessarily limited." Id. at 1427. In Amar's view," 'We the People
of the United States,' through the Constitution, have delegated limited 'sovereign' powers
to various organs of government; but whenever a government entity transgresses the limits
of its delegation by acting ultra vires, it ceases to act in the name of the sovereign ...
Id.
219. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313-14 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
220. NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES IN THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION, HELD AT PHILADELPHIA
(1787), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED

DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 57 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888).
221.

ELBRIDGE GERRY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE

FEDERAL

AND STATE

CONVENTIONS

(1785),

reprinted in PAMPHLETS

ON THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE

PEOPLE, supra note 220, at 6.
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whose purpose is to advance the welfare of a principal/people.2"
For example, in 1774 James Burgh wrote:
As the people are the fountain of power, so are they the
object of government, in such manner, that where the people
are safe, the ends of government are answered, and where
the people are sufferers by their governors, those governors
have failed of the main design of the institution .... 22
Ten years earlier James Otis voiced a similar argument in championing the cause of rights for the then-British colonies. He wrote:
I say supreme absolute power is originally and ultimately in
the people; and they never did in fact freely, nor can they
rightfully make an absolute, unlimited renunciation of this
divine right. It is ever in the nature of the thing given in
trust, and on a condition, the performance of which no
mortal can dispence with; namely, that the person or persons
on whom the sovereignty is confer'd by the people, shall
incessantly consult their good ....

The end of government

being the good of mankind, points out its great duties: It is
above all things to provide for the security, the quiet, and
happy enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. There is no
one act which a government can have a right to make, that
does not tend to the advancement of the security, tranquillity and prosperity of the people. 4
Political thinkers of the Founding era also accepted the linkage
between popular sovereignty and government's agency duties to the
people. In FederalistNumber 45, for example, Madison wrote:
We have heard of the impious doctrine in the old world, that
the people were made for kings, not kings for the people.
Is the same doctrine to be revived in the new, in another
shape-that the solid happiness of the people is to be
sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different
form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our
forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great
body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and
that no form of government whatever has any other value
than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object.
Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public

222. See RALPH KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY
OF THE CONSTITUTION 46-60 (1993).
223. JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS (1774), reprintedin 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 213, at 54.
224. James Otis, The Rights of British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 213, at 52-53 (citation omitted).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the
union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would
be, Abolish the Union.'
Indeed, Madison and his colleagues in Philadelphia enshrined in the
Constitution's Preamble the notion that an agent/government that
holds authority in trust from the principal/people is duty-bound to act
for the good of the people. Whereas the Preamble's bookends refer
to popular sovereignty, its middle clauses enumerate government's
duties as trustee of the people's sovereignty: "to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, 226
and secure the
Posterity.,
our
and
ourselves
to
Liberty
of
Blessings
Those at the Philadelphia convention, of course, were not the
only Americans of the Founding era to embrace popular
sovereignty. 7 Instead, the statements of those at the Philadelphia
convention should be seen as a reflection of a widespread consensus
on popular sovereignty during the period. At the South Carolina
ratifying convention, for example, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney stated
that:
In every government there necessarily exists a power
from which there is no appeal, and which for that reason
may be termed absolute and uncontroulable.
The person or assembly in whom this power resides, is
called the sovereign or supreme power of the state. With us
the Sovereignty of the union is in the People.'
Likewise, both of the state ratifying conventions of Virginia and
North Carolina passed resolutions declaring "[tihat all power is
naturally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that

225. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
226. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
227. Anti-Federalists, too, believed in popular sovereignty. See, e.g., Brutus I (18
October 1787), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 207, at 276.

228. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney Explains America's Unique Structure of Freedom,
May 14, 1788, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION pt. 2, at 577, 586-87
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993); see also JOSEPH LATHROP, A SERMON ON A DAY APPOINTED
FOR PUBLICK THANKSGIVING 1787, reprintedin POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 870-71 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) ("But the constitution of the
United States ... is not, in any sense whatever, a compact between the rules and the

people; but it is a solemn, explicit agreement of the people among themselves.").
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magistrates therefore are their trustees, and agents, and at all times
amenable to them." 9
The notion that constitutions should be based upon popular
sovereignty simply was not an issue of contention from the time of the
Revolution through the Founding. All sides shared the underlying
premises that sovereignty ultimately rests with the people, that
legitimate government derives its power from the people, and that
legitimate government acts as the agent of the popular sovereign. 30
For this reason we find relatively little debate over popular
sovereignty and its possible permutations in the historical record.
Instead, the most common debates centered on which institutional
structures and designs would best effectuate government rooted in
popular sovereignty. There was, at the time, little debate over
whether legitimate government ultimately derives its authority from
the people. Instead, in the debates on the federal convention, as well
as those in the state ratifying conventions, the typical controversies
focused upon issues such as the method of choosing House and
Senate members,"' whether the courts and executive branch ought
to compromise a "council of revision" as a check on the legislative
branch, 2 or whether judges ought to enjoy life tenure during good
behavior. 3
The late 1780s debate over judicial life tenure is instructive. In
the period leading up to ratification, both Federalists and AntiFederalists claimed to be the champions of popular sovereignty. Each
side, however, had its own ideas on how best to structure the rules
and institutions of a government based on popular sovereignty. On
the issue of judicial life tenure during good behavior, Alexander
229. Resolutions of Virginia, reprintedin THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 228, pt. 2, at 557, 559; Resolutions of North Carolina, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 228, pt. 2, at 565, 566; see also Henry Lee's Sharp Reply
to Patrick Henry's Attacks on the Constitution, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 228, pt. 2, at 637, 646 ("It goes on the principle that all power
is in the people, and that rulers have no powers but what are enumerated in that paper.").
230. See MARTIN EDELMAN, DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 13

(1984).
231. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, 42 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT]; 3 id.
344-45; 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,20,28,46,51-52,55, 58,
148, 150-60 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS].
232. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 231, at 563-72; 1 RECORDS, supra note 231, at 21,28, 94, 9798, 105, 109-10, 131, 138-41, 144; 2 UL 294-95, 298-301; 3 id. 133, 385.
233. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 231, at 446-69; 1 RECORDS, supra note 231, at 21, 116, 126,
226, 230, 237, 244; 2 id. 44, 132, 146, 172, 186.
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Hamilton, a Federalist, argued that life tenure was needed to protect
the Constitution, which is law derived directly from the people, from
encroachments by the legislature. The Anti-Federalist Brutus,
however, argued against judicial life tenure because it "rendered
[judges] totally independent [of] both the people and the legislature."'
Thus, one finds Hamilton arguing that only life tenure
would render the judiciary independent enough to protect the
people's constitution, and Brutus contending that an independent
judiciary would be free to exercise its powers contrary to the good of
the people. Hamilton the Federalist and Brutus the Anti-Federalist
agreed on the paramount importance of popular sovereignty, but
disagreed as to which institutional rules would work as the best means
toward that end.
2. Popular Sovereignty Theory in the Revolutionary
and Founding Periods
Though popular sovereignty maintained its central importance to
constitutional theory from before the Revolution through the
Founding period, its particular shape or form changed dramatically in
that interval. More specifically, the normative notions of the proper
structural relationships between the principal/people and their
agent/government, and between the three branches of government,
underwent a sea change. In the principal-agent language of popular
sovereignty theory, between 1776 and 1787 American constitution
builders revised their thinking on which type of institutional scheme
would minimize the agency costs inherent in the principal-agent
relationship between the people and their constituted government.
The shift in thinking on popular sovereignty proceeded along two
related fronts. First, at the time of the Declaration of Independence
in 1776, American constitution builders by and large believed that
governments dominated by powerful populist legislatures represented
the optimal institutional structure for governments rooted in popular
sovereignty. By the time of the Founding, however, American
constitution builders had discarded the idea that a powerful populist
legislature alone could serve as a good agent of a sovereign people.
On the second front, in 1776 Americans viewed the legislatures in

234. Brutus XI (31 January 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 207, at 293; see also Brutus XV (20
March 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES,

supra note 207, at 304-09 (arguing that the "independence" of the Supreme

Court would undermine the power and control of the people).
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their state governments as their sole legitimate agents in government.
By 1787, however, all three branches of government, including the
judiciary, came to be seen as agents of the sovereign people. While
at the time of the Revolution courts were generally the subordinates
of preeminent legislatures, by the time of the Founding placing courts
in a peer or coequal status with legislatures was thought a necessary
structural ingredient to good government rooted in popular
sovereignty. Both aspects of the evolution in popular sovereignty
theory stemmed from negative practical experience with the legislative
bodies created immediately following Independence in 1776.
(a) Shifting Attitudes Toward Legislatures
Legislative supremacy was a touchstone of constitutional design
in the Revolutionary period, a time when Americans placed great
faith in populist legislatures as protectors of individual liberty and
promoters of the public good. 5 The state constitutions written
immediately following the Declaration of Independence were
characterized by "frequent elections, a broad electorate, and
legislatures that were reasonably representative of the general
population,",1 6 and few restrictions (other than frequent electoral
checks) on the power and authority of legislative bodies. 7
By the time the delegates to the Philadelphia convention met in
1787, however, distrust and disenchantment with legislative bodies had

235. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES, supra note 207, at 3.
236. DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG
115 (1980). According to
Professor Lutz:
Between January 1, 1776 and the adoption of the American Constitution in 1789
the original thirteen states, plus Vermont, wrote and adopted a total of eighteen
constitutions ....The first eighteen constitutions can be divided into two "waves"
of constitution writing. The first wave took place within a year after the writing
of the Declaration of Independence ....[It was characterized by] the universal
emasculating of the executive power ....
The first constitution in the second
wave was the 1777 constitution of New York.... [It] began the resurrection of
the executive branch ....
Lutz, supra note 207, at 70-71.
237. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, PopularSovereignty, the Origins of JudicialReview,
and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL.51, 58-59 (1986); cf Demophilus [George
Bryan?], The Genuine Principles of the Ancient Saxon, or English [,] Constitution,
Philadelphia 1776, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA
1760-1805, at 341,353-54 (Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) [hereinafter
AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING] (extolling the virtues of populist government, and annual
electoral control over government).
POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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become a dominant theme of American politics."8 Indeed, a main
cause for the calling of the Constitutional Convention was
disenchantment with the powerful state legislatures that the
Revolutionary-era state constitutions, penned only a few years earlier,
had entrenched. 39 A decade of factionalism in the powerful state
legislatures had prompted a reaction against them, and a "rethinking
of the sovereignty of the people."2' On this fundamental shift in
attitudes toward legislative bodies, Gordon Wood writes:
The people's will as expressed in their representative
legislatures and so much trusted throughout the colonial
period suddenly seemed capricious and arbitrary. It was not
surprising now for good Whigs [in the 1780s] to declare that
"a popular assembly not governed by fundamental laws, but
under the bias of anger, malice, or a thirst for revenge, will
commit more excess than an arbitrary monarch." 24
The American people did not lose their capacity to hate and fear
government that they thought oppressive. Instead, they merely
redirected those emotions at different governmental institutions when
the revolution and its war had ended. Wood writes:
In the 1780's the Americans' inveterate suspicion and
jealousy of political power, once concentrated almost
exclusively on the Crown and its agents, was transferred to
the various state legislatures. Where once the magistracy
had seemed the sole source of tyranny, now the legislatures
throughout the Revolutionary state constitutions had become
the institutions most feared ....Increasingly, from the outset
of the Revolution on through the next decade, the legis238. RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 8-12 (1969).
239. GORDON S. WOOD, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14-20 (1987). Wood

explains how state constitutions written around the time of the Declaration of Independence placed great trust in legislatures as promoters of the public good and protectors of
liberties. Within a decade, however, Americans had grown disillusioned with the virtues
of government by legislature. See also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 52 (1934) (discussing

the Convention's voting down of every motion proposing property qualifications for
officeholders); 2 RECORDS, supra note 231, at 228 (quoting Constitutional Convention
delegate John Mercer's statement: "What led to the appointment of this Convention?
The corruption & mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States.").
240. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 255 (1988) (arguing that the "misuse by

representatives of powers" seen in the state legislatures following the Revolution caused
a rethinking of popular sovereignty theory, rather than its repudiation).
241. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
405 (1969) (citing AEDANUS BURKE, AN ADDRESS TO THE FREEMEN OF THE STATE OF

SOUTH CAROLINA (1783)).
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latures, although presumably embodying the people's will,
were talked of in terms indistinguishable from those formerly used to describe the magistery.242
James Madison, a member of the Virginia legislature in the
middle 1780s, was well aware of the vices of government dominated
by powerful populist legislatures. A paper written by Madison, which
Wood calls "the most important document dealing with American
constitutionalism written between the Articles of Confederation and
the federal Constitution," cataloged the problems with state legislatures.243 Later, in arguing for the proposed federal Constitution,
Madison wrote, "The founders of our republics [the states] ... seem

never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations,
which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the
same tyranny as if threatened by executive usurpations."2' Gouverneur Morris, an influential delegate to the federal Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, concurred with Madison and
proclaimed that "the public liberty is in greater danger from Legislative usurpations from any other source" and that "Legislative
'
Hamilton too,
tyranny [is] the great danger to be apprehended."245
by 1788, was pointing to the problems of government dominated by
legislative bodies. He wrote in FederalistNumber 71 that:
The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly,
seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and
disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other
quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the
executive or judiciary, were a breach of their privilege and
an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to
exert an imperious control over the other departments
246

The shift away from legislative supremacy as the ideal
institutional scheme for constituting governments rooted in popular

242. lal at 409; see also SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 97-98 (noting the abuses and
excesses in the legislative branch that led to "fear and suspicion of [their] political power").
243. WOOD, supra note 239, at 15.
244. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
245. 2 RECORDS, supra note 231, at 76, 551.
246. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also Remarks by Alexander Contee Hanson, in PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE
PEOPLE, supra note 220, at 254 (discussing relations between the government and the
people); William Grayson to James Madison, in THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN
VIRGINIA 15-16 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1903).
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sovereignty actually began well before the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia in 1787. As early as
New York's state constitution of 1777, the shift to a more balanced
allocation of powers between the three branches of government can
be detected. Three years later the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, the first constitution that state had ratified since well before the
Declaration of Independence, furthered the shift away from legislative
supremacy toward balanced government. Finally, several other
states-Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Vermont-revised their constitutions shortly before or
shortly after the Founding to reflect the new thinking in constitutional
design.
Connected with the emergent and widespread distrust of
legislative bodies at the time of the Founding was a growing fear of
pure or populist democracy. While the founders and their contemporaries were just as enamored with popular sovereignty as American
revolutionaries had been eleven years earlier, they had grown fearful
of populism, majority tyranny, and democratic despotism. Reflecting
this change of attitude, in FederalistNumber 10, for example, Madison
wrote:
Pure democracy.., can admit of no cure for the mischiefs
of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost
every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government
itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to
sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles
of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and
have in general been as247short in their lives as they have been
violent in their deaths.
Likewise, Dr. Benjamin Rush in 1788 wrote of populist democracy,
"A simple democracy, has been very aptly compared by Mr. Ames of
Massachusetts, to a volcano that contained within its bowels the fiery
materials of its own destruction."248 By the middle of the 1780s

247. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320-21 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(illustrating that Madison's adherence to separation of powers resembles his advocacy of
factionalism).
248. BENJAMIN RUSH TO DAVID RAMSAY, COLUMBIAN HERALD (CHARLESTON, S.C.),
APRIL 19, 1788, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 228, pt. 2,
at 417, 418; see also MELANCTON SMITH AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON DEBATE

1996]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Americans believed their highly representative state legislatures
created by Revolutionary-era state constitutions were too close to
pure democracy, mirrored "unfiltered" majority sentiments too
Elbridge Gerry's attitude
closely,249 and were too factional.
expressed at the Philadelphia convention-"the evils we experience
flow from the excess of democracy" --was commonplace. In short,
by the late 1780s, the solution to the question of how government
rooted in popular sovereignty ought to be structured from 1776 had
become the central problem. Where earlier thinkers viewed majority
will as right and just,"' by the 1780s Americans began to view
majority will as reflected in state legislatures as oppressive. Indeed,
a main theme of The Federalistis a distrust of legislative bodies. On
the widespread disenchantment with the state governments and their
powerful legislatures, Madison wrote in FederalistNumber 10:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate
and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and
private faith and of public and personal liberty, that our
governments are too unstable, that the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules
of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority 52
Thomas Jefferson also had detected the weakness of the state
governments constituted at the time of the Revolution. The mere fact
that the powerful legislatures were popularly elected did not stop
them from acting against the good of the people. Two of Jefferson's
most famous quotes on the state legislative bodies-"[a]n elective
despotism was not the government we fought for"' 3 and "[o]ne
hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as

25, 1788, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONsTrrtLTON, supra note 228, pt. 2, at 803, 805 (recounting Melancton Smith's argument
at the New York ratifying convention that "the impulses of the multitude are inconsistent
with systematic government. The people are frequently incompetent to deliberate
discussion, and subject to errors and imprudencies").
249. Madison referred to a "filtration" process whereby the small size of the national
legislature under the proposed federal Constitution would tend to keep local demagogues
out of Congress and admit only those of refined learning and statesmanship.
250. 1 RECORDS, supra note 231, at 48.
251. "A democratical despotism," wrote John Adams in 1775, for example, "is a
contradiction in terms." John Adams, Novanglus, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 79
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
252. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
253. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 311 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
ROTATION OF THE SENATE, JUNE
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one"2--capture the thinking that had emerged in the 1780s. In
short, American thinking on the optimal institutional design of
government for effectuating popular sovereignty underwent a radical
transformation between 1776 and 1787. Where in 1776 powerful
populist state legislatures were put forward as the best way to
structure governments rooted in popular sovereignty, by 1787 the
powerful populist state legislatures were considered a central culprit
in a broken political system, and a key impetus toward the calling of
the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.
(b) The Changing Agency Relationship of Courts
and Legislatures
Hand in hand with the repudiation of legislative supremacy as the
optimal formula for effectuating popular sovereignty, the thinking on
which branches of government serve as the people's agents changed
dramatically between 1776 and 1787. At the time of the Revolution,
legislative bodies, particularly lower houses, were viewed as the sole
agent of the people in government. The grant of authority from the
popular sovereign was to the elected legislature, with other branches
of government viewed as subordinate to the agent/legislature. 5
Given this Revolutionary-era idea, it quite naturally followed that the
institutional design of government would allocate the bulk of
government power to legislative bodies. Regarding courts, the
dominant idea was the Blackstonian vision of courts as subordinate to
the legislature. 6
After eleven years of experience with legislative supremacy in
state governments, however, by 1787 prevailing views rejected the
idea that a legislature alone could ably serve as the people's agent.
Instead, more and more, Americans viewed the government as a
whole as the trustee of the people's sovereignty, 7 and understood
each part of government, including the judiciary, to owe agency duties
directly to the people, rather than through a legislative conduit.
Rather than being subordinate to legislatures, both the executive and
judicial components of government were increasingly viewed as
coequals to or peers of legislative bodies. The Massachusetts

254. Id. at 311 (quoting Jefferson); see also Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of
Virginia, in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 213, at 319 (containing
essentially the same language).
255. See WOOD, supra note 241, at 163-73.
256. Id. at 301-02.

257. Id at 447-48.
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Constitution of 1780, for example, stated that "[a]ll power residing
originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several
magistrates and officers of government, vested with authority, whether
legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and
are at all times accountable to them."'" s In a similar vein the
Massachusetts convention of 1780 argued that "as all powers of
government are derived from the people, and as government is itself
instituted for their benefit, every person to whom the power is
delegated should feel himself dependent on the people, and be
accountable to them for his political conduct."' 9
Gordon Wood argues that the branch of government most
empowered by the new thinking in the 1780s was the judicial
branch.2' Indeed, the institutional role of courts had undergone
such transformations that by the middle of the 1780s Attorney James
Varnum could convincingly deploy the emerging view that courts
owed agency duties directly to the people in his brief for Trevett v.
Weeden.26 ' Wood captures the essence of Varnum's argument:
It was the duty of the judiciary, said Varnum, to measure the
laws of the legislature against the constitution and the rights
of the people. Such fundamental laws were created and
hence could be changed only by the people-at-large, not by
the legislatures, which were no longer considered uniquely
representative of the people. The judges were in a sense as
much agents of the people as the legislators; neither could
overleap the bounds of their appointment. The judiciary's
special task was to "reject all acts of the Legislature that are
contrary to the trust reposed in them by the people." 262
Though Varnum's argument was not without controversy in the
middle of the 1780s,' it was the sort of argument that would have
seemed utterly extreme at the time of the Revolution, when legislatures were viewed favorably as the sole agents of the people in

258. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, Declaration of Rights, art. V, in 1 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUIONS, supra note 214, at 958 (emphasis added).
259. WOOD, supra note 241, at 448.
260. Id. at 453-56.
261. R.I. 1876. In the 1780s there was almost no case reporting as we know it today.
Cases, however, were reported in newspapers and pamphlets. 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 943 (1953).

Trevett v. Weeden, therefore, was not included in a case reporter until 1876. See also
WOOD, supra note 241, at 459-60 (discussing Varnum's arguments).
262. See WOOD, supra note 241, at 460.
263. Goldstein, supra note 237, at 62-63.
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government.2" By 1786, however, Varnum's argument could carry
the day, and the Rhode Island State Supreme Court could refuse to
enforce a state statute and instruct lower courts to do the same. 6
Though such measures would have been an anathema only a little
more than a decade earlier, it is no coincidence that the earliest
experiments with judicial review "occurred in the 1780s in state
supreme court cases,"2" or that the Judiciary Act of 1789 explicitly
granted the Supreme Court the power to declare state laws unconstitutional.267 Wood, citing James Wilson, summarizes the
radical evolution in American thinking on popular sovereignty that
occurred between 1776 and the time of the Founding as follows:
[A]ll government officials, including even the executive and
judicial parts of the government, were agents of the people,
not fundamentally different from the people's nominal
representatives in the lower houses of legislatures.... The
different parts of government were functionally but not
substantively different. "The executive and judicial powers
are now drawn from the same source, are now animated by
the same principles, and are now directed to the same ends,
with the legislative authority: they who execute, and they
who administer the laws, are so much the servants, and
therefore as much the friends of the people, as those who
make them." The entire government had become the
limited agency of the sovereign people.
The pervasive Whig mistrust of power had in the years
since Independence been increasingly directed ...against
the supposed representatives of the people, who now seemed
to many to be often as distant and unrepresentative of the
people's interests as Parliament once had been.... [T]he
houses of representatives, now no more trusted than other
parts of government, seemed to be also no more representative of the people than the other parts of government.
They had lost their exclusive role of embodying the people

264. According to Professor Graham there was "a lack of firm precedents for judicial
review in the colonial period ... followed by no less Delphic a response under the early
state constitutions." George J. Graham, Jr., The Supreme Court,in FOUNDING PRINCIPLES
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 253,264 (George J. Graham, Jr. & Scarlett G. Graham eds.,
1977).
265. Id. at 265.

266. Goldstein, supra note 237, at 62. Other instances of state court uses of judicial
review in the 1780s include The New Hampshire Ten PoundAct Case, (N.H. 1786), Bayard
v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787), Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. 1784), and Holmes v.
Walton (N.J. 1780). 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 261, at 969-75.

267. COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 216, at 204.
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in government.... [Under the proposed federal Constitution
a]l parts of the government were equally responsible but
limited spokesmen for the people, who remained as the
bits and pieces
absolute and perpetual sovereign,2distributing
s
1
agents.
various
their
to
of power
The emerging idea that courts as well as legislatures act as agents
of the people is seen most clearly in the suddenly persuasive
justifications for judicial review.269 Though judicial review was not
without controversy in America in the middle to late 1780s, it was
increasingly seen as a legitimate method for checking legislative
bodies. The main justification for judicial review, which endures to
this day, was stated by Alexander Hamilton in FederalistNumber 78:
No legislative act ...contrary to the Constitution, can be
valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is
greater than his principal; that the servant is above his
master; that the representatives of the people are superior to
the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers
may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but
what they forbid.... A constitution is, in fact, and must be
regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law... [T]he
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intentions of their agents. Nor
does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of
the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that
the power of the people is superior to both, and that where
the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter
rather than the former.... [W]henever a particular statute
contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the
judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the
former.2 70

268. WOOD, supra note 241, at 598-99 (quoting JAMES WILSON, LECrURES ON LAW,
1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 398-99 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804)); see also LUTZ, supra
note 236, at 98 (discussing the role of direct popular consent in relation to the legislature
and judiciary); Gordon Wood, Democracy and The American Revohtion, in DEMOCRACY:
THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY 97 (John Dunn ed., 1992).
269. Professor Goldstein points out that in the 1780s a handful of commentators had
championed judicial review in public writings, and attorneys had begun to incorporate
judicial review arguments into their appellate briefs. Further, by the 1790s judicial review
was no longer considered controversial. Goldstein, supra note 237, at 64, 66.
270. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
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Hamilton's justification for judicial review rests on two basic premises.
The first is the idea that Constitutional law is superior to statutory law
because the former is the expression of the popular sovereign, while
the latter is merely the expression of an agent/legislature. The second
premise, which had gained a currency it did not have a decade before
the Founding, is that courts owe their allegiance directly to the
people, rather than to Congress. From these two premises the
conclusion naturally follows: Because judges owe an agency duty
directly to the people and not to Congress, when a command of
Congress-a statute-conflicts with command of the popular
sovereign-the Constitution-judges must follow the latter and
discard the former. If we take away the second leg of Hamilton's
justification for judicial review-the idea that courts owe their agency
duties directly to the people-then it by no means follows that courts
should follow the Constitution over statutes. If, as was the thinking
in the Revolutionary period, legislative bodies are the sole agents of
the popular sovereign in government, then legislative bodies and not
courts ought to decide the constitutionality of laws.27 Only a
system that accepts courts as legitimate agents of the people would
incorporate judicial review of unconstitutional statutes.
Not only had popular sovereignty theory evolved to the point
that the courts, along with legislatures, were viewed as agents of the
people; views on the scope of agency powers wielded by legislatures
were also changing. At the time of the Declaration of Independence,
legislatures were thought competent to act as the voice of the people
in making and ratifying state constitutions. Professor Willi Paul
Adams writes:
[P]opular sovereignty had emerged [by 1776] as the basic
principle of legitimate government. But how was this
principle to be realized in practice? ...

Somehow "the

people" had to be the originator of the basic law of the
land.... At first the provincial congresses drafted and
ratified constitutions in the same way they drafted and
passed bills. They considered themselves to be the "full and
free representation of the people" .... Since they were
already acting as legislatures, it was only natural for them to
take on the new task in legislative fashion. Just as there was

271. Professor Shalhope documents the fact that in the period immediately following
the Revolution "the legislatures themselves became the principal interpreters of the
fundamental [constitutional] law under which they convened." SHALHOPE, supranote 206,
at 89.
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no referendum on a new law, so there was no plebiscite on,
no popular ratification of, the first of the state
constitutions.27
The idea that legislatures were competent to speak for the people was
rooted in the then-prevalent idea that legislatures were the sole
legitimate agents of the people in government.273 The rising distrust
of legislative bodies in the decade following the Revolution, however,
led to a narrowing of legislative powers in general, and the use of
special constituent conventions of the people to ratify state
constitutions in particular.274 According to Professor Adams,
Within a few years ... legislation and constitution making
came to be considered two entirely distinct steps in the
political process, each requiring a separate representative
body. The specially elected "constitutional convention"
became the embodiment of the "constituent power" of the
people. In addition the convention's proposals had to be
submitted for final ratification to the adult free male
citizenry.275
By the time of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in the
summer of 1787, the notion that legislatures' agency powers encompassed making, ratifying, and amending constitutions had died
out.276 After debating the issue the delegates to the Philadelphia

272. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CoNSTIrUIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY
ERA 63-64 (Rita Kimber et al. trans., 1980).
273. See LUTZ, supra note 236, at 78-79; see also BEITZINGER, supra note 207, at 175

(noting the tendency "to identify liberty with the popular legislative house").
274. LUTZ, supra note 236, at 78-79; see also MORGAN, supra note 240, at 258-61
(discussing the Massachusetts constituent assembly that ratified the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, and its implications for popular sovereignty theory).
275. ADAMS, supra note 272, at 64; see also LUTZ, supra note 236, at 71-73 (observing
that the people had allowed representatives to write a constitution that was subject to
popular ratification). Most of the constitutions written in the "first wave" of state
constitutions after the Declaration of Independence had no procedure for amendment.
Maryland, Delaware, and Georgia, which did allow for amendment, required only some
form of legislative approval. The amendment procedures of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, in contrast, involved
ratification by the people. Id. at 73-74.
276. WOOD, supra note 241, at 306-07, 328. As Professor Shalhope writes,
[O]nce constitutions came to be viewed as being superior to government, the
manner in which they were drafted became crucial. It became apparent that if
constitutions were to be made genuinely impervious to legislative tampering, they
must be created by a power greater than the legislatures themselves. Gradually,
but surely, the institution of the constitutional convention developed.
SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 90; see also Goldstein, supra note 237, at 61-62 (making
similar arguments).
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convention opted for special constituent assemblies of the people
rather than state legislatures for the ratification of the proposed
Constitution. 77 Madison's position at the Philadelphia convention,
which carried the day by a vote of nine state delegations to one, was
that state legislatures were "incompetent" to ratify the federal
Constitution, and that only constitutions created by the people
themselves could be considered supreme to legislatively created
law.27 Article V of the federal Constitution of 1787, of course,
allows for amendments where either three-fourths of the state
legislatures or three-fourths of conventions of the people in the states
Congress's role in the
approve a proposed amendment.279
amendment process is limited to proposing amendments to the
people."s A similar trend in the amendment procedures for state
constitutions is evident.
The procedure for amending state
constitutions written early in the Revolutionary era involved the
consent of legislative bodies. Within a few years, however, state
constitutions began to require that amendments be ratified by the
people.2 a
In sum, the move away from legislative bodies as makers,
ratifiers, and amenders of constitutions, the increasing persuasiveness
of arguments for judicial review, and the political writings of the
period, demonstrate that between the Revolution and the Founding,
Americans had totally reconfigured their notions of the proper
structural relationships between the principal/people and their
agent/government, and between the three branches of that
agent/government. While at the time of the Revolution popular
sovereignty theory embraced only the legislative bodies as legitimate
agents of the people in government, by the time of the Founding
courts as well as legislatures were considered direct agents of the
people. In Part III.B we will see how this evolution in the theory of
popular sovereignty affected the theory of separation of powers, or in
other words, how the idea that courts are agents of the people led to
a redistribution of power between legislative and judicial branches of
government during the Founding period.

277.

See SAUL

278.

JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 415-16 (E.H. Scott

K. PADOVER, To SECURE THESE BLESSINGS 429-41 (1962).

ed., 1893).
279. U.S. CONST. art. V.
280. U.S. CONST. art. V.
281. LUTZ, supra note 236, at 74.
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3. Popular Sovereignty Theory and the Honest Agent Conception
Under the Revolutionary-era or populist version of popular
sovereignty found in the state constitutions, the people appear as the
principals, and legislative bodies assume the role of the sole legitimate
agents of the people in government. Courts and executives occupy a
place further removed from the popular sovereign, lower in "rank" or
The proper institutional design for
position than legislatures.'
government rooted in popular sovereignty under the 1776-77 incarnation of the theory can be schematically modeled as below:
The Sovereign People/Principal

I

Legislative Body/Agent of the People

I

Courts/Agents of
Legislative Body

1

Executive/Agent of
Legislative Body

CHART #1

In the model ultimate political power and authority reside in the
people, who delegate governing power and authority exclusively to a
legislative body. Meanwhile, the executive and courts operate as
agents of the legislative body, merely administering and adjudicating
the laws spoken for the principal/people by the agent/legislature. The
agency relationship between the judicial and legislative branch, in
other words, derives from the primary agency relationship between
the legislature and the people. The popularly elected legislative body
acts as the sole legitimate agent of the people in government, and the
unelected judiciary, far removed from the popular sovereign, assists
the legislature in carrying out its agency duties by adjudicating cases,
enforcing legislative commands, effectuating legislative will, and doing

282. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
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what the legislative body would do if it had unlimited time and
expertise in adjudicative practices. Thus, under the 1776 model of
popular sovereignty theory, the judicial function stems not from the
need for an agent of the people in government separate and independent from the legislative branch, but rather simply from the fact that
judges possess something legislatures lack: expertise in interpreting
and applying law to particular cases.
In contrast to the populist popular sovereignty theory of 1776,
under the federalist form of popular sovereignty ratified into the
Constitution of 1789, the sovereign people are considered the
principals, but each branch of government is a direct agent of the
people. Though each branch plays a distinct and separate role in the
political process, they are coequals, peers, or counterparts, with no
single branch holding a superior status over the others. The proper
institutional design of government according to the federalist popular
sovereignty theory can be schematically modeled as follows:
The Sovereign People/Principal

1

Government/Agent of the People
Legislative-Executive-Judicial
CHART #2

On this version of popular sovereignty theory, all three branches of
government, rather than just the legislature, are considered legitimate
agents of the people, with each branch owing agency duties directly
to the popular sovereign.
Despite its electoral removal from the people, the judicial branch
plays an institutional role that parallels that of the two electorally
accountable branches-it acts as an agent of the popular sovereign,
rather than as an agent of a coordinate branch of government. Why?
Under the federalist popular sovereignty theory woven into the
Constitution of 1789, the agency duties of the judicial branch derive
from a constitutive grant from the people made during a period of
constitutional politics, rather than from periodic electoral checks
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As the schematic models in
during periods of normal politics.'
Charts 1 and 2 illustrate, even though the first principle of American
constitutional theory in both the Revolutionary and Founding periods
was popular sovereignty, the versions of popular sovereignty
employed in those eras resulted in two very different institutional
government structures. The popular sovereignty of 1776 can be
termed hierarchical,with authority flowing from the people to their
agent legislatures, and then from the legislatures to the subordinate
executive and judiciary. The popular sovereignty -theory of 1787, in
contrast, can be termed institutionally or structurally egalitarian,with
authority flowing directly from the principal/people to three peer
branches of government, none of which holds a superior position over
the others.
Recall the honest agent conception, under which the third branch
operates as an agent of the first when interpreting statutes. The
honest agent conception can be schematically modeled thus:
Enacting Congress

I

Courts/Agents of Congress
CHART #3

In the above model subordinate courts act as agents of the legislature
when interpreting statutes. A judge operating under the honest agent
conception essentially is concerned with one question when
interpreting statutes: What did the enacting legislature tell the court
to do in this situation? Judges who lean towards textualist approaches
as a means of effectuating the honest agent conception would apply
textualist rules in search of what the legislature "said." Judges who
favor intentionalist approaches would answer the question by trying
to discern the legislature's "intent" or the statute's "purpose." At

283. On the distinction between constitutional politics and normal politics, see BRUCE
A. ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOuNDATIONS (1991); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 461-62 (1989); Bruce A.
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discoveringthe Constitution,93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022-23

(1984).
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bottom, however, both textualist and intentionalist judges are in
search of the same Holy Grail-the command or will coming down
from the legislative superior.
Upon comparing the model of the honest agent conception with
the models of both populist and federalist popular sovereignty theory,
one sees clearly that the honest agent conception is far less congruous
with the latter than with the former. Indeed, the honest agent model
is but a fragment of the populist popular sovereignty model, with the
part representing the relationship between the principal/people and
their agent/legislature chopped off. The honest agent conception
meshes well with populist popular sovereignty theory, because both
subordinate courts to legislatures, or in other words, both place courts
beneath legislative bodies in the governmental "chain of command."
The institutional structure represented by the model of federalist
popular sovereignty theory, in contrast, places the courts and
legislature in peer positions, with each occupying a station as an agent
of the principal/people. Rather than a hierarchical relationship
between a superior legislature and subordinate courts, as in the honest
agent conception and the populist version of popular sovereignty
theory, the federalist popular sovereignty theory locates the legislature
and the courts in equivalent (but not identical) positions.
The federalist popular sovereignty theory is incompatible with the
honest agent conception because the two place the judicial branch in
entirely different institutional roles vis-a-vis the legislative branch.
The former makes courts and the legislature peer institutions, while
the latter subordinates the courts to the legislature. The populist
popular sovereignty theory, in contrast, meshes well with the honest
agent conception because both contemplate a similar institutional role
for courts. Both, in other words, subordinate courts to the legislative
bodies. The incongruity between the federalist popular sovereignty
theory ratified into the Constitution of 1789 and the honest agent
conception brings the normative underpinning of textual and
intentional statutory interpretation rules into serious question. Simply
put, a federal court that acts as a subordinate honest agent of the
enacting legislature when interpreting statutes flies in the face of the
federalist model of popular sovereignty that had evolved by the late
1780s and was ratified into the federal Constitution.
In order to operate in accord with the popular sovereignty theory
ratified into the Constitution of 1789, when interpreting statutes
federal courts must act as peers, coequals, or counterparts of
Congress, instead of honest agents of Congress. Rather than acting
on behalf of an institutionally superior legislature, when interpreting
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statutes the federal courts must act on behalf of their true principals,
the people. Rather than simply seeking to discover and apply the
legislative command or will, when interpreting statutes the federal
courts must see their primary role as discovering and effectuating a
more public-regarding statutory scheme. In brief, when faced with an
ambiguous or open-textured statute, rather than asking "what did the
enacting legislature command or intend?" as is the main question
posed by courts operating in accord with the honest agent conception,
federal courts must ask "which of the several plausible interpretations
is most public-regarding?" Immediately one can see the different spin
the two competing approaches bring to bear on the interpretive
process. Under the latter approach, the focus is not backwardlooking, but rather is forward-looking. The goal is not reconstruction
of past command or intent, but rather setting the trajectory of
statutory development in public-regarding ways. The animus of
interpretation is not re-creation of an event in the past (the legislative
command or intent), but creation of an event in the present with the
events of the past serving as parameters. Of paramount importance,
however, is the fact that federal courts that ask "which plausible
statutory interpretation is the most public-regarding?" act thereby as
coequals or peers of Congress, and agents of the principal/people,
rather than as subordinate honest agents of the first branch. Federal
courts that approach statutory interpretation cases with the development of statutes along public-regarding lines foremost in their minds,
in other words, act consistently with the federalist popular sovereignty
theory of the Constitution, rather than with the discarded populist
popular sovereignty theory of the Revolutionary period state
constitutions.
Though the federalist popular sovereignty theory found in the
federal Constitution is generally inconsistent with approaches to
statutory interpretation rooted in the honest agent conception, it does
appear at least consistent with the dialogic model of statutory
interpretation espoused by proponents of dynamic statutory
interpretation. Generally speaking, dynamic theories of statutory
interpretation are not aimed at judicial reproduction of some
unchanging legislative command or intent. To the contrary, dynamic
theories are premised on the notion that statutory law is never a
finished or solidified product, but instead may be judicially shaped
depending on time, circumstance, changed context, or other factors.
By affording courts a role in the shaping of the meaning of statutory
law, dynamic interpretive theories, unlike those rooted in the honest
agent conception, do not always place courts in a subordinate
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institutional role in relation to legislative bodies. Instead they treat
courts and legislatures as players with different but coequal or peer
institutional roles in the statute creation game. For this reason
dynamic theories are at least minimally compatible with the
institutionally egalitarian structure of the federalist popular
sovereignty theory found in the federal Constitution of 1789.
This does not, however, mean that the several dynamic theories
of statutory interpretation are fully consistent with the federalist
version of popular sovereignty theory. Most importantly, the various
dynamic theories do not direct the federal courts to act as agents of
the people by shaping law along public-regarding lines. Rather, they
instruct courts to make statutes consistent with the legal landscape
(Calabresi's common law method),' to reflect current thinking
(Aleinikoff's synchronic coherence),' to apply statutes written in6
the past to today's problems (Eskridge's quasi-dynamic model),U
or to maintain internal coherence with past political decisions
In order to be consistent with
(Dworkin's chain novel method).'
the popular sovereignty theory ratified into the federal Constitution,
judicial shaping of open-textured or ambiguous statutes must be
aimed at shaping statutes along public-regardinglines. Additionally,
dynamic theories often operate as limited exceptions to honest agentstyle interpretation. Thus, Judge Calabresi argues that courts should
exercise revisionary powers over a statute only when the statute could
no longer gain majoritarian support and is out of phase with the legal
landscape. In all other instances Calabresi would have courts employ
Likewise,
traditional honest agent-style interpretive methods.
Professor Eskridge's quasi-dynamic approach counsels the use of
honest agent-style interpretation in all cases except where legislative
history and statutory text are indeterminate, and either the legal
context or underlying assumptions surrounding the statute have
changed. In those instances where dynamic theories counsel the use
of traditional honest agent interpretive methods, dynamic approaches
subordinate courts to legislatures, and therefore are inconsistent with
the popular sovereignty theory of the federal Constitution.

284.
285.
286.
287.

See supra part
See supra part
See supra part
See supra part
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B. Separation of Powers and Statutory Interpretation
What does the important constitutional principle of separation of
powers bring to bear on the issue of how the federal courts ought to
approach statutory interpretation cases? Textualists and intentionalists often cite separation of powers as supporting the honest
agent conception underlying their respective interpretive theories.
The simple notion is that the Constitution commits power to make
law to the legislative branch, to implement law to the executive
branch, and to adjudicate law to the judicial branch. The honest
agent conception, or more accurately textual and intentional rules of
statutory interpretation, are designed at least in part to prevent the
third branch from encroaching onto the statute-making territory of the
first branch. As with popular sovereignty, however, the honest agent
conception is less consistent with the particular brand of separation of
powers theory ratified into the federal Constitution than with the
separation of powers theory found in the state constitutions of the
Revolutionary era. Separation of powers at the time of the
Revolution meant only a division of government powers, with much
power allocated to the legislative branch. By the time of the
Founding, however, separation of powers had come to mean not only
separated but also overlapping government powers, a balanced
distribution of powers between three coequal or peer branches of
government, and an institutional design of government explicitly
incorporating checks and balances. In brief, the honest agent
conception underlying textual and intentional statutory interpretation
is consistent with the separation of powers theory widely invoked at
the time of the Revolution, and incorporated into several state
constitutions in 1776-77, but inconsistent with the evolved separation
of powers theory of the 1780s, which was ratified onto the federal
Constitution.
1. Why Separation of Powers?
When the delegates to the Constitutional Convention met in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, popular sovereignty was in
danger.m
The populist state legislatures created by the

288. As Professor Goldstein writes, "Popular sovereignty was very much in the air in
1787, but whether it could be saved from itself was an open question." Goldstein, supra
note 237, at 63.
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constitutions ratified in 1776 and 1777 had led the new states into
disarray."s9 The consensus was that those governments had proved
to be poor trustees of the people's sovereignty, and that the
Revolutionary experiment with popular sovereignty had been a
failure."
The weighty question facing American constitution
builders in the middle and late 1780s was how, if at all, could a
government rooted in popular sovereignty be structured to insure that
it would act as a good agent for the people? Hamilton signaled the
weight of the issues in 1787 with his opening to FederalistNumber 1,
when he wrote the following:
After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the
subsisting federal government, you are called upon to
deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of
America. The subject speaks of its own importance;
comprehending its consequences nothing less than the
existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts
of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many
respects the most interesting in the world. It has been
frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to
the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to
decide the important question, whether societies of men are
really capable or not of establishing good government from
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined
to depend for their political constitutions on accident and
force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which
we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in
which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of
the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be
considered as the general misfortune of mankind.291

289. Morgan writes:
[Tihe state assemblies [created by the Revolutionary period state constitutions],
unchecked now by royal governors and their upper-class councils, acted in ways
that alarmed many leaders of the Revolution. They passed laws in haste and
repealed them in haste. They passed laws violating the treaty with Great Britain,
delaying or scaling down the payment of public and private debts, issuing paper
money as legal tender, refusing to pay their states' quota of national expenses,
raising their own salaries and lowering those of other governing officers.
MORGAN, supra note 240, at 252-54.
290. See COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 216, at 3-17. Gordon Wood argues that
problems with the Articles were only half the reason the Philadelphia Convention was
called. An equally important cause of dissatisfaction was the governments of the several
states. WOOD, supra note 239, at 9-10; see also COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 216, at
195-96 (discussing state laws that the framers found objectionable).
291. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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As Hamilton's words suggest, the stakes were high in the summer of
1787 when the delegates to the Constitutional Convention met in
Philadelphia. If the existing regime could not be fixed, perhaps
popular sovereignty was useful as a rallying cry in revolution, but
inadequate as a first principle of government. And if some better
institutional scheme of governance could not be found, perhaps the
people were forever condemned to be subjects of government, rather
than its ultimate superiors. 2
American constitution builders' response to the Revolutionaryera experiment with popular sovereignty was a melange of
institutional devices including federalism, separation of powers,
bicameralism, the enumeration of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers, the executive veto, democratic electoral checks, and the
amendment process. These first-order constitutional principles hold
little intrinsic value. Instead their value derives from their ability to
effectuate the ends of government rooted in popular sovereignty-a
government both by the people and for the people. They are, in
other words, part of an institutional scheme designed to minimize the
agency costs inherent in the principal-agent relationship between a
people and their constituted government. On this -view, the electoral
check, to provide an example, is not a device aimed at legitimizing
government, but rather a way to ensure that government does not act
illegitimately. The agent/government is not legitimized by periodic
elections, but rather first by the constitutive act of the people, which
transfers power and authority to an agent/government, and second by
the agent/government's continuing good trusteeship of that power and
authority. Electoral checks play a role in insuring that the
agent/government acts as a good trustee of the principal/people's
sovereign power, but they do not, at least in times of normal politics,
legitimize the acts the agent/government takes.
Separation of powers serves a similar derivative purpose. The
founders did not propose a national government of separate but
overlappingpowers for its own sake, but rather in an attempt to offer
the people a government that would act in public-regarding ways, or
at least do so with greater frequency than had the state governments
created at the time of the Revolution. Separate but overlapping
powers, American constitution builders had come to realize by the
middle to late 1780s, are an important ingredient in the mix of

292. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
supra note 207, at 15-16.
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institutional devices aimed at creating a government that will act as
a good trustee of the people's sovereign power. The institutional
device of separation of powers holds no intrinsic value. Rather, its
value is derived from its ability to check the agent/government, and
insure that the interests and rights of the principal/people remain
intact. In other words, the "ultimate purpose [of the Constitution]
was not democratic government-which at the time meant representative majoritarianism-but a government so structured that it would
invariably promote the public interest."2' In short, then, the answer
to the question "why separation of powers?" is: "To effectuate
popular sovereignty."' 94
2. The Shift in Separation of Powers Between the
Revolution and the Founding
While at both the time of the Revolution and the time of the
Founding separation of powers was considered an important
institutional device for effectuating government rooted in popular
sovereignty, the form that separation of powers took in the two eras
differed substantially. The state constitutions of the Revolutionary
period were characterized by a simple division of powers, with much
of the power allocated to state legislatures and very little to executive
and judicial branches. In reaction to the powerful royal governors the
colonies experienced before the Declaration of Independence, state
constitutions of the Revolutionary era embraced legislative
supremacy.295 By the time of the federal Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia eleven years later, however, thinking on separation of
powers had shifted dramatically. The emphasis in 1787 was on
separated but also overlapping powers. While real checks and
balances had been scuttled in 1776, by 1787 they came to be seen as
a necessary ingredient in good government.296 Further, in contrast
to the legislative supremacy of the Revolutionary period, by the time
of the Founding separation of powers theory had been transformed
to incorporate the idea that the three branches of government should
operate as balanced coequals.2" While the three branches of
government were still seen as performing distinctly different functions,
by the late 1780s they came to be seen as peers of equal status.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

EDELMAN, supra note 230, at 18.
See PAUL K. CONKIN, SELF-EVIDENT TRuT-S ix (1974).
See supra notes 235-37, infra notes 325-28, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 337-62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 363-65 and accompanying text.
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(a) Separation of Powers During the Revolutionary Period
In the period leading up to and immediately following the
Declaration of Independence, separation of powers was axiomatic in
American constitutional theory. All of the state constitutions written
in the years immediately following the Declaration of Independence298 employed separation of powers to one degree or
another.29 9 The Virginia Constitution of June 1776, for example,
stated, "The legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be
separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly
belonging to the other: nor shall the same person exercise the powers
of more than one of them at the same time."3°° Professor Vile calls
this "the clearest most precise statement of the doctrine [of separation
of powers] which had at the time appeared anywhere, in the works of
political theorists, or the pronouncements of statesmen." '' Three
other states-Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina-explicitly
mentioned separation of powers in their Revolutionary-period state
constitutions.3 °2 Those state constitutions that did not explicitly
mention separation of powers nonetheless invoked it033 Pennsylvania's constitution of 1776, for example, created an executive with a
twelve member council, a legislature, and a judiciary."° Separation
of powers was often cited during the Revolutionary period as vital to
good government.30 5 The instructions of the citizens of Boston to
their representatives in 1776 read:
It is essential to Liberty that the legislative, judicial, and
executive Powers of government be, as nearly as possible,

298. Eight states wrote constitutions in 1776. Those states were, in chronological order
of their ratifications, New Hampshire, South Carolina, New Jersey, Virginia, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina. In 1777 three states, Georgia, New York,

and Vermont, wrote new constitutions. Massachusetts did not ratify its post-Declaration
of Independence constitution until 1780. Rather than write new constitutions, Connecticut
and Rhode Island simply stripped their existing charters from 1662 and 1663, respectively,
of references to the British Crown. For a complete discussion of the ratification of the

post-Declaration of Independence state constitutions, see ADAMS, supranote 272, at 63-98,
96-110 (1988), and
LUTZ, supra note 236, at 23-51.
299. See ADAMS, supra note 272, at 266-71.
300. M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 119 (1967).
301. Id.at 290.
302. WOOD, supra note 241, at 150.
303. See ADAMS, supra note 272, at 266-71.
DONALD S. LuTz, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

304. See id. at 268.
305. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 213, at 108-09.
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independent and separate from each other, for where they
are united in the same Persons, there will be wanting that
natural Check, which is the principal Security against the
enacting of arbitrary Laws, and wanton Exercise of Power in
the Execution of them.3°
Though separation of powers was incorporated into all of the
state constitutions of the Revolutionary era, and universally cited by
political thinkers of the day, some commentators have argued that the
state governments in the period following the Revolution did not in
fact practice the doctrine. Professor Corwin, for example, argued that
even though "the majority of the Revolutionary constitutions recorded
recognition of the principle of the separation of powers ... the
recognition was verbal merely. ' Professor Wood echoed Corwin's
thesis, writing, "what more than anything else makes the use of
Montesquieu's maxim in 1776 perplexing is the great discrepancy
between the affirmations of the need to separate the several
government departments and the actual political practice the state
governments followed." 3"
Professor Vile, however, correctly
counters that the separation of powers of the state constitutions
immediately following the Declaration of Independence was real.
Though differing in degree, the state constitutions of the
Revolutionary period clearly separated government into distinct
branches with distinct powers and responsibilities.3" Vile locates
the source of confusion among historians in the "failure to distinguish
between the separation' 31of
powers on the one hand, and checks and
0
balances on the other. ,
While the state constitutions created in the period immediately
following the Declaration of Independence incorporated separation

306. Id. at 319.
307. Edward S.Corwin, The Progressof ConstitutionalTheory Between the Declaration
of Independence and the Meeting of the PhiladelphiaConvention, 30 AM. HisT. REV. 511,

514 (1924-25).
308. WOOD, supra note 241, at 153.
309. Professor Vile writes, "It is true.., that in their practical operation the early State
governments deviated considerably from the spirit of the doctrine [of separation of
powers]; but in Virginia, and many other states, it was the separation of powers that

formed the basis of the institutionalstructure of the government." VILE, supra note 300,
at 119 (emphasis added); see also id. at 134-36, 143 (discussing the institutional nature of
separation of powers in the early state constitutions).
310. Id. at 136. As Professor Beitzinger points out, despite the presence of separation
of powers in the early state constitutions, there were "no viable checks on legislative
majorities." BEITZINGER, supra note 207, at 177; see also id. at 179-80 (describing the
criticisms of Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison of a lack of a check upon legislative
power).
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of powers, they actively avoided checks and balances. 31
The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, with its unicameral legislature and
Supreme Executive Council, represents an "extreme rejection of
checks and balances, allied with separation of powers., 312 Although
it created three distinct branches, the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776 provided few devices for one branch to have partial agency in
another. As explained eight years after its ratification by a correspondent in the PennsylvaniaGazette, the government under the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 distributed authority to three distinct
branches: the legislative, to which " 'belongs the right to make and
alter the general rules of the society; that is to say the laws,' " the
executive, which is" 'entrusted the execution of these general rules,' "
and the judicial, which is charged with " 'the interpretation and
application of the laws to controverted cases.' ,113 Along with
Pennsylvania, the Vermont Constitution of 1777 also represents an
extreme example of the simultaneous embrace of separation of
powers and rejection of checks and balances. 314 Though less
extreme than Pennsylvania and Vermont, the other American states
exhibited "strong assertions of the doctrine of the separation of
powers and an antipathy toward checks and balances., 315 In short,
by 1776, separation of powers was "the only coherent principle of
constitutional government upon which to build a constitution," but
"the American
system of checks and balances had yet to be for, 316
mulated.
Why did American constitution builders of the Revolutionary
period reject checks and balances? In 1776 checks and balances
seemed too similar to the theory of mixed or balanced government
employed in England. Under the ancient theory of mixed or balanced
government, the different "estates" of society-royals, aristocrats, and
commons-and their parallel forms of government-monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy-were instilled in different parts of

311. Professor Vile writes, "In many respects [the state constitutions] differed
considerably.., but they all adhered to the doctrine of separation of powers, and they all
rejected, to a greater or lesser degree, the concept of checks and balances." VILE, supra
note 300, at 133.
312. Id. at 138.
313. Id. at 139 (quoting PA. GAZETrE, Apr. 28, 1784). One should note that under the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 the judiciary was in fact a branch of the executive. Id.
at 138-39.
314. Id. at 140.
315. I1&at 141.
316. Id.
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government.317 Royals were represented by the Monarch, aristocrats by the House of Lords, and commoners in the House of
Commons? 18 A government of pure monarchy, aristocracy, or
democracy was thought to be unstable, with monarchy degenerating
into tyranny, democracy degenerating into anarchy, and aristocracy
A government that properly mixed
degenerating into oligarchy.3
or balanced the three, however, would remain stable and maintain the
positive attributes of each.32 The American Revolution, however,
embraced a populist form of popular sovereignty-the idea that all
political power flows directly from the principal/people to their
constituted agent/government, and that highly representative elected
legislative bodies are the sole legitimate agents of the people in
government. As such, popular sovereignty in the Revolutionary
period was "deeply opposed to the ideas of the balanced constitution,
in which important elements were independent of popular
power."32 Thus, the anonymously penned pamphlet from 1776
entitled The People the Best Governors argued
The just power of a free people respects first the making and
the executing of laws. The liberties of a people are chiefly,
I may say entirely guarded, by having the controul of these
branches in their own hands.
But it seems there is another objection started by some:
That the common people are not under so good advantages
to choose judges, sheriffs, and other executive officers as
their representatives are. This is a mere delusion ....For
they say, that the people have wisdom and knowledge
enough to appoint proper persons through a state to make
laws, but not to execute them.... [T]he objection falls: The
more simple, and the more immediately dependent (caeteris
paribus) the authority is upon the people the better, because
it must be granted that they themselves are the best guardians
of their own liberties."

317. See WOOD, supra note 241, at 197-98.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. VILE, supra note 300, at 137.
322. The People the Best Governors: Or a Plan of Government Founded on the Just
Principles of Natural Freedom (1776) [hereinafter The People the Best Governors],
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 237, at 390, 391-93 (emphasis
added).
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For the anonymous pamphleteer, the more government power directly
connected to the people the better. Such an absolute view leaves
little room for the incorporation of different social orders into a
"balanced" governmental structure. In a similar vein, Samuel
Williams, describing the underlying principle of the Vermont
Constitution of 1777, wrote that "the security of the people is derived
not from the nice ideal application of checks, ballances, and
mechanical powers, among the different parts of the government...
but from responsibility of each part of the government, upon the
people."3" In short, the rejection of checks and balances in the
period immediately following the Declaration of Independence went
part and parcel with the Revolutionary-era form of popular
sovereignty, which rejected monarchy and aristocracy and the theory
of mixed or balanced government that accompanied them? 4
The popular sovereignty theory of the Revolutionary period also
had implications for the distribution of powers under the state
constitutions written in the period immediately following the
Declaration of Independence. The colonial governors, who "had used
their power to influence and control the other parts of the
constitution, particularly the representatives of the people in the
legislature,"3" had been problematic for the colonists. Colonial
governors appointed by the crown wielded substantial governing
powers, including the power to prorogue and dissolve legislative
bodies. And where official executive powers ended, colonial
governors "frequently resorted to guile, corrupting influential
legislators by offering them judgeships, government contracts, and
other forms of patronage."32 6 Often they manipulated colonial
legislative assemblies by "attempt[ing] to establish electoral districts
and apportion representation, ... by appointing [legislators] to
executive or judicial posts, or by offering them opportunities for
profits through the dispensing of government contracts and public
'
In a reaction against their negative experience with
money."327
powerful executives under the British colonial system, American

323. SAMUEL WILLIAMS, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF VERMONT 343 (1794), quoted in

VILE, supra note 300, at 14041.
324. Gordon S. Wood, Democracy and the American Revolution, in DEMOCRAcY: THE
UNFINISHED JOURNEY 508 BC TO AD 1993, at 94-95 (John Dunn ed., 1992); see also
SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 46 (arguing that in the Revolutionary period the rejection

of aristocracy and monarchy by Americans was universal).
325. WooD, supra note 241, at 156-57.
326. COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 216, at 206.
327. WOOD, supra note 241, at 157.
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constitution builders of 1776 and 1777 located the bulk of power in
legislative bodies, at the expense of both courts and executives?"s
As Gordon Wood writes, "When Americans in 1776 spoke of keeping
the several parts of the government separate and distinct, they were
primarily thinking of insulating the judiciary and particularly the
legislature from executive manipulation."329 Wood summarizes the
Revolutionary-era state constitutions as follows:
The state constitutions of 1776 explicitly granted the
legislatures ... functions that in the English constitutional

tradition could in no way be justified as anything but
executive, such as the proroguing and adjourning of the
assembly, the declaring of war and peace, the conduct of
foreign relations, and in several cases the exclusive right of
pardon. In the judicial area the constitutions... [led] to a
heightened involvement of the legislatures in controlling the
courts and in deciding the personal affairs of their
constituents in private law judgments.33
Eight of the state constitutions written immediately following the
Declaration of Independence provided that the legislature would

328. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES, supra note 207, at 3; COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 216, at 207-08.
According to Shalhope, "in practice Americans employed the concept [of separation of
powers) only to protect the legislative and judicial branches from incursions by the
executive. More precisely, they lodged almost all power-executive, legislative and
judicial-in the legislature, the true embodiment of the people in the government."
SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 88. The new Revolutionary-period assemblies, observes
Morgan,
drafted constitutions that provided for an executive, for they grudgingly
recognized that they needed an executive of some kind. But they took care to
make him their own creature, giving him no veto power or any other powers that
might inhibit their own. The new governments would be run by representatives
...who knew their places as agents of the people who chose them.
MORGAN, supra note 240, at 245. Wood agrees: "[T]o the Americans in 1776 their
legislatures represented more than the supreme lawmaking authority in their new states.
They were as well the heirs to most of the prerogative powers taken away from the
governors by the Revolution." WOOD, supra note 241, at 162-63.
329. WOOD, supra note 241, at 157.
330. Id. at 155-56. Along similar lines Professor Shalhope writes:
The first essential step to protect the people was to remove all prerogative
powers from their governors. Pennsylvania went so far as to eliminate the
position altogether, and every other state stripped the governor's position of all
aspects of an independent magistracy. Most instituted annual elections for their
executive and limited the number of years one man could serve. No governors
were allowed to share in the lawmaking authority, and none had the exclusive
power of appointing judicial and executive positions. American governors came
to be viewed solely as repositories of the executive functions of government.
SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 87-88.
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Many of the constitutions afforded
choose the executive.33 1
32 Pennsylvania went so far as to
a
one-year
term
executives only
eliminate the unitary executive altogether, and instead created an
executive counsel of twelve members chosen by popular election.33
In Virginia and many other states judges were selected by the

legislature, and served at their pleasure.3"

Further, once the state

constitutions of 1776 and 1777 were in place, "the State legislatures
business, including that
soon meddled in every type of government
335
normally reserved to the judiciary.,
While the embrace of legislative supremacy in the state
constitutions of 1776 and 1777 was a reaction against powerful
colonial executives, it was also a function of the era's widely held
assumptions regarding legislative assemblies. At the time of the
Revolution, Americans viewed legislatures that mirrored the people
as the very definition of good government. According to Wood,

331. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. VII, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 273, 274; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. II, reprintedin 1
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 377, 378; MD. CONST. of 1776,
art. XXV, reprintedin 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 817,
824; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VII, reprintedin 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 214, at 1310, 1312; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XV, reprintedin 2 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1409, 1412; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19, reprinted
in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1540,1544-45; S.C. CONST.
of 1776, art. HI, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at
1615, 1617; VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 214, at 1910, 1910; see also CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214 (reprinting the
above constitutions); SOURCES, supra note 214 (same).
332. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. II, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 377, 378; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art.
II, reprintedin 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 956, 964; N.H.
CONST. of 1784, pt. II, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
214, at 1280, 1283, 1287; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VII, reprintedin 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1310, 1312; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XV, reprintedin
2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1409, 1412; PA. CONST. of
1776, § 19, reprintedin 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1540,
1544-45; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XVII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1857, 1860, 1862; VA. CONST. of 1776, reprintedin 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1910, 1910; BEITZINGER, supra
note 207, at 176; see also CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214 (reprinting the above
constitutions); SOURCES, supra note 214 (same).
333. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1540, 1544; CONKIN, supra note 294, at 1544; Matthew
J. Herrington, PopularSovereignty in Pennsylvania, 67 TEMPLE L.REv. 575, 588 (1994).
334. See, e.g., VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1910, 1911; see also CONKIN, supra note 294, at 1911
(discussing the subject).
335. VILE, supra note 300, at 143 (citing Corwin, supra note 307, at 514-15).
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In 1776 the Revolutionaries had placed great confidence in
the ability of the state legislatures to promote the public
good and protect the people's liberties.
In their
Revolutionary state constitutions written in 1776-77
Americans had greatly increased the size of the state
legislatures, had made them more representative of the
people than the colonial assemblies had been, and had
granted enormous power to them.336
(b) Separation of Powers at the Time of the Founding
The state constitutions of 1776 and 1777 reflected two main,
widely held, Revolutionary-era themes. First, while they embraced
separation of powers, they avoided checks and balances. 337 Second,
and related to the populist form of popular sovereignty in vogue at
the time, the Revolutionary-era state constitutions reflected the belief
that legislative supremacy was necessary for good government.
Within eleven years, however, the thinking of Americans had radically
changed. Rather than rejecting checks and balances, Americans came
to see overlapping powers as central to controlling their
agent/government; rather than embracing legislative supremacy, they
came to believe that governmental power ought to be evenly
dispersed between three coequal or peer branches. By the latter half
of the 1780s James Winthrop's view that "[i]t is now generally
understood, that it is for the security of the people, that the powers
of the government should be lodged in different branches" was most
common? 38 Likewise, in contrast to the thinking of 1776, Madison
argued in 1788 that
"it is evident that each department should have
339
a will of its own.,
The shift in separation of powers theory between the Revolution
and the Founding was a direct result of the problems that Americans
experienced with powerful, unchecked, populist legislatures created by
the Revolutionary-era state constitutions.3"
Having embraced

336. WOOD, supra note 239, at 14-15.
337. See supra notes 311-24 and accompanying text.
338. "Agrippa"[James Winthrop]XVII, Amend the Articles of ConfederationorAmend
the Constitution? Fourteen Conditions for Accepting the Constitution, MASS. GAZETTE,
Feb. 5, 1788, reprintedin THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 228, pt. 2, at
155, 156.
339. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also Simeon Baldwin, Oration at New Haven (1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 228, pt. 2, at 514, 521-22 (explaining the logistics and the
benefits of separation of powers).
340. See supra notes 239-54 and accompanying text.
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legislative supremacy and a separation of powers theory "almost
unalloyed with any checks or balances,"34' Americans soon came to
see that powerful legislatures could be as problematic as the powerful
executives had been in the colonial days. Wood writes, "In the years
after 1776 the state legislatures did not live up to the Revolutionaries'
initial expectations.... [F]actional interests were now demanding and
getting protection and satisfaction from state legislatures that were
342
elected annually ... by the broadest electorates in the world."

Legislatures once revered as the people's agents and as the protectors
of public welfare were increasingly viewed as the problem rather than
the solution. In 1784, for example, James Iredell, then Attorney
General of North Carolina, called the products of the state's
legislature" 'the vilest collection of trash ever formed by a legislative
body.' ""' Henry Knox, in advising Rufus King, a delegate to the

federal Constitutional Convention, wrote "The vile State governments
are the sources of pollution, which will contaminate the American
name for ages.... Smite them, smite them in the name of God and
the people." 3" In both Vermont and Pennsylvania the Councils of
Censors charged their respective state legislatures with encroachment
upon the executive and judicial functions, including hearing private
cases and overturning court judgments.345 The Pennsylvania Council
of Censors wrote, "The assumption of the judicial and executive, into
the hands of the legislative branch, doth as certainly produce instances
of bad government as any other unwarrantable accumulation of
authority. 3 And Vermont's Council charged the state legislature
with "becoming a court of chancery in all cases over £4000, interfering
in causes between parties, reversing court judgments, staying
executions after judgments, and even prohibiting court actions in
matters pertaining to land titles or private contracts involving bonds
or debts, consequently stopping nine-tenths of all causes in the
state."347 Against this backdrop, in arguing for the proposed
Constitution in 1788, Hamilton rhetorically asked, "To what purpose
separate the executive or the judiciary from the legislative, if both the

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

VILE, supra note 300, at 144.
WOOD, supra note 239, at 15.
WOOD, supra note 241, at 406.
WOOD, supra note 239, at 19.
WOOD, supra note 241, at 407-08.
L at 408.
Ia at 407.
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executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute
devotion of the legislative?" '
While in 1776 Americans reacted against powerful executives
in the Colonial period, by the 1780s Americans began to react against
powerful state legislatures created by the Revolutionary-era
constitutions. Some argued that legislatures ought to be made even
more populist and reflective of the people. 49 Even as late as the
1780s the idea lingered that American society possessed a fundamental unity of interests. The tide of the times, however, was against such
sentiments. The more common theme was a recognition of factions
in American society, which populist governments dominated by
legislative bodies only magnified."'
The changing American attitudes towards powerful populist
legislatures inevitably brought changes in constitutional theory.
Indeed,
the ink on the Revolutionary constitutions of 1776 was
scarcely dry before defects were appearing and reforms were
being proposed. Within even a few months some of those
states which had delayed their constitution-making were
beginning to entertain doubts about the capacity of their
people to maintain extremely popular governments.35
New York's constitution of 1777, which was less populist than the
other state constitutions of the Revolutionary period, foreshadowed
what would become the mainstream constitutional theory a decade
later.3 52 Less enamored with democratic radicalism than other states
at the time of the Revolution, New York's constitution makers in
1777 were "[t]orn in two directions-between the inherited dread of
'
magisterial despotism and a fear of popular disorder."353
As a
result, New York's 1777 constitution created a stronger senate than
did other state constitutions, and a governor elected by the people for
a three-year term, rather than by the legislature for a one-year term.

348. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
349. WOOD, supra note 241, at 409-10.
350. Id
351. Id. at 431.
352. Professor Lutz argues that the state constitutions came in two "waves." The first
wave "took place within a year after the writing of the Declaration of Independence,"
while "[t]he first constitution in the second wave was the New York Constitution of 1777."
LuTrz, supra note 236, at 44-45. The constitutions of the first wave exhibit the political and
constitutional theory of the Revolution, while those at the beginning of the second wave
tend toward the political and constitutional theory that would evolve in the 1780s.
353. WOOD, supra note 241, at 433.
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Three years later, in 1780, Massachusetts passed its first constitution
since the Revolution's beginning. Even more so than New York's, the

new Massachusetts Constitution moved toward a more equal balance
between the three branches of government than had been common in
earlier state constitutions. The popularly elected executive under the
Massachusetts document held the veto power, and thus was more
powerful than executives of other states at the tine."

The Mas-

sachusetts Constitution of 1780 represents a fundamental shift in
American constitutional theory,355 which later manifested itself in
the rewriting of several state Revolutionary-era constitutions. In 1784,
New Hampshire, for example, rewrote its Revolutionary constitution
to enhance the power of its executive at the expense of the legis-

lature." 6 The period between 1784 and 1792 saw a total of five
other states-Delaware, Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and

Vermont-amend their constitutions along similar lines.

7

In short, where legislative supremacy was a main theme of the

1776-77 state constitutions,3 58 by the middle of the 1780s legislative
supremacy was dead. So too was the "unalloyed" version of
separation of powers.

9

Having experienced the operation of

governments with few checks and balances, American constitution
builders began to see the virtues of separate but overlapping powers.

Whereas checks and balances previously had been seen as too close

354. Id. at 434.

355. See

SHALHOPE,

supra note 206, at 98-99 (arguing that the Massachusetts

Constitution of 1780 was a model for reforming the perceived problems with the legislature
that dominated Revolutionary period state constitutions).
356. See N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1280, 1283, 1287-96.
357. See DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 278, 281-83; GA. CONST. of 1789, art. II, §§ 5-10,
reprintedin 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 384, 385-86; PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. II, reprintedin 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
214, at 1548, 1550-51; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. II, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1628, 1631; VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § XI, reprinted
in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrTUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1866, 1869, 1871; see also
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214 (reprinting the above constitutions); SOURCES, supranote
214 (same).
358. Professor Vile argues that "[u]nrestrained legislative supremacy was clearly not
intended" by those who framed Revolutionary constitutions. VILE, supra note 300, at 144.
While this may be true, it is also true that legislative supremacy was considered important
to good government. Certainly the state constitutions of the Revolutionary period did not
create government solely by legislatures, but the centrality of legislative power to the early
constitutions is unmistakable. See supra text accompanying notes 330-35. By 1787 this
centrality would vanish. See supra text accompanying notes 337-57.
359. VILE, supra note 300, at 153-54.
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to the mixed or balanced system employed in England, by the middle
1780s checks and balances was seen as vital to good government
rooted in popular sovereignty. Again, the New York Constitution of
1777 foreshadowed the constitutional theory that would emerge full
force in the 1780s. Along with increasing the power of the executive
at the expense of the legislature, the New York Constitution "showed
a definite movement away from the extreme position of the earlier
State constitutions towards some recognition of the need for checks
and balances." 3" The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 again
followed the lead of New York, and fully embraced "the new
philosophy of a system of separated powers which361depends upon
checks and balances for its effective operation .... .
By the time of the Philadelphia convention in the summer of
1787, then, separation of powers theory had clearly undergone
extreme transformations. In 1776, citizens revered populist legislatures reflective of the electorate and saw legislative supremacy as
vital to good government. Separation of powers meant protecting the
legislature from executive encroachments, and the theory of checks
and balances, in the popular view, robbed the people of their power.
In contrast, by 1787 populist legislatures were feared, legislative
supremacy was repudiated, the need to create a balance of power
between the three branches was acknowledged, and the necessity of
overlapping powers in any system with divided powers was recognized. By the time Madison penned his contributions to The
Federalist in 1787 he could persuasively argue that the "oracle"
Montesquieu's separation of powers theory "did not mean that these
departments [legislative, executive, judicial] ought to have no partial
36 and that
agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other,""
at 148.
360. lId.
361. Id.

362. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301-02 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
In FederalistNumber 47 Madison also cites the overlapping powers that operated in then
existing state constitutions. The first three constitutions he discusses-those of New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York-embraced overlapping powers more than other

state constitutions, and thus reflect the emerging constitutional theory of the 1780s. See
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, reprintedin 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 214, at 956, 960-69; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, reprintedin 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1280, 1283-90; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XVIIXXXIV, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1328,
1335-37; see also CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214 (reprinting the above constitutions);
SOURCES, supra note 214 (same). To the extent that the other state constitutions he
discusses-those of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia-employ overlapping powers, they do so by giving
the legislative branch substantial control over executive and judicial branches. See DEL.
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"unless these departments [legislative, executive, and judicial] be so
far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control
over the others ... a free government, can never in practice be duly
maintained."3" Because mere "parchment barriers" had proved
insufficient, under the separation of powers theory that emerged in
the 1780s the powers of each branch ought to be "connected and
' '364
blended as to give each a constitutional control over the others.
Professor Vile summarizes the shift in constitutional thinking on
separation of powers and checks and balances as follows:
[I]n revolutionary America there were those who adhered to
the pure doctrine of the separation of powers, accepting no
compromises with the old constitutional theory of checks
and balances.... As the Revolution progressed, however,
the extreme view of the pure separation of powers found
fewer adherents, and by the time of the Federal
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia some form of a
constitution of checks and balances was inevitable.... [T]he
idea of checks and balances, rejected at the height of
revolutionary fervour, was considered an essential
constitutional weapon to keep all branches of government,
and especially the legislature, within bounds.... The two
doctrines, drawn from different sources, and as a result of
the very conflict with each other, were now to become
interdependent, combined into a single, essentially American
doctrine, which still provides
the framework of political life
65
in the United States.?

CONST. of 1776, arts. 4-10, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 214, at 273, 274-75; GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 377; MD. CONST. of 1776, reprintedin 1 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 817; N.J. CONST. of 1776, arts. I-XII, reprinted
in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1310,1311-12; N.C. CONST.
of 1776, reprintedin 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1409; PA.
CONST. of 1776, reprintedin 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at
1540; S.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 214, at 1615; S.C. CONST. of 1778, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 214, at 1620; VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supranote 214, at 1910; see also CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
214 (reprinting the above constitutions); SOURCES, supra note 214 (same). Of this latter
group of states, only South Carolina had amended its Revolutionary-era constitution
before Madison penned FederalistNumber 47. Thus, these documents primarily reflect the
Revolutionary-era constitutional theory of legislative supremacy and a rejection of mixed
or balanced government.
363. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
364. Id
365. VILE, supra note 300, at 153-54.
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Changing ideas about separation of powers and checks and
balances were connected to changing ideas on popular sovereignty
and on the role of legislatures as agents of the people. As argued
above, popular sovereignty theory evolved between 1776 and
1787.11 During the Revolution citizens viewed legislative bodies,
especially lower houses, as the sole agents and representatives of the
people in government. By 1787, however, Americans realized that,
in practice, powerful populist legislatures had proved poor agents of
the people. They began to see all organs of their governmentsexecutive, upper legislative senates, and judiciary, as well as the lower
houses-as their agents. Since separation of powers was viewed as a
means toward the end of popular sovereignty-a government both by
and for the people-it should come as little surprise that it too was
transformed. 67 In 1776 the separation of powers theory's primary
use was to empower the legislative branches, and in particular lower
houses, at the expense of executives." The public viewed legislative supremacy as the correct formula for creating
agent/governments that worked for the good of the principal/people.
By 1787, however, citizens were using separation of powers theory to
argue against legislative supremacy, and in favor of a system of
balanced government where each branch would have "partial agency"
in the others. In the words of Professor Shalhope, "Once all branches
of the government-executive, judicial, and legislative-were
considered as separate and equal servants of the people, it made
that no single one should wield more power than any
perfect sense
9
other.

, 36

The Changing Institutional Role of Courts Between
1776 and 1787
How did the transformation of separation of powers theory affect
the institutional role of courts in the Revolutionary and Founding
3.

366. See supra part III.A.2.

367. Wood writes:
The assumption behind this remarkable elaboration and diffusion of the idea of
separation of powers was that all governmental power, whether in the hands of
governors, judges, senators, or representatives, was essentially indistinguishable;
that is, power in the hands of the people's "immediate representatives" in the
lower houses of the legislatures was basically no different, no less dangerous, than
power in the hands of governors, senators, and judges.
WOOD, supra note 241, at 453.
368. Id.at 449.
369. SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 99.
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periods? Under the separation of powers theory prevalent in the
Revolutionary era the courts were thought less central to government
than we are accustomed to today. Jefferson's opinion in 1776, which
captures the thinking of the day, was that the judge ought to be "a
mere machine," mechanically implementing the legislative will.37
Accordingly, the state constitutions of the Revolutionary era mainly
rendered the courts subordinate to, and dependent upon, legislative
bodies. Further, since the legislatures, but not the courts, were
thought the agents of the people, state courts of the Revolutionary
era were generally thought not to have the power of judicial
review.371 Some political tracts of the Revolutionary period even
went so far as to argue that judges ought to be popularly elected.37
On another front, many around the time of the Revolution pushed for
legislatively enacted codifications of judicially fashioned common law.
The aim was both to weed out what was perceived as unjust law, and
to locate law-making authority in popularly elected legislatures, rather
than unelected courts which could exercise substantial equitable
discretion when adjudicating common law principles. 73 In the
radically democratic Revolutionary period Americans were willing to
trust their legislative bodies to weed out unjust laws when making
codifications more than they were willing to trust unelected judges to
adjudicate with equity.374 Thus, in 1776 the anonymous writer of
The People The Best Governors argued that when courts adhere not
to the letter of the law, but instead "put such a construction on
matters, as they think most agreeable to the spirit and reason of the
law," judges "assume what is in fact the prerogative of the legislature,
for those, that made the laws ought to give them a meaning, when
they are doubtful."375 As Professor Lutz writes:
[T]he early state constitutions placed the courts under the
only other power available-the legislature. With the
exceptions of Maryland, which still permitted judges to be
appointed by the governor with the advice of his council,
370. WOOD, supra note 241, at 161.
371. ADAMS, supra note 272, at 269-70.
372. See, e.g., The People the Best Governors, supranote 322, reprintedin 1 AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 237, at 398 ("7Thly, that the freemen vote annually, in
their town meetings respectively, for the judges of the superior court, at large through the
government.").
373. WOOD, supra note 241, at 301.
374. Id.
375. The People the Best Governors, supra note 322, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 237, at 400. The anonymous author also suggested that
appeal from trial courts be directly to popularly elected legislative bodies. Id.
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and Pennsylvania, which gave, the executive a partial role,
the first wave of constitutions sought to make the judiciary
so dependent upon the legislature that judges would merely
work out the details of applying legislative will. Judges were
elected by the legislatures, dependent upon them for salary,
subject to impeachment by them, and often limited in their
tenure. American legislatures also had a habit of interfering
with the process of adjudication by amending court decisions
with statutory law. This was in keeping with their belief in
legislative supremacy and reflected, as well, a distrust of
judicial discretion. 76
By and large, however, Americans in 1776 were less concerned with
curtailing judicial power than with expanding legislative powers in
their new state governments. As Professor Wood writes: "At the
time of Independence, with the constitution makers absorbed in the
problems of curtailing gubernatorial authority and establishing
legislative supremacy the judiciary had been virtually ignored or
considered to be but an adjunct of feared magisterial power.""77
Thus, the subordinate role of courts under the separation of powers
theory of 1776 can be seen as more a function of the embrace of
legislative supremacy than of any particular vices Americans had
detected in their judicial institutions.
Experience with the legislative supremacy and the virtually
unalloyed separation of powers that characterized their
Revolutionary-era state constitutions brought about an evolution in
thinking on the institutional role of courts. While in 1776 the courts
were institutionally subordinated to legislatures, by 1787 their
institutional role became central in a separation of powers theory that
had evolved to incorporate courts as a coequal check on legislatures.37
As citizens came to believe that all branches of
government, and not merely the legislature, were agents of the
people, and that separation of powers required a balanced system of
overlapping powers, they pointed to the judiciary more often as a
check on legislative excesses. In Wood's words,
The growing mistrust of the legislative assemblies and the
new ideas rising out of the conception of the sovereignty of
the people were weakening legislative enactment as the basis
for law. The legislatures seemed to many to be simply
another kind of magistery, promulgating decrees to which
376. LuTrz, supra note 236, at 96.
377. WOOD, supra note 241, at 454.
378. Id.
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the collective people, . standing outside the entire
government, had never really given their full and unqualified
assent. Thus, all the acts of the legislature, it could now be
argued, were still "liable to examination by the Supreme
Judiciary, their servants for this purpose ....
While at the time of the Revolution the call for codification was
aimed at vesting law-creating authority in populist legislative bodies,
within a decade it became clear that statutorification coupled with
strict judicial construction led to arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
Rather than seeking to enhance legislative power by restricting the
equitable discretion of courts, by the 1780s Americans came to realize
that discretion in the hands of judges was necessary for just adAmericans of the period were learning the lesson
judications."
that no legislative body can foresee the novel circumstances to which
a statute may be applied, or envision the evolving context in which it
will operate. Given the reconsidered role of courts under an evolved
separation of powers theory, by 1788 Hamilton could argue that "the
courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority."38'
This short phrase of Hamilton's shows how much American
thinking on the relationship of legislatures and courts to each other
and towards the people had changed since 1776. Citizens at the time
of the Revolution saw legislative bodies as an embodiment of the
people, and the courts as agents of the legislatures. Hamilton,
however, here portrays the legislative body as an entity distinct and
apart from the people, and the courts as an agent of the people.
When the courts came between the legislature and the people in 1776
they were seen as usurping the legislative function. By 1788, however,
when they did the same they were viewed as keeping the legislature
within its prescribed bounds. Hamilton was arguing for the idea that
unelected federal courts could check a popularly elected Congress
through judicial review and nullify statutes in violation of the
Constitution. His arguments are a logical extension of both the
popular sovereignty and separation of powers theories that had
emerged by that date,3 and were palatable enough to be put forth
379. Id at 456 (citing PROVIDENcE GAzwrrE, May 12,1787); see LuTz, supranote 236,
at 97-98 ("Despite the direct consent through elections, the judiciary nonetheless came to
be viewed as embodying the will of the people.").
380. WOOD, supra note 241, at 303-04, 457.

381. Id at 462.
382. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
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in a widely circulated newspaper editorial aimed at demonstrating the
virtues of the proposed federal Constitution to the American people.
To be sure, arguments for judicial review stirred controversy even by
1788. But driven by fundamental shifts in popular sovereignty theory,
such arguments were the logical conclusion of the transformed
separation of powers theory of the late 1780s, and thus were all but
compelled to acceptance. Indeed, Hamilton was not the first to
publicly voice such arguments, for they had been made as early as
1784 by pamphleteer Tudor Tucker, and in 1786 by attorney James
Iredell in a North Carolina newspaper.
It was not only with an eye to protecting the people's foundational organic law, however, that courts were by 1788 seen as a
check on legislative bodies. The judiciary under the proposed
Constitution would also act as a check on Congress regarding statutory
law. As Hamilton wrote in FederalistNumber 78:
[I]t is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only
that the independence of the judges may be an essential
safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the
injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by
unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the
judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the
severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not
only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those
which may have been passed but it operates as a check upon
the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that
obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are to be
expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner
compelled, by the
very motives of the injustice.., to qualify
384
their attempts.
Hamilton's words from 1788 stand in sharp contrast to those of the
anonymous author of The People the Best Governors, who in 1776

383. Goldstein, supra note 237, at 64-66. By the 1790s, judicial review was no longer
controversial. Id at 66. Though the Supreme Court did not employ judicial review of
congressional statutes until 1803 in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), one
of the new government's first statutes, the Judiciary Act of 1789, explicitly recognized the
federal courts' power of judicial review over state legislative bodies. Further, the
comments of those at the federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 imply
that judicial review was by that date assumed to be within the purview of judicial power.
Finally, there is evidence that circuit courts may have exercised judicial review implicitly
prior to Marbury. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).
384. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).

1996]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

argued that a court that goes beyond strict adherence to the textual
legislative command usurps the legislative function as the sole author
of law.3" Indeed, changing views on the role of courts moved
beyond theory and into practice- Professor Shalhope argues that the
practices of the courts between the 1760s and the last decades of the
1700s changed dramatically.3 6 Around the time of the Revolution,
judges rarely took a functional or purposive approach to interpreting
legal principles. Instead they simply "discovered" existing legal
principles and applied them to the case at hand. Over the last
decades of the century, however, judges increasingly came to see the
legal process as one of creating, rather than just discovering, legal
principles. Judges, and not just legislatures, had become sources of
change in the legal landscape. By the time of the Founding judges
were becoming an independent force in the institutional structure of
good government.
On the new, more independent role of courts under the proposed
federal Constitution, James Wilson stated at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention, "personal liberty, and private property, depend
essentially upon the able and upright determinations of independent
judges."3" At the Virginia ratifying convention Edmund Randolph
stated that "If Congress wish to aggrandize themselves by oppressing
the people, the judiciary must first be corrupted!""38 At the same
convention John Marshall, who would later pen Marbury v. Madison,
asked "To what quarter will you look to the protection from an
infringement on the Constitution, if you will not give the power to the
3 9 In sharp contrast to the circumstances of a decade
judiciary?""
earlier, by the time the state ratifying conventions rolled around
Americans looked to the courts as protectors of their liberty and
welfare against oppressive legislative bodies.
In sum, the role of courts under separation of powers theory
shifted dramatically between 1776 and 1787. In 1776, the courts were
seen as subordinate to and dependent upon populist legislatures, and
even as an arm of the executive. By 1787, courts were viewed as
independent agents of the people, on the same plane as legislatures,
and indeed as necessary checks on legislative excesses. While in 1776
Jefferson could argue that the courts ought to act as "mere machines"

385. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
386. See SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 121.
387. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 231, at 480-81.
388. 3 id. at 205.
389. 3 klaat 554.
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mechanically applying the people's will as reflected by legislative
bodies, by 1787-89 Madison and Hamilton could argue for the
independent judiciary as a coequal check on Congress in the proposed
Constitution. Judicial review thus became a logical extension of the
constitutional theory that had evolved, and Hamilton could emphasize
that courts were a check in statutory cases as well as constitutional
matters.
4. Separation of Powers and the Honest Agent Conception
As Professor Aleinikoff tells us, the idea of legislative supremacy
is "deeply ingrained"; "the legislature did something back then, our
intuition tells us, and until they act again is it not up to the courts (or
any interpreter) to update the law. To update is to usurp the
legislature's job, to violate important notions of legislative supremacy
and separation of powers.... ." Indeed, these intuitions encapsulate
arguments marshalled by proponents of the honest agent conception.
Professor Aleinikoff states their reasoning as follows: "The model is
premised on legislative supremacy and separation of powers. In our
system of government, the legislature is assigned the chief law-making
responsibility; an interpreter's job is to be faithful to the legislative
will-as expressed in authoritative utterances called statutes-lest the
interpreter become law maker.""39 Thus, the honest agent conception is supported with the simple and intuitively acceptable idea that
the Constitution commits power to make law to the legislative branch,
to implement law to the executive branch, and to adjudicate law to
the judicial branch. By subordinating the third branch to the first,
and denying courts a legitimate role in the law creation process, the
honest agent conception, and the rules of statutory interpretation that
flow from it, operate to prevent the third branch from encroaching
onto the constitutional territory of the first branch. This simple
model of separation of powers is often buttressed with notions of
Congress's democratic legitimacy. As Professor Sunstein states: "The
agency view is usually defended by a claim of legitimacy.... In a
democratic system, one with an electorally accountable legislature and
separated powers, it is usually thought impermissible for courts to
invoke considerations that cannot be traced to an authoritative textual
instrument."391 The idea, in other words, is that the Constitution
commits law-making power to Congress because Congress has

390. Aleinikoff, supra note 165, at 22.
391. SUNSTEIN, supra note 136, at 113.
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electoral legitimacy. To the extent the federal courts fail to conform
to the honest agent conception they usurp what is committed to an
elected branch and undermine democratic principles. Both the simple
model of separation of powers .and the idea that the Constitution
grants exclusive statutory law-creating power to the democratically
legitimate legislative branch should be familiar to even those who
have never heard them, for they seem connected with popular myths
about our system of government. The practicing lawyer, and indeed
the sitting judge, are (perhaps unwittingly) socialized to incorporate
these ideas into their background beliefs and assumptions about how
our government institutions work. Perhaps this explains why most
statutory interpretation theorists who explicitly or implicitly espouse
the honest agent conception fail to deeply investigate whether these
ideas comport with the ideas animating our federal constitutional
scheme.
Once we do probe deeply in this area, once we do question the
simple model of separation of powers, we find that the simple model
proves too simple. The honest agent conception fails to recognize the
animus of the separation of powers theory ratified onto the federal
Constitution. The separation of powers theory that appears in
Revolutionary-period state constitutions was typified by a simple
division of government powers, with much power allocated to the
legislative branch. Legislative supremacy over the other two branches
of government was viewed as a necessary ingredient in the organizational design of government rooted in popular sovereignty as
conceived in 1776. Checks and balances were rejected since partial
agency of the executive and judicial branches in the legislative branch
would divest governing authority from what was then viewed as the
sole agent of the people in government. By the time of the Founding,
however, separation of powers theory had shifted dramatically. The
aims of the separation of powers theory ratified into the federal
Constitution of 1787 were not only separate but also overlapping
government powers, a balanced distribution of powers between three
coequal or peer branches of government, and an explicit incorporation
of checks and balances. The branch of government most empowered
by this evolution in separation of powers theory was the judicial
branch. 92
The honest agent conception underlying textual and intentional
statutory interpretation is difficult to square with the particular

392. WOOD, supra note 241, at 453-54.
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separation of powers theory ratified into the federal Constitution in
the late 1780s. The honest agent conception posits the federal courts
as the subordinate agents of Congress which should simply carry out
the legislative command. Separation of powers theory by the late
1780s, however, had explicitly rejected the idea that governments
ought to be organized along the lines of legislative supremacy. Courts
were no longer subordinate agents of legislatures; they were coequals
or peers whose role, as Hamilton stated, should be "mitigating the
severity and confining the operation" of legislatively enacted
statutes.393 Rather than thinking it wise to locate a monopoly of lawcreating authority in legislative bodies, American constitution builders
of the late 1780s came to believe that courts ought to be afforded
discretion in shaping law, even statutory law.394 Thus, rather than
cohering with the separation of powers theory ratified into the federal
Constitution, the honest agent conception coheres with the separation
of powers theory ratified into the state constitutions of the
Revolutionary period. 95
The thinking of 1776, which is reflected in the state constitutions
of that time, was expressed by the author of The People The Best
Governors, who argued that when courts fail to adhere to the letter
of the law, but rather "put such a construction on matters, as they
think most agreeable to the spirit and reason of the law," they assume
"the prerogative of the legislature, for those, that made the laws ought
to give them a meaning, when they are doubtful. ' ' 39 6 This line of
393. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
at 465-70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
394. See id.,

395. While the evolution in separation of powers theory between 1776 and 1787 was
dramatic, the latter never came to be the mirror image of the former. In other words,
while courts were viewed as agents of legislatures in 1776, in 1787 legislatures clearly were
not considered the agents of courts. The reaction against the legislative supremacy of the

state constitutions written in the Revolutionary period never swung so far as to embrace
judicial supremacy. Thus, at the federal Constitutional Convention Madison argued that
courts ought not be given the power to overrule law created by the legislative branch, for
this "makes the Judiciary Department paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was
never intended and can never be proper." WOOD, supranote 241, at 304. That the courts
were never intended to be the superiors of legislative bodies should not obscure the fact
that by the late 1780s separation of powers theory had evolved to a point where the "mere
machine" model of courts that Jefferson had advocated in 1776 was rejected in favor of
a model in which courts exercise discretion as a coequal check on the legislative branch.
Jefferson, however, continued to hold his normative conception of the role of courts well
into the 1780s. See id.at 304 n.75.
396. The People the Best Governors, supra note 322, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 237, at 400. The anonymous author also suggested that
appeal from trial courts be directly to popularly elected legislative bodies. Id.
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argument sounds very much like the sort of rhetoric employed by
modern-day proponents of the honest agent conception. By the late
1780s, however, Americans had come to think of courts in a totally
different way. Under the separation of powers theory of the
Founding period, courts were considered checks on the legislature,
which, as Hamilton argued, ought to possess both powers of judicial
review, and equitable discretion when applying statutes.
C. Interpreting the Practical Implications of the Constitution's
Central Principles
The American Constitution is much more than a set of disaggregated rules. It is a reflection of bedrock political principles that
have a binding and limiting impact on the practices and institutional
structures of today's federal government. How should we discover
the meanings and implications of these bedrock political principles?
To begin, we must come to understand the intellectual and historical
developments which gave them life. Constitutional theory never
springs forth out of thin air. Rather, constitutional theory has a
lineage, a parentage, a genealogy from which it evolves, and like a
child, its mature incarnation cannot be fully understood without first
knowing something about its earlier developmental phases. This is
especially true for the unique forms of popular sovereignty and
separation of powers theories that emerged in the late 1780s, since the
versions of those theories never would have come into being had
Americans not first experienced government based on the very
different forms of popular sovereignty and separation of powers
theories employed in the Revolutionary period.397 Indeed, the
constitutional theory of the Founding period was a direct reaction to

397. As Professor Elazar has written:
Over the years, considerable attention has been given to the political theory
of the United States Constitution and its implications for American government
and politics. Studies of the document itself, the Constitutional Convention of
1787, the Federalist,Supreme Court interpretations, and executive and legislative
actions of constitutional import abound, as well they should. State constitutions,
however, have been studied almost exclusively from a reformist perspective ....
Relatively little attention has been given to the political theories and philosophic
assumptions underlying the fifty state constitutions and their colonial predecessors.... This slighting of state constitutional theory is ironic because the framers
of the federal Constitution were influenced by their experiences with their
respective state constitutions and the preexisting conceptions of constitutional
government in the original states.
ELAZAR, supra note 207, at 107-08.
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perceived failings of the constitutional theory of the Revolutionary
period.398
Often constitutional theorists who seek an original understanding
of the Constitution focus exclusively on events and writings from 1787
to 1789, from the Philadelphia convention to the Constitution's final
ratification.39 Much is missed by looking only toward the tail end
of the Founding period. The years from 1776 to 1789 witnessed
drastic transformations in the ways American constitution builders
conceived of both popular sovereignty and separation of powers
theories, and ignorance of these transformations results in only a
partial understanding of these foundational constitutional principles.
Because there is a definite relationship between the constitutional
theory of 1776-77 and the constitutional theory of 17 87 -89 ,"°
knowledge of Revolutionary-era popular sovereignty and separation
of powers theories yields a fuller comprehension of the distinctly
398. As Professor Shalhope points out, "[W]hen the Constitutional Convention
gathered in Philadelphia in 1787, it represented the culmination of reform efforts to curb
the democratic excesses of the state legislatures and to provide an institutional framework
that could safely accommodate the dynamic changes taking place within American
society." SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 100.
399. Professor Amar rightly points out that in seeking the original understandings of
the Constitution The Federalistis of paramount importance, as are the records of ratifying
conventions, while the debates in Philadelphia are of lesser importance. The former
sources more closely represent the thinking of the popular sovereign, while the latter
represent the thinking of those behind closed doors in Philadelphia. Akhil Reed Amar,
Our Forgotten Constitution: A BicentennialComment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 287-89 (1987).
400. In trying to understand American constitutional theory and political thought
during the Revolutionary period it is vital to look to the state constitutions, rather than
the Articles of Confederation. The states were where most of the political action, and
indeed political power, resided in the Revolutionary period, and for some time thereafter.
In Professor Shalhope's words:
For most Americans struggling to break free from oppressive centralized
authority, the creation of republican governments in the states became the whole
object of the Revolution itself. The richest and most provocative discussions of
constitutional principles and political theory--sovereignty, representation,
equality, the separation of powers,... -took place in the states.
SHALHOPE, supra note 206, at 87.
[The] first American constitutions have lost their primacy of place to the
Constitution of 1787/1788. Bicentennial patriotic rhetoric has often fused the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution into one all-engulfing
Revolutionary act. Yet the Constitution was not adopted in 1776. Before that
happened twelve critical years later, its authors and supporters, as well as its
critics, had often looked back on the diverse constitutions of the first hour ....
An attempt to reconstruct the political and social thought of the founders... can
hardly begin, therefore, with what we know of the proceedings of the Federal
Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, or with the defense of its work in The
Federalist.
ADAMS, supra note 272, at 4.
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different Founding-era versions of those theories. Knowledge of the
former, in other words, brings the latter into bas-relief, and the
contrasts between them brings a sharper image of both into focus.
Those who have looked only to the tail end of the eleven-year period
leading up to the Founding have missed unique features and contours
of the popular sovereignty and separation of powers theories of the
federal Constitution, and therefore have mistakenly argued or
assumed that the honest agent conception comports with
constitutional principles. The contrast between the Founding- and
Revolutionary-era versions of popular sovereignty theory reveals that
in 1787 popular sovereignty meant more than simply a government
created by the people and for the people, but also carried with it
definite normative ideas aboutthe institutionalstructureofgovernment.
Most important for our purposes, it meant that the federal courts
were to be considered agents of the people, rather than subordinate
agents of the legislative branch. Likewise, by ignoring the development of separation of powers theory in the eleven years following the
Revolution, some have missed the fact that by 1787 Americans sought
a balance of power between the three branches, an empowerment of
the judiciary, and an institutional structure of government aimed at
neutralizing excessive legislative prerogative in both statutory and
constitutional realms. In short, by looking only at the tail end of the
period leading up to the ratification of the Constitution, one risks
missing the subtle theoretical distinctions that reveal the incompatibility of current practices and institutional structures with
foundational constitutional principles. 41 To the limited extent that
statutory interpretation theorists have tried to justify the honest agent
conception with reference to constitutional principles, they have fallen
into this easy trap.
Beyond looking at the development of the Constitution's
fundamental principles, in discovering the meaning of popular
sovereignty and separation of powers theories, or any other
constitutional principle, one must look first to the sense of those who
ratified the Constitution-the people-and only second to the
401. A related problem is that many confuse ideas from the Revolutionary period with
those of the Founding period. As we have seen, the political science of these two periods
was markedly different, even to the point of the Founding's representing a rejection of
Revolutionary-period principles. Statutory interpretation theorists who have tried to justify
the honest agent conception have usually not been careful in distinguishing ideas of 1776
and the ideas of 1787-89. It is clearly the latter set of ideas, however, which was ratified
into the federal Constitution, and which therefore guides the structure and operation of
today's political institutions.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

thoughts and writings of those who attended the Philadelphia
convention. The founders may have written and proposed the
Constitution, but the people ratified it. Indeed, both Madison and
Jefferson believed that the meaning of the Constitution should be
sought in the "plain understanding of the people at the time of its
adoption."'
Sources such as The Federalist, which presented the
proposed Constitution to a wide public audience, better illuminate the
Constitution's basic principles than sources such as James Madison's
Convention Debates, which merely catalogs arguments made behind
closed doors by those who drafted and proposed the Constitution.
On the other hand, the thinking of the various founders can be
important to our understanding the Constitution, not because of the
founders' status as the Constitution's drafters, but rather because
many of the founders were political figures who both shaped and
reflected latent popular opinions of the day. They were, in a manner
of speaking, at the center of the storm between 1776 and 1789, and
therefore were uniquely situated to comprehend and chronicle the
shifting political theory of that tumultuous period. The founders are
not a source, but rather a conduit. Current and future generations
should look back to them not as deities whose words and thoughts
convey the Constitution's original meaning, but rather as time
capsules reporting on the precise nature of constitutional theory in the
Founding period. James Madison's writings and opinions, for
example, are important not because he was one of the Constitution's
prime drafters, but rather because he both participated in and
observed the changing political opinions and attitudes of Americans
between the time of the Revolution and the Founding. His writings,
and the writings of other important public figures of the time who
happen to also be among the Constitution's drafters, both document
and crystallize these shifting currents. As applied to statutory
interpretation, we should, for example, place great weight on
Hamilton's argument in The Federalistthat courts possess the power
to check congress at the statutory as well as constitutional level.
Why? Not because the private musings of a New York lawyer bind
us today, but rather because such musings were included in the most
widely read arguments in favor of the federal Constitution and
because they reflect the theory of government ratified by We the
People.

402. BERGER, supra note 238, at 120.
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In looking to the sense of the ratifiers at the time of the
Founding for an understanding of the Constitution, however, we
ought not take a micro-level approach. The argument presented here
is not that the ratifiers had some particular notion of, for example,
what rules and norms of statutory interpretation ought to govern the
federal courts. Whether or not Americans of 1787 contemplated such
an issue is entirely irrelevant. The inner thoughts of those who gave
us the Constitution, whether they be founders or ratifiers, regarding
such particularized operational level issues do not bind current and
future generations. What is enduring and binding in the Constitution
are the principles that are embodied in the document. What counts,
in other words, are not particular notions Americans of the day may
or may not have had about the way courts should interpret statutes,
but rather the then prevalent theories of what institutional forms
make for good government rooted in popular sovereignty, or how
power should be divided under separation of powers, and the
implications that these ideas have on current judicial interpretive
practices.
Like particularized ideas Americans may have held about
operational level issues, the practices at the time surrounding or
immediately following the Founding period are of little relevance in
discerning the meaning of the Constitution's fundamental principles.
The Constitution of 1789 was not an incrementalist document, but
rather a document which radically reconfigured the institutional
design of American government. The sweeping new institutional
structures set forth in the Constitution of 1789 were at the time
untested, and for the most part built without the benefit of a template
or blueprint borrowed from other earlier experiments in selfgovernance. Given the breadth of change, and the fact that American
constitution builders of the Founding period were sailing in uncharted
waters, we can hardly expect that the full meaning and practical
implications of the Constitution's foundational principles would have
been immediately apparent. Indeed, we should expect that practices
and structures inconsistent with the central ideas ratified into the
Constitution of 1789 would have persisted immediately following, and
even long after, its ratification. The Founding was the culmination of
a revolution and a period of great ideological change. Change is
usually not neat and orderly, but uneven, messy, and full of loose
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ends.'
It should not bother us, therefore, if the statutory
interpretation practices of the federal courts following ratification of
the Constitution did not differ significantly from those prior to
ratification, or if the practices in the federal courts of the day were
basically along the lines of the honest agent conception. Nor should
it come as a surprise if the founders, political thinkers of the day, and
the American people did not fully realize the implications that the
novel institutional designs embedded in their updated constitutional
theories would have on operational level issues such as statutory
interpretation. It is the ideas embodied in the Constitution, and not
the practices of Americans following ratification, which endure and
continue to govern. Though uneven, there was a definite shift in
American attitudes on the ideal institutional structure of their
governments during this eleven-year period leading up to the
Philadelphia convention. Popular sovereignty and separation of
powers meant something very different in 1787-89 when the federal
Constitution was ratified than in 1776 when the Revolutionary-era
state constitutions were ratified. In trying to understand the meaning
of the federal Constitution and its current operational level
implications, it would be foolish to ignore these differences. We
today are in the final analysis, governed by the principles ratified into
the federal Constitution of 1789 and not by the principles of the
Pennsylvania, Virginia, or Vermont constitutions of 1776-77. The
popular sovereignty and separation of powers theories of the federal
Constitution of 1789 are entirely different animals than the popular
sovereignty and separation of powers theories of the state
constitutions of 1776-77. Only after highlighting these differences can
we clearly see the incompatibility between the honest agent conception and the latter incarnations of popular sovereignty and separation
of powers theories.
IV. AFTER THE HONEST AGENT CONCEPTION
Part HI demonstrated a fundamental incompatibility between the
honest agent conception, and the popular sovereignty and separation
of powers theories of the federal Constitution. The honest agent

403. In discussing changing attitudes toward whether or not legislatures ought to ratify
constitutions, for example, Professor Lutz comments as follows: "Like many developments
in America at that time the process was fitful, indirect, and often unconscious. There were
so many competing ideas involving so many people that the development could hardly be
viewed as being directed by some commonly held architectonic plan. Nevertheless, the
end result was theoretically coherent." LUTZ, supra note 236, at 79.
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conception misconceives both the relationship between the federal
courts, Congress, and the people, and the institutional roles and
divisions between the first and third branches. Rather than subordinate agents of Congress, the proper institutional role of the federal
courts is that of agents of the people. Instead of supposing an
impenetrable wall of separation between congressional and judicial
roles, the federal courts must recognize a balanced but overlapping
allocation of statutory law-shaping powers between the first and third
branches, which allows for checks between two peer branches of
government. Rather than asking "Which interpretation is the one
that the enacting Congress commanded or intended?", as the honest
agent conception counsels, when interpreting statutes federal courts
should ask "Which plausible interpretation is most public-regarding?"
Section A of this Part examines the extent to which existing
statutory interpretation theories, despite the fact that they are usually
rooted in the honest agent conception, might be compatible with the
idea that the federal courts should concern themselves with shaping
statutes along public-regarding lines. Briefly, courts operating under
any single textual, intentional, or dynamic interpretive approach are
constrained in their ability to shape statutes. Only by dishonestly
and/or strategically employing existing interpretive approaches can a
court shape statutory law. When a court does resort to "subterfuge"
in an effort to shape statutory law, however, existing textual,
intentional, and dynamic theories either afford a court unconstrained
discretion, or alternatively .guide judicial statute-shaping discretion in
ways not designed to result in a more public-regarding statutory
scheme. Section B of this Part introduces a two-step approach to
statutory interpretation aimed at both affording the federal courts the
ability to shape statutory law, and insuring that courts shape statutes
along public-regarding lines. Under the proposed two-step approach,
when faced with ambiguous statutes courts would use traditional tools
of statutory interpretation to determine the range of plausible
interpretations, and then engage in constrained statute-shaping aimed
at producing public-regarding statutory interpretations. The two-step
approach represents a first tentative step towards an interpretive
theory that is compatible with the proper institutional role of the
federal courts imbedded in the popular sovereignty and separation of
powers theories of the federal Constitution. The two-step approach,
in other words, is not intended to be a fully developed theory of
statutory interpretation, but instead is merely a preview of how an
interpretive approach consistent with our fundamental constitutional
principles might appear.
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A. Interpretation Theory Redux
Courts operating within the framework of honest agent
interpretive approaches can, in many cases, shape statutory law along
public-regarding lines. They can do so because when interpreting
statutes courts may employ a multitude of legitimate interpretive
methods and rules, each of which can lead to a unique interpretation
of the same open-textured statute.4 4 As will become clear,
however, a court using only a single interpretive approach rooted in
the honest agent conception is very limited in its ability to shape
statutory law in public-regarding ways. A court that strategically
404. Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993), is but one example of this
phenomenon. Another excellent example is found in United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d
1312 (7th Cir. 1990), affd sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1205 (1991). In Marshallthe defendants were convicted of distributing and selling
certain amounts of the illicit drug LSD. Id. at 1314-15. A federal statute set minimum and
maximum terms of imprisonment for selling illicit drugs based upon the weight of drugs
sold. IL at 1315 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v), (B)(v) (1988)). For most drugs the
weight includes not only the weight of the drug in its pure form, but also the weight of any
carrier medium with which the drug is cut. Id. at 1317. Unlike most illicit drugs, however,
LSD in its pure form weighs next to nothing. Id at 1331 (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating
that an average dose of LSD without its carrier weighs less than two millionths of an
ounce). The issue before the Seventh Circuit was whether the weight of blotter paper,
gelatin cubes, or sugar cubes-common LSD carriers-should be factored into the
minimum sentence calculation under the statute. ld. at 1315. If so, given that LSD alone
weighs almost nothing, the weight of the carrier medium alone would determine the weight
of the drug sold, and therefore determine the length and severity of the sentence under
the applicable statute. Id. at 1333 (Posner, J., dissenting).
The Seventh Circuit majority opinion, written by Judge Easterbrook, used a fourcorners textual approach and interpreted the sentencing statute to require that the weight
of LSD and its carrier medium be counted when calculating minimum and maximum
sentences. See id at 1314-20. Judge Easterbrook relied on the words of the statute, their
conventional meaning, and the statute's structure in reaching his conclusion. Id. at 1317.
Thus he concluded, "It is not possible to construe the words of § 841 to make the penalty
turn on the net weight of the drug rather than the gross weight of carrier and drug." Id.
at 1317.
The dissent, written by Judge Posner, employed an imaginative reconstruction
approach in support of an interpretation that would have eliminated the weight of the
carrier medium from the sentence calculation. See id at 1331-38 (Posner, J., dissenting).
The basic thrust of Judge Posner's argument is that Congress really did not understand
how LSD is sold or how little it weighs. See id. (Posner, J., dissenting). Based upon
mistaken assumptions regarding LSD, Congress treated it the same as other drugs, such
as heroin and cocaine, covered by the sentencing statute. See id. at 1334 (Posner, J.,
dissenting). Congress, however, did not intend the odd applications that the majority's
literal interpretation of the statute produces. See id. at 1337 (Posner, J., dissenting). Thus,
Posner argued, "The literal interpretation adopted by the majority is not inevitable. All
interpretation is contextual. The words of the statute.., will bear an interpretation that
distinguishes between the carrier vehicle of the illegal drug and the substance or mixture
containing a detectable amount of the drug." Id. at 1337 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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employs a variety of honest agent based interpretive approaches
enjoys greater leeway in shaping statutory law. Even here, however,
under certain conditions, statutory law is impervious to judicial
shaping along public-regarding lines. Only where a court dishonestly
applies interpretive approaches rooted in the honest agent conception
do its statute-shaping powers approach those required by a court
acting as a peer of Congress and an agent of the people. On the
other hand, a court which dishonestly applies honest agent-based
interpretive approaches is left relatively unconstrained in the way it
chooses to shape statutory law. The dishonest application of honest
agent-based interpretive approaches, in short, affords courts the ability
to shape statutory law, but offers no guarantee that they will shape it
in a public-regarding fashion. Dynamic theories limit and constrain
the judicial statute-shaping powers in various ways, and therefore
offer a partial solution to the problem of unchecked judicial statuteshaping power. Dynamic interpretive theories, however, constrain
judicial statute-shaping in ways that tend to result in an updated and
internally coherent body of statutory law, but not necessarily a more
public-regarding statutory law. The rules of dynamic interpretation,
after all, are designed with present-mindedness and internal
coherence, rather than public-regarding qualities, in mind. Of course,
like their textual and intentional counterparts, dynamic interpretive
theories do sometimes prevent ends-oriented courts from shaping
statutes along public-regarding lines, even if applied strategically.
In order to explain the limitations of existing interpretive
approaches we will examine a number of spatial game models, such
as the one depicted below in Figure W4
The game has two
players, Congress and a federal court. Congress moves first by
passing a statute, and the federal court moves second by interpreting
the statute. The game ends at this point with an interpretive outcome.'
405. Professors Eskridge, Ferejohn, and Weingast have employed similar game models
to explain court-legislature interaction previously. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 377-85 (1991);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523,
547-54 (1992); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitationof Statutes: StrategicStatutory
Interpretation,80 GEo. L.J. 565, 574-79 (1992).
406. In this model, and in models that follow, strategic aspects of the relationship
between Congress and the federal courts are ignored. In the models presented here the

factors contributing to statutory interpretation outcomes are the interpretive rules that
apply, the statute Congress passed, and whether the court chooses to honestly, dishonestly,
or strategically apply a given set of interpretation rules. The fact that Congress may react
to the court's statutory interpretations is not considered. Briefly, a court that wishes to
shape statutes in public-regarding ways might consider whether the interpretation it
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FIGURE #1
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The interval s' to s" in the model represents the range of plausible
statutory interpretations of some ambiguous statute, given the use of
traditional tools of statutory interpretation. When statutory terms are
completely free of ambiguity, s' = s". Point C' represents the most
likely intent of the enacting Congress, while point C" represents the
most natural reading of statutory text. Point FC represents what the
federal court interpreting the statute determines to be the most
public-regarding way to structure the statutory scheme, to which we

will refer as the public-regarding point. How the court goes about
determining the public-regarding point will be addressed later. For
now, suffice it to say that under the two-step approach advanced in
section B of this Part, the public-regarding point does not correspond
to the court's policy preference.
When faced with an ambiguous statute, the court must decide (1)
which interpretive approach to employ, (2) whether to employ it
honestly, and (3) whether to engage in strategic interpretation.4°

reaches would be overruled by Congress. Thus, even where the interpretive rules that
apply allow a court to reach a statutory interpretation that the court finds public-regarding,
recognizing that Congress could pass a statute overturning the interpretation, the court
might opt for some interpretation that is less than public-regarding, but impervious to
congressional override.
Such considerations, while important in other contexts, are not important here. The
purpose of the spatial models here is simply to illustrate the limitations different
interpretive theories place on judicial statute-shaping powers. For an empirical treatment
of congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretations, see Eskridge, supra
note 405. For game theoretical treatments of this phenomenon, see Eskridge & Ferejohn,
supra note 405, at 547-51; Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 405, at 574-82; John A.
Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L
REv. L.& ECON. 263 passim (1992).
407. A situation in which a court applies an interpretive approach in an honest fashion
is one in which a court both closely adheres to the rules of the interpretive approach and
makes a good faith effort to reach the interpretive outcomes that the interpretive approach
is designed to produce. Thus, a court that applies the four-corners approach in an honest
fashion uses the text, and only the text, of the statute in an effort to discover the legislative
command.
A court that dishonestly applies an interpretive approach, in contrast, may use the
language of the interpretive approach in the reasoning of an opinion justifying its
interpretive outcome, but will view the rules of interpretation as obstacles to be overcome.
Further, a court which dishonestly applies an interpretive approach makes no attempt to
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The outcome of the game depends upon several factors, including the
degree of statutory ambiguity, the interpretive approach the court
adopts (textual, intentional, or dynamic), and the tactics employed by
the federal court (honest, dishonest, or strategic). The models will
help to clarify the effects that different interpretive approaches and
different interpretive strategies have upon ultimate interpretive
outcomes, and to reveal the conditions under which existing statutory
interpretation theories are insufficient for courts acting as agents of
the people, rather than subordinate agents of Congress.
1. The Constraints of Textual Interpretive Approaches
Let us begin with the four-corners textual approach. Under the
four-corners approach the text and only the text is considered a
legitimate guide to the meaning of the legislative command, and the
In the
role of the court is simply to effectuate that command.
spatial model in Figure #2 below, the interval s' to s" represents the
range of plausible textual readings of an ambiguous statute given the
use of a four-corners interpretive approach, while point C represents
the most probable textual meaning. Points FC'and FC" represent
two different hypothetical public-regarding points. Since four-comers
textualism contains no rules to constrain the court in determining the
location of FC along the policy continuum, the court exercises
unconstrained policy discretion in determining the public-regarding
point.4 9
reach the interpretive outcomes that the interpretive approach is designed to produce.
A situation in which a court applies interpretive approaches strategically is one in
which the court chooses between more than one legitimate interpretive approach in an
effort to shape statutory meaning. A strategic court will employ a textual approach in one
case, an intentional approach in another, and a dynamic approach in a third, all in an
effort to shape statutory meanings. Different interpretive approaches result in different
conceptions of what constitutes a plausible interpretation of a given statute, and also in
different conceptions of what constitutes the most likely or most natural reading of
statutory meaning. Stated in terms of the spatial game model, different interpretive
approaches yield both different C points and different s points.
408. See supra part II.A.1.
409. There is, of course, no guarantee that a court exercising unconstrained policy
discretion will locate FC at a point that actually corresponds with a public-regarding way
to structure the statutory scheme. For the purposes of this hypothetical, and the
hypotheticals to follow, however, the assumption is that the court sets point FC at a point
along the policy continuum that represents the most public-regarding way to structure the
statutory scheme in question. The purpose of this hypothetical, and of those that follow,
is to demonstrate the limitations that textual, intentional, and dynamic interpretive
approaches place upon the judicial shaping of statutory law along public-regarding lines.
By assuming that point FC in the model represents the most public-regarding point along
the policy continuum, we will be able to see the circumstances under which different
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A court applying the four-corners approach in an honest fashion
would reach an interpretation corresponding with point C, since point
C represents the most probable textual meaning of the statute.
Further, a court honestly employing the four-corners textual approach
would be constrained from shaping the law to point FC', since point
FC' is a plausible (but strained) textual reading of the ambiguous
statute. In contrast, if the court chose to apply the four-corners
approach in a less than honest fashion, it could reach an
interpretation corresponding with point FC'. A court that dishonestly
applies the four-corners textual approach, however, could not reach
an interpretation corresponding with point FC", since point FC" lies
outside the range of plausible textual interpretations. On the other
hand, such a court could reach an interpretation corresponding with
point s", which is the interpretation closest to point FC" that is also
within the range of plausible statutory interpretations, s' to s".
A basic pattern emerges from the model in Figure #2. First,
when a court honestly applies an interpretive approach, it must reach
an interpretation corresponding with point C (here the most natural
reading of statutory meaning), and therefore can exercise no statuteshaping powers. Second, where a court dishonestly applies an
interpretive approach it can reach any interpretation within the range
of plausible interpretations (falling in the interval s' to s"), and
therefore can exercise limited statute-shaping powers. Finally, even
if the court applies an interpretive approach dishonestly, it cannot
shape the statute beyond the range of plausible readings of the
statute. Stated another way, dishonest application of a single textual
interpretive approach allows room for the judicial shaping of statutes
within the range of plausible textual interpretations.
While Figure #2 involves a four-corners textual interpretation
approach, the results are similar when we apply a textual-intentional
approach to the spatial game model. Under the textual-intentional
approach, when faced with statutory ambiguity the court seeks to

interpretive rules prevent a court from reaching a statutory interpretation which
corresponds to point FC.
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discover and apply the most probable congressional intent, but uses
text alone or almost exclusively to determine intent.4 10 Under such
an approach, points s' and s" in Figure #2 above would correspond to
the range of plausible congressional intentions given the use of
statutory text as the indicator of intent, while point C would represent
the most probable congressional intent as evidenced by statutory text.
A court honestly applying the textual-intentional approach would
reach an interpretation corresponding to the most probable congressional intent, point C, and therefore would be constrained from
shaping the statute along public-regarding lines to point FC'. If the
court chooses to apply textual-intentionalism dishonestly, however, it
could shape the statute to the meaning corresponding with point FC',
but could not reach the interpretation corresponding with point FC".
The basic pattern observed in the application of four-comers
textualism repeats itself in the application of textual-intentionalism.
An important difference between four-corners textualism and textual
intentionalism, however, is that in many cases the two will lead to
different sets of plausible readings of statutory text, and to different
versions of the most natural readings of statutory text. This was the
case in Smith v. United States,4" in which Justice O'Connor's fourcomers approach led to one reading of the sentencing statute,412
while Justice Scalia's textual-intentional approach led to a wholly
different reading of the statute.413
The fact that different versions of textualism can lead to both
different ranges of plausible statutory interpretations, and to different
versions of the most natural textual reading of a statute, presents
courts with the opportunity to deploy the two forms of textualism in
a strategic fashion. In short, by vacillating between the four-corners
and textual-intentional approaches a court can in many instances
expand its ability to shape statutory law. In Figure #3 below, the
interval f' to f" represents the range of plausible statutory
interpretations given the use of the four-corners textual approach,
with point Cf representing the best four-corners textual reading of the
ambiguous statute. The interval ti' to ti" represents the range of
plausible interpretations given the use of the textual-intentional
approach, with point Cti representing the most likely legislative intent
as evidenced by statutory text. As always, FC' and FC", the judicially

410.
411.
412.
413.

See supra part II.A.2.
113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
See id at 2053-59.
See idt at 2060-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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determined public-regarding points, represent hypothetical versions of
what the court finds to be the most public-regarding way to structure
the statutory scheme. Note that in this model Cti corresponds with
FC".
FIGURE #3
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The intervals f' to fP and ti' to ti" partially overlap at the interval
ti' to f". The disparity in the range of plausible interpretations
resulting from the use of four-corners textualism and textual
intentionalism is rooted in the difference between the discovery of
what the statute says (four-corners textualism) on the one hand,
versus the discovery of what the enacting Congress meant the statute
to say (textual-intentionalism) on the other hand. Under the
circumstances represented by the model, a court honestly applying the
four-corners approach would interpret the statute at point Cf, while
a court honestly applying a textual-intentional approach would
interpret the statute at point Cti. Further, a court dishonestly
applying the four-comers approach could choose to interpret the
statute at point FC', but not at point FC", since the former lies within
the range of plausible four-comers interpretations (i.e. interval f' to
f"), while the latter does not. The converse holds true for a court
dishonestly applying the textual-intentional approach: It could adopt
interpretation FC", but not interpretation FC'. A court willing to
deploy strategically four-comers and textual-intentional approaches,
however, could choose to interpret the statute at either point Cf or at
point Cti. If the court favors FC' as the most public-regarding way to
structure the statute, it would choose interpretation Cf, and would
couch its opinion in four-corners terminology. In contrast, if the court
favors point FC" as the most public-regarding, it would choose point
Cti, and its opinion would sound of the textual-intentional approach.
Finally, a court which is both dishonest and strategic could reach
interpretations that correspond with either point FC'or FC" or any
other points in the f to ti' interval.
In short, under the circumstances presented in the model in
Figure #3 above, so long as a court is willing to engage in the strategic
use of textual interpretation theories, it could, at least in theory,
subvert the aims of the honest agent conception and shape statutory
law along public-regarding lines. While in this particular case
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interpretation theories rooted in the honest agent conception do not
entirely foreclose a role for federal courts as shapers of statutory law
along public-regarding lines, the strategic use of interpretation
approaches is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it encourages the use of interpretation theories aimed at one end
(effectuating the honest agent conception) in order to reach an
entirely different end (the judicial shaping of statutes along publicregarding lines). While a public-regarding interpretation can be
reached, it is reached in a fashion that is not publicly and explicitly
stated in the court's reasoning. In such cases the interpretive method
becomes a subterfuge for judicial statute-shaping. The problem is not
with judicial statute-shaping per se, but rather with the use of an
interpretation method as a deception. Second, and more importantly,
even if one is not bothered by the use of interpretation methods as a
subterfuge, the subterfuge works only under certain circumstances.
If we change the configuration of the spatial game model only slightly,
even courts willing to switch strategically between four-comers and
textual-intentional approaches will be impotent to shape statutes along
public-regarding lines.
The spatial game model in Figure #4 below illustrates the point.
As with the model in Figure #3 above, the interval f' to f" represents
the range of plausible statutory interpretations given the use of the
four-comers approach, while the interval ti' to ti" represents the range
of plausible statutory interpretations given the use of the textualintentional approach. In this model, however, the court's understanding of the most public-regarding way to structure the statutory
scheme lies outside the range of plausible interpretations given the use
of both four-corners and textual-intentional interpretive approaches,
or, in other words, FC' lies outside the interval f' to ti".
FIGURE #4
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Under these circumstances the best a court that strategically but
honestly 414 applies the two textual interpretive approaches can do,

414. To say that a court strategically but honestly applies different approaches to
statutory interpretation is to mean two things: First, the court chooses to apply the
interpretive approach which affords it the greatest opportunity to shape the statute along
the most public-regarding lines. Second, once the court has chosen the interpretive
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as far as shaping the law in a public-regarding way is concerned, is to
adopt a textual-intentional approach and interpret the statute at point
Cti. Point Cti, which corresponds to the most likely congressional
intent evidenced by statutory text, is closer to point FC', the publicregarding point, than is point Cf, the most natural four-corners textual
reading of the statute.
Even in playing this limited statute shaping role the court is
engaged in a subterfuge since its choice of interpretive approach is
driven by the desire to reach a certain interpretive outcome. By using
subterfuge the court is bending and distorting interpretive rules and
practices in an effort to shape the statute in a public-regarding way.
Though the outcome the court strives to reach in this hypothetical is
consistent with the popular sovereignty and separation of powers
theories of the federal Constitution, the use of subterfuge to achieve
it is troubling. Ideally, courts would apply a single approach to
statutory interpretation that would afford them a constrained and
channeled discretion to shape statutes in public-regarding ways
without a need to resort to strategic subterfuge.
2. The Constraints of Intentional Interpretive Approaches
Turning to intentional statutory interpretation theories, despite
the fact that they are thought to offer courts greater discretion and
less constraint than textual approaches, they too can, under certain
circumstances, stunt the judicial shaping of statutory law along publicregarding lines. In cases where a court chooses to apply law as
legislative intent,415 imaginative reconstruction,416 or the legal
process method,417 the analysis is essentially the same as when a court
chooses to apply either a four-corners or a textual-intentional
approach. In brief, where a court honestly applies any single
intentional approach, it will interpret the statute at the point
corresponding to the most probable version of legislative intent or
statutory purpose. Where a court dishonestly applies any one of the
three basic intentional approaches, it can bend statutory meaning, but
only within the range of plausible versions of legislative intent or
statutory purpose. In cases where the court's idea of the most publicregarding way to structure the statutory scheme lies beyond the range

approach that affords it the greatest opportunity to shape the statute in a public-regarding
fashion, the court applies that interpretive approach in an honest fashion.
415. See supra part II.B.1.
416. See supra part II.B.2.
417. See supra part II.B.3.
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of plausible versions of congressional intent or statutory purpose, the
best a court can do is to adopt the plausible interpretation closest to
the court's public-regarding ideal point. Finally, a court can expand
its statute-shaping powers by strategically employing intentional
methods of statutory interpretation. Even here, however, there will
be limits on the court's statute-shaping powers. Beyond these
generalities, subtle differences appear depending upon which of the
three basic forms of intentionalism-law as legislative intent,
imaginative reconstruction, or legal process purposivism-a court
chooses to apply.
Under the law as legislative intent approach the law is the intent
of the enacting Congress, while the statutory text is merely evidence
of congressional intent counting no more than other evidence of
intent, such as floor debates or legislative committee reports.418 Of
the three main intentional interpretive approaches, law as legislative
intent offers courts the least interpretive discretion.
Unlike
imaginative reconstruction or legal process purposivism, under law as
legislative intent the court is seeking something that at least in theory
exists-the actual intent of the enacting Congress. In this way law as
legislative intent parallels the four-corners textual approach. While
the four-corers approach is aimed at discovering the actual legislative
command, law as legislative intent is aimed at discovering the actual
congressional will.
In the spatial game model displayed in Figure #5 below, the
interval s' to s" represents the range of plausible interpretations of
actual legislative intent regarding some ambiguous statute. Point C
represents the most probable actual congressional intent. Points FC'
and FC" represent hypothetical judicially determined public-regarding
points.
FIGURE #5
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A court honestly applying the law as legislative intent approach would
adopt an interpretation corresponding with point C, the most
probable version of legislative intent. A less than honest court could
adopt an interpretation corresponding to point FC', but not one

418. See supra part II.B.1.
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corresponding to FC". If the court's ideal public-regarding point
corresponds to point FC", then a court dishonestly applying law as
legislative intent would reach an interpretation corresponding to point
s". Thus, where a court applies law as legislative intent dishonestly,
the court could reach any interpretation it found public-regarding
within the range of plausible versions of legislative intent (s' to s"), or
could adopt the plausible version of legislative intent closest to its
ideal public-regarding point (s").
Next consider the imaginative reconstruction approach, under
which courts seek first to discover the actual intent of the enacting
legislature, and second, where actual intents are ambiguous or
missing, to construct a legislative intent consistent with the basic
thrust of the elements of legislative intent that are clear." 9 Since
under imaginative reconstruction a court seeks to discover both
something that does not and never did exist (such as legislative intents
regarding cases never contemplated by the enacting legislature), as
well as actual legislative intents, courts utilizing this approach
generally enjoy greater interpretive discretion than courts applying the
law as legislative intent approach.
In the spatial game model in Figure #6 below, the interval s' to
s" represents the range of plausible interpretations of actual legislative
intent regarding some ambiguous statute. The intervals ir' to s' and
s" to ir" represent imaginative reconstructions of legislative intent, or
in other words the court's version of what the enacting Congress
would have intended had it thought of the novel issue at hand, or had
its actual intent been more clear. C' corresponds to the most
probable interpretation of actual legislative intents, while C"
corresponds to the most probable version of imaginatively
reconstructed legislative intents.
FIGURE #6
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A court applying imaginative reconstruction honestly would reach an
interpretation corresponding to C",420 whereas a court honestly
419. See supra part II.B.2.
420. Why would the court not reach an interpretation corresponding to point C'?
Because under the imaginative reconstruction approach a court applies the actual
legislative intent, here C', when actual legislative intent has addressed the issue before the
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applying law as legislative intent would reach an interpretation
corresponding to point C'. As always, when the court aims to apply
imaginative reconstruction honestly, there is no possibility of judicial
shaping of an ambiguous statute in public-regarding ways. When a
court applies imaginative reconstruction dishonestly, however, because
the range of plausible imaginatively reconstructed intents is a bit
larger than the range of actual intents, the opportunity for bending
statutory meanings is greater than under the law as legislative intent
approach. Stated another way, when the court finds that the most
public-regarding way to shape a statutory scheme lies within the range
of plausible imaginatively reconstructed legislative intentions (ir' to
ir"), but beyond the range of plausible actual intents (s' to s"), the
court applying the imaginative reconstruction approach dishonestly
could opt for an interpretation within the former range (ir' to ir"). A
court applying law as legislative intent dishonestly, however, could at
best opt for an interpretation at an extreme outer limit of the range
of plausible actual intents (s"). In the spatial game model displayed
in Figure #6 above, for example, where the court's ideal publicregarding point corresponds to point FC", which lies in the interval s"
to ir", and the court applies imaginative reconstruction in a dishonest
fashion, the court can opt for an interpretation corresponding to point
FC". But, if under the same circumstances the court opts to apply
dishonestly law as legislative intent, then a court with an ideal publicregarding point at FC" could at best reach an interpretation corresponding to point s", which represents the plausible actual intent
closest to point FC". Though in this limited circumstance the
dishonest application of imaginative reconstruction gives a court a
greater opportunity to shape statutory law than does the dishonest
application of law as legislative intent, there are certainly cases where
the law-shaping abilities of courts applying imaginative reconstruction
are proscribed. For example, when the court's ideal public-regarding
point lies beyond the range of plausible imaginatively reconstructed
legislative intentions-point FC' in Figure #6 above-the best the
court can do is reach the interpretation at the extreme outer limit of
plausible imaginatively reconstructed intents-point ir" in Figure #6
above.

court, and actual legislative intent is unambiguous. An assumption of the model is that
actual legislative intent is ambiguous. This assumption is incorporated in the model by the
space in the interval s' to s". If legislative intent were completely clear, s', s" and C' would
correspond to the same point in the model.
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The analysis of the Hart and Sacks legal process purposive
interpretation is essentially the'same as under the textual and
intentional approaches discussed above.421 A court applying the
purposive approach aims to interpret ambiguous statutory terms so as
to effectuate the statute's underlying purpose, as opposed to the
enacting legislature's intent.
In sum, when a court applies interpretive approaches rooted in
the honest agent conception, in many situations it will be constrained
from shaping statutes in public-regarding ways. First, when a court
honestly applies only one interpretive approach rooted in the honest
agent conception, no opportunity arises for judicial shaping of
statutory law. The court simply opts for the interpretation that is the
most probable legislative intent or the most natural reading of
statutory text. Second, when a court dishonestly applies a single
interpretive approach rooted in the honest agent conception, it is able
to shape statutory law within the confines of the reasonable
interpretations following from that interpretive approach. Finally, a
court may strategically apply any one of the several interpretive
approaches rooted in the honest agent conception. Following this
tactic may greatly enhance a court's ability to shape statutory law. In
other words, since interpretive outcomes often depend on interpretive
processes, and courts can freely choose from several different
interpretive processes, even when employing honest agent interpretive
methods courts can reach a wide range of interpretive outcomes. A
system in which courts strategically employ the variety of honest agent
interpretive methods as a subterfuge aimed at shaping statutory law
in public-regarding ways, however, is only a second best alternative.
Courts adopting this tactic strive toward worthy ends, but they do so
by questionable means. Much more importantly, however, the
strategic use of interpretive methods rooted in the honest agent
conception leaves the judicial statute-shaping function unconstrained
and unchanneled. Courts strategically and dishonestly employing
honest agent-style interpretive methods, in short, can set statutory
meanings at almost any point along a broad continuum.
3. The Constraints of Dynamic Interpretive Approaches
Though it is certainly possible for courts employing dynamic
interpretive approaches to bend private-regarding statutes toward
public-regarding meanings, as with textual and intentional approaches

421. See supra part II.B.3.
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rooted in the honest agent conception, there are cases in which the
use of any single dynamic method limits the ability of courts to shape
statutes in public-regarding ways. Consider first Professor Dworkin's
dynamic theory, under which Congress acts as the author of the initial
chapter in a chain novel, and courts interpreting the statute act as
authors of later chapters.4" When authoring chapters in the chain
novel, courts must strive to make the entire story a coherent whole,
or in other words, must write the current chapter in the story of a
statute along the trajectory set by earlier authors of the chain novel.
By making courts authors of later chapters in the chain novel of
statutory law, Dworkin's theory explicitly affords courts a role in the
shaping of statutes. Since under Dworkin's theory courts interpreting
statutes are constrained by the earlier chapters in the chain novel of
statutory law, however, the more chapters that have been written the
more constrained an interpreting court will be. Many interpretations
will cohere with a freshly minted statute, fewer with a statute that has
been interpreted by an administrative agency, and still fewer with a
statute that has been interpreted by an agency and several federal
district courts. As a statute grows older, and has been interpreted by
more agencies and courts, the range of interpretations that will make
a coherent whole out of earlier chapters in the statute's story shrinks.
Dworkin's argument suggests that only one unique interpretation may
cohere with a fully interpreted statute.4z If this is correct, then at
least for mature statutes, courts can have no role to play in shaping
statutory meaning. Rather, the role of a court is simply to discover
which single interpretation coheres with all of the previously authored
chapters in a statute's story.
The spatial model in Figure #7 below illustrates the point. In the
model, the interval c' to c" represents the range of interpretations that
cohere with a freshly minted but ambiguous statute. The interval a'
to a" represents the range of interpretations that cohere with the same
statute after it has been interpreted by an agency. The interval j' to
j" represents the range of interpretations that cohere with the same
statute after it has been interpreted by an agency and then by a
federal court. Finally, the point d* corresponds to the single
interpretation that coheres with the same statute after it has been
interpreted several times by federal courts. As always, FC' and FC"

422. See supra part II.C.1.
423. See Dworkin, supra note 113, at 541 n.6.
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correspond to hypothetical court-determined ideal public-regarding
points.
FIGURE #7
FC'

c'

FC"

a'

j' d* j" a"

Cif

Under the Dworkinian approach, a court faced with an ambiguous,
freshly minted statute could find any point within the interval c' to c",
such as FC', to be an interpretation that coheres with the statute.
After interpretation by an agency, however, a court seeking to shape
the statute along public-regarding lines could not reach an
interpretation corresponding with point FC', but instead would be
limited to at best reaching an interpretation corresponding to point a'.
Finally, after the statute has been interpreted by a handful of federal
courts, the court with an ideal public-regarding point at FC' would be
constrained to reaching an interpretation corresponding to point j'.
In short, as the stature matures, and is interpreted by more and more
actors, under the Dworkinian chain novel approach the ability of a
court to shape the statute diminishes. In cases in which a statute is
fully mature and has been interpreted several times over, its meaning
can crystallize or harden, leaving no room for judicial shaping along
public-regarding lines. Thus, under the chain novel approach to
statutory interpretation, judicial statute-shaping powers depends upon
how many times a statute has been interpreted by other relevant
actors.
The Calabresian common law method operates in almost exactly
the opposite fashion.424 Under the Calabresian interpretive system,
in cases in which a statute is freshly minted the statute-shaping powers
of the federal courts are usually very limited, but as a statute grows
older the statute-shaping powers of the federal courts tend to
increase. More specifically, when a statute is obsolete, in the sense
that it no longer fits the legal landscape and could no longer win
majoritarian support in the legislature, under the Calabresian
approach to statutory interpretation courts may treat the statute as it
would treat common law. That is, a court can either reshape the
statutory scheme, perhaps by altering or creating an exception to the
obsolete statute, or in extreme cases a court can simply discard the

424. See supra part II.C.3.
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statute altogether. Where statutes are not obsolete, however, a court
employing the Calabresian method would engage in traditional honest
agent-style statutory interpretation. Usually statutes will become
obsolete, in the Calabresian sense, as they grow old.4" Thus, under
the Calabresian common law method judicial statute-shaping powers
are positively correlated with the age of a statute, whereas under the
Dworkinian approach judicial statute-shaping powers are negatively
correlated with the age of a statute. The Calabresian interpretive
approach, in other words, constrains judicial statutory construction
powers precisely where the Dworkinian interpretive approach
maximizes it, and vice versa.
The spatial game model in Figure #8 below shows how the
Calabresian common law method constrains judicial discretion over
young statutes, but expands judicial discretion as the statute grows
older. The interval s' to s" represents the range of plausible statutory
interpretation given the use of traditional honest agent-style
interpretive methods. Point C represents the most likely intent of the
enacting legislature. Point FC represents a hypothetical judicially
determined public-regarding point.
FIGURE #8

FC

I

C

( I)

If the statute is not obsolete, a court implementing the Calabresian
common law method engages in traditional honest agent-style
interpretation, and would therefore reach an interpretation corresponding to point C. In such cases there is no room for judicial shaping
of the statute along public-regarding lines. Once the statute is
deemed obsolete, however, the court can shape the statute's meaning
to correspond with point s', reconstruct the statutory scheme to
correspond with point FC', or even discard the statute altogether. In

425. Since the majority coalitions that passed old statutes through Congress have long
since dissolved, most old statutes probably could not gain majoritarian support in Congress
today. Additionally, since the legal landscape may very well have changed considerably
in the decades since their initial passage, old statutes are not very likely to fit the current
legal landscape. Freshly minted statutes, on the other hand, are not very likely to be
obsolete in the Calabresian sense. Since the coalitions that passed recent statutes are still
intact, new statutes could probably again gain majoritarian support in Congress. Further,
though some new statutes are explicitly designed to alter the legal landscape, those that
are not have not been in place long enough for the legal landscape to change significantly.
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short, when (and only when) the statute becomes obsolete, a court
with ideal public-regarding point FC could shape the statute along
public-regarding lines.
Like Judge Calabresi's common law approach, Professor
Eskridge's dynamic theory of statutory interpretation affords courts
the ability to update statutory law under certain limited circumstances.426
Under Eskridge's theory the "evolutive" interpretive
perspective controls judicial interpretation of statutes only when an
applicable statute which does not specifically address the issue before
a court is coupled with either a decisive shift in the policy context, or
a decisive shift in public values. In all other cases-for example,
when statutory text specifically addresses the issue before the
court-the textual perspective, the historical perspective, or some
combination of the two guides the interpretive process. In other
words, when the text of a statute specifically addresses the issue
before the court, the court acts as the traditional honest agent of the
enacting Congress, and attempts to enforce either the legislative
command or legislative intent. Only in those cases "when the
statutory text is not clear and the original legislative expectations have
been overtaken by subsequent changes in society and law" can a court
engage in statute-shaping aimed at updating law, rather than
furthering the enacting legislature's command or will." 7
The limits Eskridge's approach places on judicial capabilities to
shape statutory law are represented in the spatial game model
depicted in Figure #9 below.
FIGURE #9
FC

I

C

( I)
SI

I"

The interval s' to s" represents the range of plausible statutory
interpretation given the use of traditional honest agent-style
interpretive methods, with point C representing the most likely intent
of the enacting legislature, and point FC representing a hypothetical

426. See supra part II.C.2.
427. Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1484. Eskridge's theory stands in contrast to the
Posnerian imaginative reconstruction approach to statutory interpretation, under which a
court faced with a statute that does not directly address the issue before the court tries to
interpret the statute along the lines of the enacting legislature's basic intent, goals, or
assumptions. See supra part II.B.2.
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judicially determined public-regarding point. In cases when statutory
text addresses the issue before a court, traditional honest agent-style
interpretation leads to an interpretation corresponding to point C, and
no room exists for judicial shaping of the statute along publicregarding lines. Only when the statute does not specifically address
the issue before the court, and a decisive shift in the social or legal
context has occurred, can a court shape statutory meaning.
It is important to note that even when shaping statutory meaning
under Eskridge's theory, as under the Dworkinian and Calabresian
approaches, the court may be limited in its ability to shape the statute
along public-regarding lines. Why? Because under all three
approaches the end goal of a court engaging in a statute-shaping
function is not the development of public-regarding law, but rather
the development of a coherent legal regime (under the Dworkinian
approach), 42 the weeding out of obsolete statutes (under the
Calabresian approach),429 or the updating of statutory law so that it
is consistent with current social and legal values (under the Eskridgian
approach).43 Thus, a court applying the evolutive perspective under
Eskridge's interpretive theory could not reach an interpretation
corresponding to point FC in the model (Figure #9) above if point FC
is not consistent with current social and legal values. In short, the
Eskridgian theory of statutory interpretation limits the ability of
courts to shape statutory law along public-regarding lines in two ways:
First, when statutes address the issues before a court, the court must
employ honest agent interpretive methods. Second, even when a
statute does not address the issues before a court, and the court can
therefore apply the evolutive perspective, the court can only shape the
statute along the lines of current social and legal values, rather than
along the lines of public-regarding values, which may very well be
different.
Turning finally to Professor Aleinikoff's synchronic coherence
interpretive approach, we once again encounter limits on the judicial
shaping of statutory law along public-regarding lines.43 ' Under
synchronic coherence courts interpreting statutes apply traditional
honest agent methods of statutory interpretation with a twist. The
twist is that courts use the probable intent, meanings, and background
assumptions associated with the currentlegislature rather than those
428.
429.
430.
431.

See supra part
See supra part
See supra part
See supra part

II.C.1.
II.C.3.
II.C.2.
II.C.4.
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of the enacting legislature in elucidating statutory meanings. The
theory is dynamic in that it results in statutory meanings that evolve
over time, rather than static meanings that solidify at the moment of
legislative enactment. The theory, however, is very similar to honest
agent interpretive approaches, with the main point of differentiation
being who counts as the principal. Under traditional honest agent
textual and intentional approaches to statutory interpretation, the
enacting legislature is the principal, and courts are their agents.
Under synchronic coherence, however, both the enacting legislature,
which provides the statutory material to be interpreted, and even
more so the current legislature, whose intentions and background
assumptions act as a refracting lens of statutory meaning, are properly
considered the principals. Though it results in evolving statutory
meanings over time, Aleinikoff's synchronic coherence theory
provides no room for the judicial shaping of statutory law along
public-regarding lines. Indeed, under synchronic coherence any
statute-shaping function of the courts involves merely the mechanical
application of current legislative intents, assumptions, beliefs, and
values to replace the intents, assumptions, beliefs, and values of the
enacting legislature. A court is not an active player in shaping
statutory meaning, but rather simply performs the task of infusing
statutes with a legislative "present-mindedness." Stated another way,
though Aleinikoff's approach results in evolving statutory meanings,
evolution results from changes in the composition of successive
legislatures, rather than a dialogue between the enacting Congress and
the federal courts, or a sense that the federal courts are agents of the
people rather than agents of the first branch.
Further, any evolution in statutory meanings resulting from a
judicial implementation of synchronic coherence would not lead to a
systematic conversion of private regarding statutes into publicregarding statutes. The same general factors that led to the initial
passage of private-regarding statutory law are likely to remain in
successive legislatures. This is not to say that the legislative coalition
that formed to pass a particular statute will be durable over successive
Congresses. To the contrary, given the difficulty of getting a bill over
the series of hurdles that constitute the legislative process, each of
which provides an opportunity for opponents to defeat it, such
winning coalitions are even more difficult to maintain than they are
to assemble. The point, however, is that the beliefs, assumptions, and
values of a current Congress are no more likely to be public-regarding
than those of a long retired enacting Congress. As with the
Calabresian and Eskridgian interpretive theories, synchronic
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coherence may very well lead to an updating of statutory law, but
does not necessarily lead to public-regarding statutory law.
In sum, existing theories of statutory interpretation, whether
textual, intentional, or dynamic, constrain the ability of courts to
shape statutory law in public-regarding ways. Different interpretive
approaches proscribe judicial statute-shaping under different structural
circumstances. When applied honestly, textual and intentional
theories afford no room for judicial statute-shaping along publicregarding lines. When courts apply these theories dishonestly and/or
strategically, they can, in a broad range of structural circumstances,
shape statutes along public-regarding lines.
Dishonest and strategic statutory interpretation, however, has at
least two problems: First, it results in a hidden decision procedure,
and leaves litigants uncertain of the true basis for judicial decisions.
Second, and more important, it provides no constrainton the way that
courts shape statutes. Stated simply, courts which dishonestly and/or
strategically apply existing interpretive methods as subterfuge possess
the power to shape statutes within a wide band of unconstrained
discretion. There is nothing to ensure that such courts will shape
statutes in public-regarding ways. Textual and intentional interpretive
approaches rooted in the honest agent conception are aimed at
constraining and guiding courts in the search for the legislative
command or intent; they, however, contain no elements designed to
constrain courts which opt to engage in judicial statute-shaping via
subterfuge. Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation do constrain
and guide, to one degree or another, the judicial statute-shaping
function. But the constraints on judicial statute-shaping they put forth
are aimed at ensuring that courts update statutory law, keep it in sync
with the shifting legal landscape, or maintain its coherence with past
decisions, rather than at ensuring that courts will shape statutes along
public-regarding lines.
The two-step interpretive approach offered in section B below
has two advantages over existing textual, intentional, and dynamic
approaches. First, and most important, because the two-step
approach offers courts a legitimate role in the shaping of statutes
along public-regarding lines, it is fully consistent with the popular
sovereignty and separation of powers theories of the federal
Constitution. It, in other words, offers the federal courts an explicit
and legitimate institutional role as an agent for the people, rather
then as a subordinate agent for Congress. Second, the two-step
approach is aimed at constraining courts in the shaping of statutes
along public-regarding lines, whereas textual, intentional, and dynamic
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approaches either offer little to constrain a court which chooses to
shape statutes, or limit the judicial statute-shaping function to
updating or coherence with the legal landscape.
B. Toward a Two-Step Theory of Statutory Interpretation
Under the honest agent conception the question foremost in the
mind of a judge when interpreting a statute, is "What did the enacting
Congress command or intend?"432 If, however, the federal courts
are to act as agents of the popular sovereign rather than as agents of
Congress, the question that should be first in the mind of a judge is,
"Which of the several plausible interpretations of this ambiguous
statute is the most public-regarding?" The spatial game model in
Figure #10 below illustrates the differing institutional roles for the
federal courts under the two normative conceptions.
FIGURE #10

(II
st

C' C"

)I
S
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i

The interval s' to s" represents the range of plausible interpretations
of some ambiguous statute, given the use of traditional tools of
statutory interpretation. Point C' represents the most likely intent of
the enacting Congress, while point C" represents the most natural
reading of statutory text. Point FC represents the federal court's
public-regarding point.
Assume that interpretive rules rooted in the honest agent
conception, under which the court aims to discover and enforce the
legislative command or intent,433 are part of the game. Under this
set of interpretive rules the federal court that honestly applies a given
interpretive method will reach for a statutory interpretation corresponding with either point C' or C". The court will reach for an
interpretation corresponding with point C' if textual rules apply, and
will opt for an interpretation corresponding with point C" if inten432. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
433. This is true so long as the court believes that intentional approaches to statutory

interpretation are the best way to effectuate the honest agent conception.

For the

purposes of this hypothetical, assume that the court adheres to an intentionalist approach
to statutory interpretation. The hypothetical is just as valid if it is assumed that the court
adheres to a textual approach to statutory interpretation. On this assumption the interval
s' to s" would represent the plausible textual readings of the statute, and point C would

represent the most natural textual reading of the statute.
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tional interpretive rules apply. Assume now that the court conceives
of its institutional role as an agent for the people, rather than as an
honest agent of Congress, and therefore views the shaping of
ambiguous statutory law along public-regarding lines, rather than
fidelity to the enacting Congress, as its fundamental goal. This shift
in institutional roles alters the interpretive rules of the game. At one
extreme a radical revisionary set of interpretive rules could apply to
the federal court, under which the court would simply interpret
ambiguous statutory provisions at point FC. Point FC, which in
Figure #10 above lies outside of the range of plausible interpretations
of the statute, represents what the court believes to434 be the most
public-regarding formulation of the statutory scheme.
Under a less dramatic set of interpretive rules, courts aiming to
shape statutory law in a public-regarding fashion would be constrained
to working within the bounds of plausible statutory interpretations, or
in other words within the range s' to s" in Figure #10 above. Under
this approach the federal court would reach an interpretation of the
ambiguous statute corresponding to point s", which is the point closest
to FC that is within the set of plausible interpretation of the ambiguous statute. This second set of interpretive rules affords both the
court and the enacting Congress a role in shaping the meaning of the
statute. Congress moves first by passing a statute. In areas in which
the statute is ambiguous, a range of "policy space"4 5 opens. Within
the policy space a federal court can shape the statute in the way
closest to its own notions (as opposed to the enacting Congress's
notions) of the most public-regarding way to structure the statutory
scheme.436
434. This approach, however, is just as much at odds with the popular sovereignty and
separation of powers theories of the federal Constitution as are interpretive approaches
rooted in the honest agent conception. The rejection of the honest agent conception as
incompatible with popular sovereignty and separation of powers theory in the federal
Constitution does not imply that the extreme opposite ought to be adopted. A radical
revisionary role for the federal courts would, in effect, virtually obviate the role of
Congress. When faced with a statutory case, a federal court operating under such a system
could totally ignore the statute and decide the case on its own lights. Congress's role
would be reduced to creating and replacing causes of action. The shape or form of those
causes, however, would be entirely judicially determined. This clearly is not in line with
constitutional principles.
435. Professors Schuck and Elliott coined the term policy space in reference to agency
statutory interpretation under the Chevron standard. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990
DUKE L.J. 984, 1024-25.

436. For now I leave to the side the issue of how a court should determine what the
most public-regarding way to shape a statutory scheme. Note, however, that under the
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Under this approach, statutory interpretation becomes a two-step
process, which involves both interpretive judgment and policy
discretion. In the first step the court uses traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, such as text, legislative history, and canons and
presumptions of construction, to determine the range of plausible
meanings to ambiguous statutory clauses. Here the court exercises
interpretive judgment, acting as an impartial observer attempting to
discover the range of plausible interpretations of the congressional
command and intent. In the second step of the interpretive process
the court engages in a policy-oriented analysis of the several plausible
interpretations of the statute. Here the court does not ask "what is
the most likely congressional intent or most natural textual reading of
the ambiguous statute?," as do courts operating under the institutional
assumptions expressed by the honest agent conception; nor does the
court simply reconfigure the statute without regard for congressional
intent or textual meaning, as courts operating under the extreme
radical revisionary approach outlined above might do. Instead, the
court's reasoning and analysis centers upon which of the several
plausible interpretations is the most public-regarding. If, as in Figure
#10 above, the court's analysis concludes that the most publicregarding statutory scheme lies outside the range of plausible
statutory interpretations, then the court chooses the plausible
interpretation closest to what it finds to be the most public-regarding
way to structure the statutory scheme.
In the first part of the two-step interpretive process the court
engages in statutory interpretation,but in the second phase the court
is actively engaged in statutory construction. The interpretation phase
takes advantage of courts' specialized expertise in discerning the
possible meanings of statutes, while the second phase offers the
advantages of the judicial process to the shaping of statutory law.
Unlike Congress, the federal courts are not beholden to electoral or
special interest constituencies, which can warp statutes into interestgroup-serving deals aimed at serving narrow constituencies carrying
disproportionate voices at the expense of broader public concerns.437
two-step interpretive approach offered here a court's conception of public regarding is not
the same as its own policy preferences. Instead, interpretive rules, canons, and
presumptions guide the judicial determination of what is and is not a public regarding

statutory scheme.
437. Political scientists have come to understand that attentive interest groups and
geographic interests influence the votes of members of Congress and the content of
statutes to a much greater extent than more diffuse, dispersed, and unorganized interests.
Rather than producing public-regarding legislation, these distortions in influence over the
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congressional product often yield legislation in the service of narrow interests.
Summarizing the current literature on Congress, Professor Elhauge writes:
According to this literature, the government cannot be trusted to regulate in the
public interest. Legislators are disproportionately influenced by organized
interest groups and thus enact legislation enabling those groups to exact
economic rents from others.
The defining theme of the interest group theory of lawmaking is its rejection of
the presumption that the government endeavors to further the public interest....
Legislators seek to maximize their chances of reelection. Voters and interest
groups seek to maximize their own well-being at the expense of others....
Voters and interest groups demand the regulatory results that benefit them, and
legislators.., supply regulatory results to the highest bidder. The results need
not further the public interest.
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More IntrusiveJudicialReview?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 32, 35 (1991). Professor Macey echoes Professor Elhauge's summary when
he writes:
According to the so-called interest group or economic theory of legislation,
market forces provide strong incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve
private rather than public interests, and hence statutes are supplied by lawmakers
to the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups. The
widespread acceptance of interest group theory has lead to suspicion about much
of what Congress does ....
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223,224 (1986). Similarly,
Professors Ferejohn and Weingast write:
The main claim of this modern literature is that members of Congress enjoy their
life in Washington and the powers and perquisites that go with it and that they
arrange their activities in order to ensure that they are able to retain their hold
on office. Congressional institutions and practices.., are, in this view, arranged
to suit the reelection needs of the members rather than the requirements of
rational and deliberate lawmaking.
It is no longer possible to assume that Congress is simply a deliberative
institution devoted wholly to determining the best course of public action and
putting it into statutory commands.... Rather, we must recognize that the
structure of the constitutional system confers significant incentives on legislators
to shirk their policy-making responsibilities in favor of electoral pursuits.
Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 405, at 565-66. Modern political science concurs with
the view of legislatures widely held at the time of the Founding: legislatures very often
fail to produce public-regarding statutes. As Professor Sunstein points out, "The problem
of faction has been a central concern of constitutional law and theory since the time of the
American Revolution." Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 29 (1985). Sunstein is of course correct, but it is worth noting that the
concern over factions has shifted since the time of the Founding. In the late 1780s
Madison was concerned most with the problems of a majority faction tyrannizing a
minority faction. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 48, and 51 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 9 (1956).
The modern learning on Congress, however, is more concerned with the undue influence
of narrow interest groups on the legislative product, or what Madison would term minority
tyranny. While Americans of the Founding period had practical experience with the limits
of legislative bodies as good agents of the people, political scientists in the last 30 years
have provided theoretical explanations of the mechanism that renders Congress an
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By introducing an explicit role in shaping statutory law for the federal
courts, the electorally independent third branch can shape statutes
serving narrow interests in public-regarding ways. The judicial
process is based on reasoned analysis, while the legislative process is
better characterized by political force and bargaining. Under the twostep interpretive process, political bargaining determines the
parameters of statutory policy, and in cases of ambiguity the reasoned
analysis of the judicial process works along public-regarding lines.
Further, affording courts a role in the shaping of statutes allows the
incorporation of information the enacting Congress could not have
accessed, such as how the statute functions in practice, changes in the
legal landscape, and changes in underlying social values.
Apart from and much more important than these prudential
concerns, the two-step approach to statutory interpretation, unlike
statutory interpretation theories rooted in the honest agent conception, is fully compatible with the popular sovereignty and separation
of powers theory of the federal Constitution. By affording courts an
institutional role in shaping statutory law along public-regarding lines,
the federal courts are transformed from agents of Congress into
agents of the people. Yet the first step of the interpretive process,
which constrains the range of the judicial policy discretion in the
second step, insures that the institutional role of Congress is not
emasculated or rendered superfluous. The two-step process, in short,
affords both the first and third branches separate but overlapping
roles in the making of statutory law. When authoring a statute
Congress checks the courts by setting the parameters of judicial
discretion; the courts check Congress by shaping ambiguous statutory
law within those parameters.. Finally, Congress may again check the
courts by revising or clarifying statutes. Each branch plays a distinctly
different institutional role but also operates as a peer or coequal
player in the statutory law-creating game. The two-step approach to
statutory interpretation represents a moderate option between the
honest agent conception at one extreme and the radical revisionary
approach at the other. While the honest agent conception renders the
federal courts subordinate agents of Congress, and the radical
revisionary interpretive approach renders the acts of Congress
impotent, the two-step approach to statutory interpretation allows

institution unlikely to produce public-regarding statutes.
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both Congress and the federal courts to act as agents of the people,
with neither subordinate to the other.
The two-step approach offered here is but an outline of what one
method of interpretation consistent with fundamental constitutional
principles might look like. A fully developed two-step approach,
however, would strictly channel and constrain judicial discretion at
two levels. At the first level, the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation serve as a governor on judicial discretion. Here the
courts seek to determine the range of plausible statutory
interpretations, and rules of statutory interpretation designed for
replicating the command or will of the enacting Congress are best
suited for this task. Though the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation can lead to multiple plausible interpretations of an
open-textured statute, they nevertheless place outer boundaries upon
the range of plausible interpretations even in cases of extreme
statutory ambiguity. While many plausible interpretations for a given
ambiguous statute may be reached, so too will many implausible
interpretations be ruled out. Further, Congress maintains the power
to pass precise statutory language aimed at narrowing the range of
plausible statutory interpretations, therefore limiting the ambit of
judicial discretion in the second part of the two-step interpretive
process. Of course Congress cannot foreclose judicial discretion
entirely. In some cases statutory ambiguity, and therefore a range of
plausible interpretation, are the result of legislative bargaining and an
effort to build the minimum winning legislative coalition needed to
pass a bill into law. Thus, throughout the course of the statutecreation process-approval by House and Senate committees,
approval by both chambers, changes in conference committee, and
chief executive signature-key players may demand compromise in
the form of the insertion of ambiguous statutory language or
undefined statutory standards.43 Even in cases in which a bill is
438. For example, passage of a bill advanced by liberals in Congress, which both sets

up a regulatory agency and sets forth statutory standards and requirements for the agency
to enforce, might require compromise with moderate conservatives in Congress, and with
a moderately conservative chief executive. Moderate conservatives in Congress might
demand ambiguous statutory language or undefined statutory standards, which would

afford the moderate conservative President leeway in interpreting and applying the
regulatory scheme. Statutes with extremely precise and clear meaning entrench and
crystallize an area of law. When an ambiguous bill fails to gain the requisite support at
different stages of the legislative process, the intentional introduction of statutory
ambiguity can work as a strategy for gaining the support of key players in the legislative
game. This sort of process may have been at work in the passage of Title VII. As is clear
from reading the Supreme Court opinions in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
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widely supported and can pass without much compromise, limits on
the time Congress can devote to drafting, the often unavoidable
imprecision of language, and the tendency of novel and unforeseen
cases to render ambiguous that which might at first glance seem clear,
mean that statutory ambiguity can never be fully eradicated. Finally,
there are often cases in which Congress cannot avoid the use of
imprecise statutory language or statutory standards. Some statutes by
their very nature necessitate the use of words such as "reasonable,"
"probative," or "practicable." Despite the fact that at least some
statutes will necessarily be ambiguous, however, the use of traditional
tools of statutory interpretation does place outer parameters on
judicial discretion in the first phase of the two-step statutory
interpretation process.
In the second phase of the two-step interpretive process, the
court constructs the ambiguous statute by deciding which of several
plausible interpretations is the most public-regarding, or in the
alternative by choosing the plausible interpretation closest to what the
court finds most public-regarding. Here too the federal courts must
be constrained. The two-step approach is incomplete without a set of
specific interpretive rules, canons, presumptions, and practices
designed to guide and constrain the judicial determination of what
constitutes public-regarding statutory law. Indeed, such a set of rules,
canons, and presumptions is by far the most important element of a
workable two-step approach. Merely affording courts the ability to
shape statutory law in public-regarding ways, as does the two-step
interpretive approach, does little to ensure that courts will in fact
utilize such power to shape statutes in public-regarding ways. To the
contrary, affording courts the legitimate power to shape statutes
without constraint and guidance would likely result in the very
opposite of public-regarding statutory schemes.
For this reason, a fully developed two-step approach must not
only give courts the ability to shape statutory law in public-regarding
ways, but also incorporate rules, presumptions, and canons designed
to constrain and guide the way courts define what constitutes publicregarding statutory law. Rather than affording a court free-ranging
discretion to define an ideal public-regarding point, a fully developed
two-step approach must limit judicial determination of pubic-regarding

(1979), the legislative floor debates reveal considerable confusion over whether the statute
allowed preferential hiring treatment of blacks at the expense of whites. See id. at 202-08;
id. at 231-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Whether Title VII could have been passed into
law had its meaning on this issue been crystal clear is an open question.
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points. As an example, a canon that statutory law that is stable over
time constitutes (all other things being equal) public-regarding
statutory law, might be incorporated into the second part of the twostep approach. A court applying the two-step approach would, among
other things, count the stability of a statutory scheme in locating its
ideal public-regarding point. Such a canon would tend to work
against changing a statutory regime. To provide another example, a
presumption that distributive statutory law entails widely dispersed
benefits, and narrowly concentrated costs, could be incorporated into
the two-step approach. Thus, unless the court can identify factors that
would override this presumption, a court would be required to locate
a public-regarding point which corresponds to widely dispersed
benefits and narrowly concentrated costs. To provide a third
example, the rules, canons, and presumptions constraining judicial
determination of public-regarding points might incorporate notions of
similar treatment for similarly situated parties. Ambiguous statutes
would be read, to the extent possible, as consistent in the application
to similarly situated parties. Or alternatively, ambiguous statutes
which could be read to apply only to particular classifications, would
be presumed to apply to all other similarly situated classifications.
These examples are simply meant to illustrate the methods that
could be employed in constraining judicial policy or statute-shaping
discretion in the second phase of the two-step approach. Such
constraints are absent from traditional textual and intentional
interpretive approaches rooted in the honest agent conception.
Courts strategically employing different textual and intentional
interpretive methods can, under the guise of honest agent-based
statutory interpretation, exercise broad but doctrinally illegitimate and
relatively unconstrained statute-shaping power. A fully developed
two-step approach to statutory interpretation, in contrast, would not
only explicitly afford courts a legitimate role in shaping statutory law
along public-regarding lines, but also channel or guide courts when
they seek to shape statutes. Consistent with the popular sovereignty
and separation of powers theories of the federal Constitution, the
two-step approach is based on a recognition that the federal courts
ought to play a role in the shaping of statutory law. That role,
however, is not one of unconstrained policy discretion, but rather of
channelled application of generally applicable rules, canons, and
presumptions aimed at infusing statutory law with a public-regarding
character. The rules, canons, and presumptions of judicial statutory
construction guiding courts in the second part of the two-step process,
unlike the rules, canons, and presumptions incorporated in honest
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agent approaches to statutory interpretation, must be designed with
the shaping of statutory law along public-regarding lines as a first
priority.
Of the three main approaches to statutory interpretationtextual, intentional, and dynamic-the two-step approach to statutory
interpretation fits most comfortably in the family of dynamic
interpretive theories. As with the two step approach, dynamic
theories presuppose a dialogic statutory law-creating game involving
Congress and the federal courts as active players. Further, while
textual and intentional interpretive approaches generally view
statutory law as static, or as a finished product upon passage by
Congress and signature by the Chief Executive, dynamic theories, like
the two-step approach, view statutes as mutable, fluid, unsettled, or
protean law.
The two-step approach, however, differs from other dynamic
theories in two important ways. First, dynamic theories are often
sensitive to the pervasive acceptance of the honest agent conception,
and therefore are presented as limited exceptions to honest agent
interpretation.43 The two-step approach, in contrast, is based upon
an unqualified rejection of the honest agent conception, and upon the
idea that judicial shaping of statutory law ought to be the legitimized
norm rather than the surreptitious exception. The second, and more
important, difference between the two-step approach and its dynamic
siblings is that the two-step approach is ultimately aimed at shaping
statutory law in public-regarding ways, while other dynamic theories
are aimed at shaping statutory law to maximize consistency with the
legal landscape, or at updating statutes to comport with changing
background assumptions. Under the Calabresian common law
method, for example, judicial shaping of statutory law takes place
when a statute can no longer gain majoritarian support and is out of
phase with the legal landscape,' 4 but not necessarily when the
statute is geared toward benefiting private interests at the expense of
the public good. Likewise, under Professor Eskridge's dynamic
theory, the evolutive perspective controls when statutory text and
intent are unclear and background assumptions have changed," but
439. Calabresi's common law method, for example, is to be employed only when a
statute is both out of phase with the legal landscape and can no longer gain majoritarian
support. See supra part II.C.3. Likewise, under Eskridge's quasi-dynamic approach,
dynamic elements are to be used only when statutory text and intent are unclear and
background assumptions have changed. See supra part II.C.2.
440. See supra notes 133-64 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
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not necessarily when the statute is private-regarding. The rules,
canons, and presumptions that guide judicial statute-shaping discretion
in the second phase of the two-step approach, in contrast, must be
specifically designed with shaping statutory law in public-regarding
ways as the central aim of the interpretive enterprise.
Most of the statutory interpretation rules employed in the federal
courts are based either explicitly or implicitly on the honest agent
conception, and therefore are ultimately aimed at rendering the
federal courts optimal agents of Congress. Theorists writing in the
honest agent tradition are concerned with issues such as: Which
interpretive rules are most likely to lead the federal courts to the
discovery of the legislative command or will? Which interpretive
rules will give the federal courts enough discretion that they can carry
out the will of the enacting legislature in unforeseen situations? What
is the optimal balance between the competing values of judicial
constraint and judicial discretion? The two-step approach differs from
these interpretive approaches in that it is built upon the idea that the
federal courts are agents of the people, rather than agents of
Congress. From this perspective, statutory interpretation theorists
ought to focus on developing a regime of interpretive rules and
practices that foster the shaping of statutory law in public-regarding
ways. The research agenda of statutory interpretation theorists should
focus on questions such as: What process should the federal courts
employ when deciding which possible statutory constructions are
public-regarding and which are not? How can judicial statute-shaping
discretion be channeled and constrained in a way that tends to result
in the shaping of statutory law along public-regarding lines? Could
canons and presumptions of construction work to guide courts in their
statutory law-shaping role? If so, what kinds of canons and
presumptions would work best? Would a broad-brush rebuttable
presumption that statutes are public-regarding work well, or should
more detailed presumptions be developed, such as presumptions that
certain classes of statutes are presumptively public-regarding? Could
rules of judicial interpretive deference enhance the law-shaping role
of courts? For example, though courts should generally be afforded
a statutory law-shaping role, should courts sometimes forgo that role
to improve the quality of statutory law? Should courts develop rules
of deference in cases where courts lack expertise in a certain area, or
where the nature of the judicial process is not amenable to addressing
certain policy issues, or where a particular policy area is for prudential
reasons best dealt with by other organs of government?
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All of these questions are at bottom questions of the institutional
design of government. The idea that statutory law is, and ought to
be, made and shaped by the different parts of government, with each
branch playing its own unique role, is consistent with institutional
structure embedded in the popular sovereignty and separation of
powers theory of the federal Constitution. The idea that Congress
ought to enjoy a monopoly on statute creation with the federal courts
as mere subordinate agents applying statutes in a mechanical fashion
is not. The challenge to statutory interpretation theorists is to
develop an approach to judicial statutory interpretation that (1)
affords the federal courts the power to shape statutory law in publicregarding ways, (2) does not vitiate the important role of Congress as
the initial author of statutes, and (3) channels and constrains the
policy or law-shaping discretion of federal courts, again with an eye
towards making the entire institutional process of statute creation and
shaping one that produces a public-regarding output.
The general framework of the two-step approach offered here
gives one tentative answer to the first two issues. The first step in the
process maintains a key role for Congress as the initial author of
statutes by affording Congress the power to tailor unambiguous and
precisely specified statutes. The second step in the process explicitly
gives the federal courts a power that they have often claimed by using
honest agent interpretation approaches as "subterfuge"-the power
to shape statutes in public-regarding ways within the boundaries of
permissible statutory interpretations. The next step comes in
developing rules of statutory construction which will constrain the
statutory law-shaping powers of federal courts operating under the
two-step approach. Here interpretation theorists must engage in the
familiar balancing between judicial discretion and judicial constraint,
but with an eye toward building an institutional structure that will
produce public-regarding statutory law, rather than with an eye
toward effectuating the honest agent conception. Interpretation
theorists ought to be focused on developing rules, presumption,
canons, and practices that will in some way systematize or routinize
the exercise of judicial statute-shaping powers.
The two-step approach offered here is both tentative and
incomplete. It is tentative because it is only one of many possible
ways to structure the statutory interpretation process consistent with
the popular sovereignty and separation of powers theories of the
federal Constitution. Just as there are several very different basic
approaches to effectuating the honest agent conception, so too will
there be many possible ways to give both Congress and the federal
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courts peer roles to play in the game of statute making and shaping.
The two-step interpretive approach is incomplete because it does not
yet include a set of rules of statutory construction aimed at
constraining judicial determinations of what constitutes publicregarding statutory law. The two-step approach is .i need of norms,
conventions, practices, rules, patterns, systems, routines, presumptions,
canons of construction-in short a rule-based institutional
framework-to serve as both constraints and guidelines in the process
of the judicial exercise of statute-shaping powers.
V.

CONCLUSION

The main thrust of this Article has been to demonstrate that the
honest agent conception-the normative institutional premise
underlying textual and intentional statutory interpretation theory-is
incompatible with the foundational constitutional theories of popular
sovereignty and separation of powers. Popular sovereignty is the
cornerstone of the federal Constitution, and separation of powers is
one of the central theoretical pillars resting on that cornerstone. For
too long statutory interpretation theory and practice have operated
under the misguided assumption that foundational constitutional
principles require the federal courts to act as subordinate honest
agents of Congress. As we have seen, however, the idea that the
proper institutional role of the federal courts is that of honest agents
of the first branch sounds more of the constitutional theory ratified
into the 1776-77 state constitutions than the entirely different
constitutional theory ratified into the federal Constitution. We cannot
ignore the meaning of the Founding, and the fact that American
constitutional theory evolved dramatically in the eleven years leading
up to the Philadelphia convention. In the Founding, the fountain of
legitimate political authority, the people, spoke in a time of special
constitutional transformation for purposes of altering the fundamental
political rules by which we live and our agent governors must abide.
No longer were our governments to be rooted in legislative
supremacy, and no longer were popularly elected assemblies to be
considered the sole agents of the people in government. Instead, we
were to have a government of three peer or coequal branches, with
overlapping powers, and ample checks. And we were to consider all
three branches of government as legitimate agents of the people.
The honest agent conception, and the rules of statutory
interpretation designed to effectuate it, fly in the face of these
bedrock political principles. Our goal now must be to begin the
process of building interpretive theories compatible with the popular
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sovereignty and separation of powers theories of the federal
Constitution. It is certainly true that the proper institutional role of
Congress is to make the laws. But it is also true that the proper
institutional role of the federal courts is to say what those laws mean.
According to the popular sovereignty and separation of powers
theories of our federal Constitution, the proper institutional role of
the federal courts is that of an independent branch of government
that operates as a check on Congress. Rather than a subordinate of
Congress, the judicial branch is a coequal or peer player in the statute
creation game. As a peer branch, the federal courts must take care
not to encroach upon the institutional role of Congress-that of
writing statutory law. As such, radically revisionary statutory
interpretation methods under which the federal courts are unconstrained in reshaping and reconfiguring statutory law are illconceived. Just as ill-conceived, however, is the notion that rules of
statutory interpretation ought to be designed with an eye towards
submitting the federal courts to some slavish subservience to the
command or intent of Congress. The federal courts are not the
mouthpiece of long-retired Congresses, but rather an independent
voice unto themselves who say what the law means. Rather than
honest agents of Congress, the federal courts must begin to see
themselves, and in fact conduct themselves, as the Constitution's
fundamental principles demand-as agents for the people.
Of course, pointing the direction is one thing, and getting there
is another. Our current set of commonly used interpretive theories,
and the rules that flow from them, are designed to effectuate the
honest agent conception, and therefore often inhibit judicial attempts
to shape statutes along public-regarding lines. The federal courts are
saddled with tools ill-suited for their proper institutional mission.
They need new interpretive theories and rules consistent with our
bedrock constitutional principles. They need a new theoretical
statutory interpretation superstructure to operate as a road map, and
they need new statutory interpretation rules to operate as a compass.
The challenge to statutory interpretation scholars and to thoughtful
judges is to provide that road map and compass.

